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ABSTRACT 
The theoretical foundations of the Post Keynesian view of money are examined, 
including the nature of money, role of uncertainty and time, and the use of 
equilibrium concepts. This provides a backdrop against which the Post 
Keynesian analysis of interest rates, investment behaviour: inflation and 
demand determination is presented in a framework of non-neutral money and 
Keynes' principle of effective demand. A model of the Post Keynesian theory of 
money is presented, with arguments as to why the IS/LM model of the 
neoclassical synthesis is considered deficient. The money supply endogeneity 
view is explored, together with Keynes' finance motive. The open economy 
case is considered, with emphasis on a small open economy. The monetary 
policy perspectives of the Post Keynesian camp are examined. The implications 
for South Africa are considered in respect of money supply targeting, interest 
rate policy, anti-inflation measures, public debt management, exchange rates 
and Reserve Bank objectives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although Keynes' General Theory (1936) introduced a new way of viewing the 
workings of a capitalist economy, many of the insights he developed became 
diluted in the neoclassical synthesis which became the orthodox economics of 
, 
textbooks in the 1950s, 1960s and beyond. The rise of monetarism in the 1960s 
and 1970s, based on the classical quantity theory, fed on the persistent 
inflationary tendencies exhibited by modern economies, especially since these 
occurred even in periods of slow economic growth. Mainstream Keynesianism 
did not seem to have a ready answer to the occurrence of stagflation, and 
monetarism was able to gain appeal with its relatively simple policy prescriptions 
of quantitative controls over monetary aggregates through imposition of growth 
rules. Although various writers (e.g. Kaldor, 1986) have shown that such 
monetarist prescriptions were not in fact implemented despite the outward 
support for monetarist principles by the authorities concerned (for instance in 
America and Britain in the late 1970s and early 1980s), monetarist views 
continued to have a major influence on economic thinking. 
The Post Keynesian school of economic thought arose partly in opposition to 
monetarist thinking, as well as to neoclassical economics in general and its 
more recent strands of Rational Expectations and New Classical thinking. It had 
its roots in the various economic theorists who had continued in the tradition of 
Keynes (e.g. Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor, Piero Sraffa at Cambridge), but 
broadened with time to form an increasingly well-defined body of economic 
theory and insights. Its formal commencement is often placed with the launch of 
the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics in 1978. Economists such as 
Davidson, Weintraub, Minsky, and Moore have played a formative role in 
extending and defining the body of Post Keynesian economic theory. They 
have sought to develop the conceptual framework put forward by Keynes (1936) 
and to extend its implications to areas of economic endeavour not addressed by 
Keynes. They have recognised 'that Keynes' General Theory and related 
writings were obscure in some aspects and open to alternative interpretations. 
They have adopted views which are at variance with those of Keynes in certain 
1 
important respects, for example on the endogeneity of the money supply. They 
do, however, consider that the central conceptions and insights put forward in 
the General Theory are valid and capture the fundamental interrelationships on 
which economic theory and analysis of a modern entrepreneur economy needs 
to be built. 
The conceptual framework of Keynes, as further developed and amended by 
Post Keynesians, has major implications in the field of monetary theory. 
Keynes' perception of money was one in which monetary variables are integrally 
involved in determining real economic outcomes; this contrasts directly with 
classical, neoclassical and monetarist perceptions in which money is regarded 
as a veil behind which real economic activity takes place, having an impact at 
most in the short period, but none in the long period. Behind the key role 
afforded money is the recognition that, in a modern economy, money is best 
characterised as credit money rather than commodity money, and that the 
holding of money is closely bound to economic uncertainty and to shifts in the 
desired timing of expenditure rather than being confined to meeting transaction 
requirements. 
This Post Keynesian conception of money is strengthened by the fact that 
sophisticated formulations of neoclassical general equilibrium models of the 
economy have been unable to provide an essential role for money. These 
models seek to treat money in a similar manner to commodities for which there 
are interrelated supply and demand curves and for which in principle a price 
vector can be found such that all commodity markets clear. Money as the nth 
commodity is typically regarded as the numeraire in terms of which all other 
commodity prices are expressed. But the end result achieved in general 
equilibrium remains equivalent to that of a barter economy in which participants 
have perfect knowledge. Attempts to provide money with an essential role in 
neoclassical general equilibrium models have led to the curious outcome of 
money having a restrictive effect on economic activity rather than a facilitating 
l 
effect. 
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The difference in thinking on monetary issues between those in the monetarist 
and neoclassical camp and those in the lineage of Keynes and the Post 
Keynesians can be traced historically to the Currency School versus Banking 
School controversy which emerged in the early 1800s. During the nineteenth 
century, with the expansion of the banking system, there were differing views on 
whether the quantity of money in circulation needed to be tightly controlled to 
prevent excessive economic activity leading to inflation, or whether a law of 
reflux operated whereby any money in excess of requirements would be paid 
back into the banking system. The latter view was related to a real bills 
doctrine, in which money is, in general, used to fund the requirements of real 
economic activity. These historical roots are examined further in Chapter 1 of 
this dissertation. 
Prior to Keynes' writing of the Treatise on Money (1930) and the General Theory 
(1936), Wicksell (1898) in particular had put forward a theory of interest rates in 
which there was an interaction between money rates of interest and underlying 
rates in the real economy (Wicksell's natural rate). This suggested a connection 
between monetary variables -and the real economy. However, a close 
examination of the mechanism put forward by Wicksell shows that it is money 
rates that adjust to the natural rates so that the influence is from the real 
economy to monetary variables (Rogers, 1989:42). It was primarily with the 
work of Keynes that a mechanism was put forward in which adjustments in the 
real economy take place in accordance with monetary variables. 
The separation of monetary theories between those in which real economic 
activities take place without substantive effects by monetary variables in the 
long run, and those in which monetary variables have a substantive real 
economy effect in the long as well as short run, are elucidated by the distinction 
and terms used by Schumpeter (1954) between Real Analysis and Monetary 
Analysis. Post Keynesian monetary theory is in the tradition of Monetary 
Analysis, and this is used as the point of departure for examining the theoretical 
l 
aspects of money in a Post Keynesian framework in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. 
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A key aspect of Keynes' General Theory was the principle of effect_ive demand, 
through which an economy may operate at a point below full employment, 
without there being economic forces which draw it toward full employment. The 
point of effective demand is determined by the interaction of aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply in which aggregate demand is limited by the wage (and 
similar) payments made to workers which constitute income. Central to the 
aggregate demand and supply interaction is the behaviour of entrepreneurs in 
their hiring, remuneration and investment activities. The interest rate 
mechanism, operating in conjunction with the marginal efficiency of capital, lies 
at the core of entrepreneurial investment and expansion decisions in Keynes' 
framework, and this provides the monetary equilibrium behind the point of 
effective demand taken forward by Post Keynesian writers. 
The credit view of money and principle of effective demand, with economic 
activity typically below full employment, lead Post Keynesians to a view of 
inflation in which its underlying causes lie primarily outside the sphere of 
monetary aggregates. This is one of the respects in which Post Keynesian 
thinking differs strikingly from that of monetarists, and which has strong 
implications for monetary policy. The Post Keynesian view of inflation is 
examined in Chapter 2. 
Formal models of macroeconomic theory have been dominated by the· IS/LM 
framework first introduced by Hicks in 1937, which became the essence of the 
neoclassical synthesis. Although Keynes did not oppose the IS/LM 
interpretation of his work at the time, most Post Keynesians do not regard the 
IS/LM framework as providing a suitable basis for depicting a Post Keynesian 
view. Rogers (1989) sought to adapt an IS/LM model to convey a Post 
Keynesian view, but other Post Keynesians (e.g. Davidson, 1994) feel that the 
departure from IS/LM thinking is so fundamental that use of the framework is 
misleading. In putting forward a simple formal model of the Post Keynesian 
l 
monetary framework in Chapter 2, the issue of IS/LM analysis is examined. 
4 
With Post Keynesians viewing money as primarily endogenous in nature, in 
contrast to the exogenous view held by monetarists, it is pertinent to examine 
how the money supply process takes place in the endogenous money view. 
This is taken up in Chapter 3. Underlying the Post Keynesian view is the notion 
introduced by Keynes that investment activity, funded by bank credit, is causally 
prior to saving. Credit advanced for investment is expended by entrepreneurs 
and becomes income which may be spent on consumption goods or saved. A 
cash reserve or liquid asset reserve imposed by a central bank is met as a 
portion of deposit liabilities placed with the central bank through the credit 
creation process rather than serving as a quantitative restriction on money 
supply aggregates. Instead, it is interest rates which, as a price in determining 
liquidity preference and the extent of investment to be undertaken, influence the 
extension of credit and thereby monetary aggregates. 
The finance motive, introduced by Keynes only after the General Theory in 
response to criticism, has been taken up by Davidson (1994) and other Post 
Keynesians as an important aspect of the money supply process. It is examined 
in Chapter 3, especially in relation to endogenous monetary expansion and its 
implications for investment activity. It forms a current aspect of Post Keynesian 
monetary discussion, as witnessed for example by Carvalho's recent paper on 
its role in capital formation (Carvalho, 1997). As a motive for holding money to 
meet planned autonomous (investment) expenditure, it complements Keynes' 
more widely recognised three motives relating to transactions, precautionary 
and speculative holdings. 
Keynes (1936) was concerned primarily with a closed economy, in order to 
present his arguments without the additional complexities introduced by 
international transactions. Writers in the Post Keynesian camp have sought to 
extend his precepts to open economy issues. Davidson (e.g. 1982, 1994) and 
Dow (e.g. 1986, 1993) in particular have put forward Post Keynesian analyses 
relating to international monetary ,flows. These views of monetary issues 
relating to an open economy are examined in Chapter 3, focusing on the effects 
of international flows as well as the implications for exchange rates. The 
5 
analysis is extended to the case of a small open economy (SOE) in particular, 
since the South African economy can be placed in this category. 
The Post Keynesian school regards itself as seeking to capture economic 
realities in its theories and models, and in the tradition of Keynes himself, offers 
views on economic policy issues and problems. Chapter 4 seeks to bring 
together some of the main economic policy implications and recommendations 
arising from Post Keynesian monetary theory. Post Keynesian writers such as 
Kaldor (1986) were at the forefront of the debate with monetarist exponents 
(particularly Friedman) during the period in which monetarist policy prescriptions 
were gaining prominence in many governments. Post Keynesians were firmly 
opposed to the monetary growth rule approach espoused by monetarists, but 
were also opposed to the na·1ve optimism of monetarists in advocating 
completely flexible exchange rates, and even to their advocacy of unfettered 
free enterprise with minimal government intervention. Although Post 
Keynesians are strongly supportive of a free enterprise or entrepreneurial 
economic system, and give emphasis to the economic role of entrepreneurs, 
their view that a full employment equilibrium is not automatically attainable, and 
that the economic world is subject to uncertainty and instability, leads them to 
advocate an important role for government in monetary as well as fiscal policy in 
order to improve economic performance. 
The Post Keynesian view has implications for the role which a central bank 
plays in the economy as well as for the manner in which it conducts monetary 
policy. Whereas a monetarist view implies a strong emphasis on control of 
monetary aggregates, with the ultimate objective of curbing inflation through 
monetary policy instruments, the Post Keynesian view implies stronger 
emphasis on the short-term interest rate as the primary instrument of monetary 
policy, together with the exchange rate in respect of international flows. The 
Post Keynesian view also implies a broader set of overall goals for a central 
bank, since monetary policy instruments are held to have effects on the real 
J 
economy in both the short and long period. 
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In the final chapter, the implications of the Post Keynesian theory of money for 
monetary policy in South Africa are examined. The main features of the South 
African monetary system, following the recommended approaches and changes 
presented by the De Kock Commission (1985) and subsequently adopted, are 
characterised, including more recent changes of policy significance. The De 
Kock Commission recommendations gave rise to various debates among 
economists, including that of the extent to which the monetary control 
mechanism adopted is in a monetarist or Post Keynesian mould. This issue is 
explored, as is the extent to which the approach to exchange rates accords with 
Post Keynesian thinking. The implications of the Post Keynesian view for 
money supply targeting, interest rate policy, public debt management and anti-
inflation measures are examined. It is apparent from the examination that Post 
Keynesian monetary theory has implications not only for the instruments and 
manner of conducting monetary policy adopted by the Reserve Bank, but also 
for the broader role of the Reserve Bank in the economy and the ultimate 
objectives it seeks to attain. 
The approach adopted by the Reserve Bank to monetary policy has been 
deeply influenced by monetarist thinking, as is the case in many industrialised 
economies, even though monetarist philosophies and policy prescriptions are 
frequently not taken to their logical conclusions. Use of monetary aggregate 
guidelines rather than a strict monetary growth rule is an example of this. It is 
possible that the monetarist perceptions ingrained into economic thinking have 
led the Reserve Bank to adopt monetary policy approaches which are harsher 
than necessary towards real economic activity and growth. The Post Keynesian 
theory of money offers an alternative view in which monetary policy could 
possibly be used in a more positive manner towards the attainment of broader 
economic objectives. 
7 
CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND TO POST KEYNESIAN MONETARY THEORY 
1.1 Introduction 
' Post Keynesian economics provides a theory of money alternative to that of 
monetarist, neoclassical and mainstream Keynesian economics. It is a theory in 
which money matters in the sense of being integrally involved in determining 
real economic outcomes in both the short and long run. It is built on a set of 
assumptions and perceptions concerning the nature of a capitalist economy 
which its adherents regard as more realistic than those of neoclassical and 
mainstream Keynesian economics. Post Keynesian economists have been 
involved in putting forward arguments, developing models and engaging in 
theoretical and policy debates over a period of over three decades. In spite of 
the strength of its theoretical roots in the work of Keynes and eminent scholars 
at Cambridge who continued in his analytical tradition, the Post Keynesian 
school has not received the prominence in university teaching of economics, or 
in adoption of economic policies, that has been attained by mainstream 
Keynesianism, monetarism and broad neoclassical economics. Mainstream 
Keynesianism appeared to provide sound analyses and policies in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but these came increasingly into question as inflation persisted in 
most economies in the 1970s, even in conditions of recession. Monetarism 
became a favoured and popular alternative, with widespread influence on 
economic thinking and policy. Neoclassical economics, with its rigorous 
mathematical approaches based on general equilibrium concepts, continues to 
proliferate in academic programmes. There are, however, many questions to be 
raised on the validity of monetarist and neoclassical theories and consequent 
policy prescriptions. With so many questions and unresolved issues facing 
conventional economics, especially concerning monetary issues, a critical 
appraisal of the monetary theory offered by the Post Keynesian school is 
pertinent. This chapter examines' the theoretical foundations and historical 
origins of Post Keynesian monetary economics to compare it to other leading 
8 
schools of economic thought and to differentiate it from allied points of view. 
Subsequent chapters explore the theoretical issues and policy implications in 
greater depth. 
Post Keynesian economics is by no means a unified body of theory and 
viewpoints. Although there are many common threads, there is considerable 
diversity in the approaches and viewpoints of writers who can be broadly 
classified as Post Keynesian, and this is particularly the case in the field of 
monetary theory. Although the insights and analytical framework put forward by 
Keynes provided a foundation stone for development of Post Keynesian thinking 
and models, there has been continual extension and refinement of the Post 
Keynesian body of economic theory, with significant departures from Keynes' 
thinking (for instance in respect of endogeneity of the money supply). It is one 
of the purposes of this dissertation to examine the views on monetary issues of 
recognised members of the Post Keynesian group, and thereby to draw together 
the core elements of the Post Keynesian view of money. 
This chapter commences with the distinction between the work of Keynes, 
subsequent Keynesianism and the later Post Keynesianism. It clarifies the way 
in which these and related terms are used in this dissertation. The relationship 
of Post Keynesianism to neo-Ricardian Keynesianism is examined, since the 
latter shares some common ground with Post Keynesianism. An outline is 
presented of some of the key precepts which lie behind Post Keynesian 
economic thinking, to place its monetary theory in context. The historical roots 
of the major divide between economic thinking in the Post Keynesian and similar 
moulds, and that of the monetarist and neoclassical persuasion, is traced to the 
contrasting views of the Banking School and Currency School. Against this 
backdrop, some of the primary theoretical issues which lead Post Keynesians to 
adopt their particular view of money are examined. This includes the relation of 
money to uncertainty and to time, and the implications ot the notions of 
equilibrium adopted. The chapter culminates with the distinction introduced by 
J 
Schumpeter between theories in a tradition of Real Analysis and Monetary 
9 
Analysis, which is found to be a useful taxonomy on which to place the further 
exposition of Post Keynesian monetary theory in Chapter 2. 
1.2 Keynesians, Post Keynesians and neo-Ricardian Keynesians 
In publishing the General Theory, Keynes regarded himself as, presenting a 
theory which would revolutionise the field of economics. He sought to persuade 
economists to re-examine certain of their basic assumptions on how an 
economic system behaves. His arguments were directed in particular at what 
he referred to as the 'classical' view whereby an economy with unfettered 
competitive forces has a self-correcting tendency towards a full-employment 
equilibrium condition. He argued that Say's Law (that production of goods 
necessarily leads to demand sufficient to absorb all goods produced) does not 
hold in an entrepreneurial money economy. He put forward a theory whereby 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply could be in equilibrium at a level 
below full employment in the economy. (Keynes, 1936:26.) 
The General Theory did indeed have a major impact on economic thinking over 
several decades. However, in mainstream professional writings and textbooks, 
Keynes' theoretical analysis was interpreted in such a manner as to retain the 
key precepts of neoclassical economics. This led to the neoclassical synthesis, 
frequently referred to as Keynesianism or Old Keynesianism, which dominated 
mainstream macroeconomic thinking to the end of the 1970s. The reconciliation 
with neoclassical precepts commenced soon after publication of the General 
Theory. Hicks (1937) sought to capture the essence of Keynes' view on 
unemployment equilibrium through the interaction of investment-saving and 
money supply-demand schedules. The resulting IS/LM analysis has served as 
the basis for examining these issues in macroeconomic textbooks, in spite of 
strong criticisms of the extent to which the IS/LM model captures the thinking of 
the General Theory (Weintraub, 1977:46). Hicks himself subsequently 
recognised that his initial interpretation could be a misleading portrayal of 
J 
Keynes' view (Davidson, 1994:118). The word Keynesian is usually used to 
refer to the neoclassical synthesis, in its various strands of Old Keynesian, New 
10 
Keynesian and nee-Keynesian. It refers to the varieties of Keynesianism which 
have re-introduced or accommodated neoclassical assumptions, thereby 
departing from certain fundamental new insights put forward in the General 
Theory. It is this accommodation of neoclassical assumptions which lies at the 
heart of its differentiation from Post Keynesianism. 
The term Post Keynesian entails views which differ markedly from the 
neoclassical synthesis interpretation of Keynes' work, and the term is used in 
full throughout this dissertation to ensure that the distinction from the 
neoclassical synthesis (and other brands of Keynesianism) is clearly 
maintained. Although having its roots in the writings of colleagues of Keynes at 
Cambridge, such as Joan Robinson and Kaldor, Post Keynesian economics 
became an identifiable school of economic thinking from the late 1970s as 
efforts were made to develop Keynes' original insights and concepts, in 
contradistinction with the neoclassical synthesis. Post Keynesians believe that 
Keynes provided a new way of analysing monetary economies, as well as 
fundamental insights not captured in the neoclassical synthesis, and that these 
have important consequences for economic theory and analysis. In spite of the 
considerable diversity in Post Keynesian views and approaches, Post 
Keynesians subscribe to certain common propositions which differentiate them 
from other leading schools of economic thought. These include an emphasis on 
the role of uncertainty and historical time, a deep scepticism towards economic 
models of a general equilibrium nature, a preference for partial equilibrium 
approaches using 'stylised facts', the view that money is integrally involved in 
determining real economic outcomes and is best viewed as credit-money rather 
than commodity-money, the view that money aggregates are outside the control 
of monetary authorities (endogenous), and recognition that institutions, both 
legal (e.g. contracts) and organisational, play an important role in economics. 
These issues are taken up further below. 
Although Post Keynesian economic~ has evolved considerably from the original 
works of Keynes, it is apparent that Keynes' conceptual framework has 
continued to have a major bearing on Post Keynesian thinking. In a recent 
11 
edition of the Post Keynesian Journal of Economics (1996), for instance, two 
papers address specifically the legacy of Keynes in current economic thinking 
(Davidson, 1996 and Carvalho, 1996), and other papers make frequent 
reference to the work of Keynes. It appears that part of the reason for the 
continued centrality of Keynes is that, in the Post Keynesian view, the dominant 
strands of economics which constitute orthodox or conventional economic 
thinking in the Keynesian mould still entail a major departure from the 
conceptual framework which Keynes put forward in the General Theory. For 
instance, Davidson (1996:50) heads a section of his paper, "Why has the 
mainstream ignored Keynes' revolutionary legacy?" in which he is referring to 
mainstream Keynesians using the neoclassical synthesis framework, whether 
Old Keynesian, New Keynesian or neo-Keynesian. Davidson maintains that 
these Keynesians still seek one or other constraint or imperfection to explain 
economic equilibrium below full employment, and still subscribe to the 
neoclassical axioms of gross substitution, ergodicity, and long-run neutral 
money. Post Keynesians thus continue to emphasise Keynes' fundamental 
departure from these precepts as well as drawing inspiration from his 
conception of the interrelationship between investment, income, consumption, 
saving and monetary variables. Even Keynesians such as Tobin, who have 
adopted and extended Keynes' liquidity preference theory as well as other 
aspects of Keynes' work, receive fierce criticism from the Post Keynesian camp 
for not having made the full conceptual leap (Davidson, 1996:58). 
This dissertation concentrates on the monetary views of the Post Keynesian 
group whose ideas follow in the lineage of Keynes himself. Closely associated 
with this group, however, are those economists who might more accurately be 
labelled as neo-Ricardian Keynesians (sometimes referred to as neo-
Ricardians). As Torr (1993:401-402) points out, the most prominent exponents 
of the neo-Ricardian Keynesian view, including Garegnani, are members of the 
managing board of editors of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. 
However, their position on several key issues is different from the more central 
' 
Post Keynesian viewpoints. 
12 
The primary distinguishing point of neo-Ricardian Keynesians relative to Post 
Keynesians in the Keynes lineage is that the former concentrate on long-period 
equilibrium positions, and do not incorporate uncertainty and expectations, 
which they regard as transitory factors, into their formal analysis. Dutt 
(1992:218) characterises them as "those Keynesians who combine Sraffa's 
critique of neoclassical theory and Keynes' theory of effective demand to show 
why unemployment equilibrium exists". The difference is of importance to 
monetary theory in that Post Keynesians such as Davidson and Moore regard 
uncertainty as fundamental to the understanding of money in a modern capitalist 
economy. Neo-Ricardian Keynesians seek to bypass the ambiguity of 
subjective factors to reach long-period equilibrium conclusions which are more 
objectively secure. The neo-Ricardian Keynesians do not deny that 
expectations play a role, but maintain that this is confined to effects on market 
prices in the short period. They regard transitory factors as having no bearing 
on the eventual equilibrium. If, however, the long-period equilibrium is path-
dependent, as many Post Keynesians would argue, their disregard of transitory 
factors is open to serious question (Dutt, 1992:222). 
Neo-Ricardian Keynesians base their analyses on the concept of a uniform rate 
of profit to which the economy tends in the long period, hence the reference to 
Ricardo in their designation. They seek to combine this concept with Keynes' 
principle of effective demand to analyse the persistent economic forces moving 
the economy toward long-period equilibrium. They regard this long-period 
equilibrium as being equilibrium in the sense of a centre of gravitation. The 
long-period equilibrium entails a set of 'natural' prices corresponding to the 
uniform rate of profit among industries and individual firms. Adoption of the 
principle of effective demand entails a long-period equilibrium which may or may 
not be one of full employment. 
Torr (1988:129) confirms the "uneasy alliance between Keynesian and 
Ricardian elements in the post-Keynesian school". The neo-Ricardians 
' 
subscribe to Keynes' 'entrepreneur economy' view as better depicting a modern 
economy than the alternative 'co-operative economy' view in which employment 
13 
decisions are characterised as being determined by entrepreneurs and workers 
jointly. They embrace the notion of an equilibrium determined by the principle of 
effective demand, rather than through unconstrained forces of supply and 
demand. However, they regard Keynes' 'bulls and bears equilibrium', in which 
divergent expectations lead to a price equilibrium in financial markets, as not 
being an essential feature of Keynes' General Theory analysis. , This accords 
with the neo-Ricardians' reluctance to incorporate expectations into their 
theoretical structure, as well as their view that expectations which are of any 
economic significance (in the short period) are in any event likely to be 
convergent. In the latter respect, neo-Ricardians have some similarities with 
rational expectations theorists in that both see expectations as being tied to a 
consistent underlying model of reality. "The Ricardians and the rational 
expectations exponents appear therefore to be in substantial agreement on how 
to treat expectations. Any disagreement that there may be between the two 
schools should revolve around just what relevant theory such rational or 
inescapable expectations are to be associated with." (Torr, 1988:126). The 
rational expectations exponents, however, adopt an unconstrained demand and 
supply equilibrium notion operating in a co-operative economy framework: it is 
the choice of economic theory which leads to widely differing conclusions rather 
than the treatment of expectations, and this choice places the neo-Ricardians 
broadly in the Keynesian camp. 
The neo-Ricardian Keynesians appear to embrace an ergodic view of the 
economic world in which "the system will gravitate to a predetermined state of 
rest, wherever it starts from." Torr (1993). This conflicts with Davidson's 
emphasis on nonergodicity as fundamental to economic systems. Torr points 
out that the crucial difference in this respect may lie in whether expectations are 
assumed to be divergent or convergent; if expectations are accorded a role, 
convergent expectations suggest an ergodic view of economic reality. 
Furthermore, if expectations are based on underlying objective realities, they 
are likely to be convergent. The issµe of whether the economic world is ergodic 
or nonergodic in nature would appear to be a significant difference at a 
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fundamental theoretical level between neo-Ricardians and the Post Keynesian 
core. 
Post Keynesian views concerning uncertainty, formation of expectations, 
equilibrium concepts and the treatment of time in theoretical models serve as a 
point of departure for much of Post Keynesian economic analysis and lie behind 
many of the arguments and conclusions which differ from other schools of 
thought. To these theoretical precepts needs to be added the Post Keynesian 
recognition that economic effects of institutions need to be taken into account in 
economic analysis (Davidson, 1982:13). A major example is the importance 
attached to the enforceability of contracts denominated in money terms, 
especially wage contracts entered into between entrepreneurs and workers in 
advance of production activity. In the monetary sphere, this concern for 
institutions translates into focussing on the mechanisms through which credit is 
provided by the banking system. Recognition is given to the fact that firms need 
to borrow from the banking system in advance of production occurring, to meet 
wages and production costs as well as for capital investment purposes, and that 
such borrowing is undertaken in accordance with their expectations of future 
sales revenues. The willingness and ability of banks to provide credit in 
advance of productive activity, and the terms on which it is provided, are 
therefore regarded as crucial to investment and economic expansion. This 
contrasts with monetarist and neoclassical thinking in which increases in money 
supply are regarded as neutral to real economic activity in the long run and in 
which no significant economic effect is accorded to the nature of institutions. In 
the Post Keynesian view, ex ante (expected) returns on new capital investment 
relative to the interest rate and repayment terms of credit provided by the 
banking system are a key determinant of investment behaviour. The Post 
Keynesian recognition of the importance of institutions extends also to 
organisational institutions, both government and private sector, and the role 
which the actions of such institutions can play in determining economic 
outcomes. 
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Post Keynesians therefore hold an economic view in which monetary variables 
are central and in which economic output does not automatically adjust to full 
employment levels through market forces. Money forms an integral part of the 
Post Keynesian economic framework, and the theoretical precepts underlying 
the Post Keynesian view have a major bearing on the monetary theory and 
monetary policy measures which have been put forward by Post Keynesian 
writers, as does recognition of the role which institutions play in economic 
i nteracti ans. 
1.3 Banking School versus Currency School 
Much of the debate and contrary viewpoints which underlie the Post Keynesian 
position relative to the monetarist, neoclassical, rational expectations and 
similar frameworks have a historical parallel in the Banking School versus 
Currency School debates which took place in Britain from the 1820s. Typical 
issues under dispute were: (1) whether note issues should vary one-to-one with 
the Bank of England's gold holdings (2) the validity of the Banking School 
doctrines of real bills, needs of trade and law of reflux (3) the desirability of a 
monopoly of note issue (4) whether overissue was a problem, and if so its 
causes (5) the appropriate definition of money (6) why trade cycles occur and 
(7) whether there should be a central bank (Schwartz, 1990). 
The Currency School, mirroring the present-day monetarist camp, advocated 
regulation to ensure that paper money was kept under strict quantitative control. 
They favoured a one-to-one correspondence of note issue with Bank of England 
gold holdings. They saw a rise in price level as a symptom of excessive note 
issues. They regarded the Bank of England, as well as the Scottish and country 
banks which were independent at that time, as being prone to over-issue, and 
saw the solution as creation of a single, regulated monopoly issuer. Although 
~ 
most members of the Currency School attributed trade cycles to non-monetary 
causes, they regarded inadequately controlled money issue as fuelling and 
J 
exacerbating cycles. The Currency School favoured a central bank which would 
be bound by rules in issuing notes; this they considered would stabilise prices 
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and business cycles. They regarded outflows of gold as having a direct impact 
on currency in circulation, which could and should be compensated by an 
increase in paper currency. They held as an objective the achievement of a 
price level which would be the same whether the money supply were fully 
metallic or a mixed currency comprising paper notes and metallic currency. 
The Banking School, parallelling Post Keynesians and most Keynesians, 
adopted the principle that deposit liabilities and notes would never be excessive 
provided that banks restricted their income-earning assets to real bills, and that 
note circulation should be demand determined (the banking principle). By 'real 
bills' was meant credit for goods in the process of being produced or in transit, 
and the associated view became known as the real bills doctrine. The Banking 
School regarded note issue as being subject to a law of reflux, whereby over-
issue could only exist for a limited period, since notes would shortly return to the 
issuer for repayment of loans. Creation of too large an amount of bank loans 
and deposits "would lead automatically to their conversion into metallic money, 
forcing the banks to restrict lending." (Moore, 1988a:5). The Banking School did 
not make any distinction between the speed of reflux of the Bank of England 
and for competitive banks in rural areas and Scotland: the latter could well have 
had longer reflux times. The School saw no need for legislative regulation of 
the banking system: to them, sound bank management was sufficient. Trade 
cycles were accorded purely non-monetary causes, and banks were regarded 
as having no particular role in stabilising or exacerbating cyclical swings. The 
Banking School was in favour of a central bank with the sole right of note issue, 
but this was primarily for co-ordination and standardisation reasons rather than 
money supply regulation. 
These debates from the 1820s were not conclusive and neither viewpoint 
predominated. Sharp controversies raged in the second half of the nineteenth 
century: the Bank Charter Act of 1844 prevented new banks in England and 
Wales from gaining the right to issue notes, and restrictions were placed on 
note issue by existing banks in subsequent Acts. The Banking School objected 
to these restrictions, and claimed vindication for its viewpoint when restrictions 
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had to be suspended in 1847, 1857 and 1866. The Currency School maintained 
that the suspensions were of no great significance. Currency ~chool views 
prevailed when maximum note issues were set for country banks and provision 
made for transfer of their circulation to the Bank of England. (Schwartz, 1990.) 
Steeped in the Banking School-Currency School divide were- the empirical 
findings of Tooke and subsequently of Gibson which contradicted the quantity 
theory view held by classical economists, in particular the indirect mechanism 
put forward by Henry Thornton in 1802. Whereas the direct quantity theory 
mechanism put forward in the eighteenth century by Hume and Cantillon relied 
on the spending of an excess accumulation of commodity money (e.g. gold) to 
increase demand and thereby prices, the indirect mechanism put forward by 
Thornton was based on the lowering of money interest rates by the banking 
system in order to lend out excess reserves, inducing businessmen to increase 
the rate of investment, leading to higher aggregate demand and a consequent 
increase in price level. Thornton's indirect mechanism would suggest a strong 
negative correlation between money interest rates and price level increases, 
especially in the upward phase of a business cycle. Tooke's empirical work, 
first published in 1838, showed, however, that movements in the general level of 
commodity prices were positively correlated with interest rates, and with 
changes in interest rates. The explanation he offered for this was that interest 
rates form a component of production costs, leading to increasing prices 
through the aggregate supply curve in its relationship to aggregate demand. 
This was a forerunner to cost-push explanations of inflation. 
Tooke's findings were confirmed by the empirical studies undertaken by Gibson 
in England, first published in 1923. Keynes referred to this as the "Gibson 
Paradox", which he addressed in his Treatise on Money (1930). Wicksell had 
addressed the issue in his writings around 1900, and both he and Gibson 
provided explanations in the saving-investment interaction rather than in money 
itself (Makinen, 1977:66). These are based on a natural rate of interest which 
! 
changes due to technological innovation or other source of improved capital 
productivity. The investment demand curve shifts outwards, as does the 
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demand for loanable funds. Since bankers do not immediately perceive the 
change in the natural rate, the money rate of interest remains at a lower level 
than the natural rate, with additional credit money being issued to meet the 
higher investment demand, leading to an increase in the price level as 
equilibrium is approached between the value of aggregate demand and supply. 
The inflationary process continues for as long as the money rate uf interest lies 
below the natural rate. These explanations are consistent with the empirical 
findings of Tooke and Gibson. 
Makinen (1977:63) regards the issue of exogeneity or endogeneity of the money 
supply as being at the heart of the Currency School - Banking School debate; 
"Put quite simply, at stake in this issue is whether the supply of money is 
exogenous (controllable by the central bank) or endogenous (determined by the 
individuals in the economic system). To the Currency School, the stock of 
money was exogenous whereas to the Banking School, it was clearly 
endogenous." Makinen (1977:66) maintains that both Wicksell and Keynes 
were assuming an exogenous money supply in the sense that the central bank 
could control it if it so wished. This would place Keynes in the Currency School, 
contrary to the view that the Banking School was the forerunner to the monetary 
analysis of Keynes and the Post Keynesians. Assumption of money supply 
exogeneity or endogeneity is probably too narrow a criterion, used on its own, 
by which to place theories in one of the two schools, especially since exogeneity 
assumptions may be adopted for expositional purposes. As taken up in Chapter 
3, Moore (1988a) regards Keynes' treatment of money in the Treatise as 
endogenous, so the matter in respect of Keynes on this criterion is in any event 
open to debate. It would seem preferable to include additional criteria, such as 
subscribing to a quantity theory of money, neutrality of real economy effects and 
a commodity-money view, in placing theories and writers in the Currency rather 
than Banking School. 
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1.4 Uncertainty and Expectations 
Post Keynesian economics views money as being closely bound to uncertainty. 
The traditional functions of money are accepted: as a unit of account, a medium 
of exchange and a store of value. But the question is asked: Why would a 
rational person hold money as a store of value in a world of perfect certainty and 
perfect markets? In a neoclassical economy with a Walrasian auctioneer using 
a tatonnement process to bring all traders to an equilibrium point before any 
transactions occur, there is no reason for money to be held as against goods or 
producible assets as a store of value (Hahn, 1982:31 ). Holding money yields no 
utility, since goods essentially exchange for goods at the equilibrium prices and 
quantities reached through the auctioneer. In a neoclassical world, 
requirements for goods and available supply are fully matched in the current 
period, and will be fully matched in the next and all subsequent periods. In the 
Post Keynesian view, however, it is rational for agents to hold money as a store 
of value to meet the inherent uncertainties of the economic world. In the words 
of Keynes (1937a:187): "Our desire to hold money as a store of wealth is a 
barometer of the degree of distrust of our own calculations and conventions 
concerning the future .... the possession of actual money lulls our disquietude." 
The uncertainty concept adopted by Post Keynesians is that put forward by 
Knight (1921) and taken up by Keynes. This can be illustrated by Davidson's 
(1994:88) distinction of three possible views of the economic environment within 
which decisions need to be made: 
An objective probability environment in which an objective probability distribution 
based in reality governs past, current and future outcomes. A decision maker is 
able to analyse past relative frequencies of outcomes in order to calculate 
statistically reliable probabilities for future prospects. 
A subjective probability environmert in which decision makers can order or 
evaluate all possible future outcomes in terms of subjective probabilities. The 
subjective probabilities may not coincide with the underlying objective 
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probabilities. Economic agents will make decisions based on their subjectively 
perceived probabilities, which will eventuate as good or bad decisions 
depending on the degree to which these correctly reflect the objective 
probabilities which prevail. A Social Darwinian style selection process would 
favour those whose subjective probability perceptions are usually correct 
against those whose probability perceptions differ from .the objective 
probabilities. 
An uncertainty environment in which the lapse of time between the moment of 
decision and the outcome is such that unforeseeable changes can occur, so that 
reliable information concerning future prospects does not exist in the present. 
Post Keynesian writers generally adopt the third category as best reflecting 
economic reality. This corresponds to their maintaining that economic systems 
are nonergodic in character. 1 It implies that the future path and state of events 
cannot be known by economic actors, even in stochastic terms. Economic 
variables are not characterised by stationary stochastic distributions through 
which expected values can be obtained using past data. The uncertainty faced 
by economic actors is distinguished from risk in terms of which outcomes are 
definable in probabilistic terms. In an uncertainty environment, the future is not 
calculable, deterministically or stochastically, even if the decision maker has the 
capacity to perform all the mathematical operations required to calculate 
probabilities of conditional events based on a full set of relevant information. 
The nonergodic viewpoint contrasts directly with a New Classical rational 
expectations hypothesis (REH) view of economic reality. Under REH, economic 
outcomes are subject to stochastic distributions and decisions on average are 
made on the basis of expected values given by the prevailing economic theory: 
"In situations of risk, the hypothesis of rational behaviour on the part of agents 
will have usable content so that behaviour may be explainable in terms of 
economic theory. In such situation,s expectations are rational in Muth's sense." 
As noted in Section 1.2, the neo-Ricardian Keynesians do not share this nonergodic 
view. 
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(Lucas, 1977:15). The REH view implies that economic decisions are 
characterised purely by risk, which is definable in terms of a probability 
distribution, and outcomes will exhibit a predictable stochastic pattern with a 
derivable expected value, and hence provide actuarial certainty. 
The adoption or rejection of ergodicity as an underlying assumption in economic 
analysis creates a major theoretical divide at a fundamental level. Neoclassical 
economists such as Samuelson and Lucas insist that assumption of an ergodic 
system, with future events being reliably predictable using stochastic analysis, is 
essential to application of the scientific method in economics: that any analysis 
involving an uncertainty (nonergodic) environment is methodologically 
unacceptable. For example, Lucas maintains, "In cases of uncertainty economic 
reasoning will be of no value." (Lucas, 1977:15). The entire edifice of Rational 
Expectations and general equilibrium modelling is built on the assumption of 
stochastically predictable economic events, and its adherents regard any 
alternative assumption as incompatible with scientific enquiry. The Post 
Keynesians reject this, regard underlying uncertainty and nonergodicity as a 
more realistic assumption for modelling real-world economic systems, and 
maintain that a theoretical structure based on this assumption is (at least) 
equally valid in scientific terms to one based on the assumption of ergodicity. 
The difference in ergodicity assumptions directly affects the manner in which 
expectations are viewed and modelled. Under ergodic assumptions, both 
objective and subjective probabilities can be analysed in terms of an expected 
utility theory and expectations can be modelled in terms of an average or central 
tendency on the part of a large number of economic agents. In a nonergodic 
world, expectations may have no such central tendency and need to be 
modelled in terms of pure uncertainty (ignorance or "unknowledge" to use the 
term coined by Shackle (197 4)) without recourse to stochastic approaches. 
"One must assume that the people in one's models do not know what is going to 
happen, and know that they do not know just what is going to happen. As in 
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history." (Hicks, 1979). 
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Post Keynesians maintain that uncertainty was fundamental in the work of 
Keynes (e.g. King, 1995:157). They maintain that the 'an_imal spirits' 
emphasised by Keynes in entrepreneurial investment decisions are a reflection 
of uncertainty: entrepreneurs undertake investment in new ventures based on 
belief and courage, rather than on the basis of a known expected value of the 
outcome based on statistical probability distributions. The role of uncertainty, 
as opposed to quantifiable, stochastic risk, is therefore an important factor in 
examining monetary theories and differentiating between classical, neoclassical 
and strands of Post Keynesian thought. 
1.5 Notions of Time 
Post Keynesian writers view the sequential nature of time as an essential 
ingredient in being able to understand and model economic systems, especially 
in relation to money. They consider general equilibrium theorists, and most 
other neoclassical writers, to be abstracting from historical time and thereby to 
be losing crucial elements on which a theory of money needs to be built. Kaldor 
expresses this in criticising neoclassical economics (1985a:61 ), "It seems clear 
that if we are to get out of the present impasse we must begin by constructing a 
different kind of abstract model, one that recognises from the beginning that 
time is a continuing and irreversible process; that it is impossible to assume the 
constancy of anything over time, such as the supply of labor or. capital, the 
psychological preferences for commodities, the nature and number of 
commodities, or technical knowledge." Moore puts forward the recognition of 
historical time as a key feature of a new Post Keynesian macroeconomic 
paradigm (1988a:167). Davidson (1980:157) regards the emphasis on historical 
time as essential to analysing real-world economies. He points out that real 
time is asymmetric, since we are able to obtain information about the past but 
cannot have similar knowledge about the future. He asserts that "Keynes' 
revolution is in the Marshall tradition of emphasising the presence of time at the 
center of economic problems." (1980:159). Rogers (1989) discusses the 
l 
incorporation of historical time in the context of methodological approaches and 
in particular the realism of underlying assumptions. He argues that, although 
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heuristic or simplifying assumptions are necessary in constructing theories or 
models, the truth status or realism of such assumptions is imp~rtant in any 
realist methodological approach (as opposed to a purely instrumentalist 
methodological approach such as adopted for instance by Milton Friedman) 
(Rogers, 1989: 143). He argues that simplifications need to be of such a nature 
that they can be removed in stages, thereby capturing more of ,the real-world 
complexity, without the model becoming invalid. He maintains that logical or 
mechanistic time does not meet this requirement of a realist methodological 
approach. 
Keynes regarded time as being closely related to money in that "the importance 
of money essentially flows from its being a link between the present and the 
future." (1936:293). With expectations being liable to confirmation or 
disappointment in an uncertain world, "we cannot even begin to discuss the 
effect of changing expectations on current activities except in monetary terms." 
(1936:294). Forward commitments in an uncertain world link the holding of 
money as a store of value to time. Money is held in the present to meet future 
commitments which are affected by an inherently uncertain world. Davidson 
(1994:86) uses the term 'time machine' to convey the characteristic of money in 
which it is able to transfer purchasing power from present to future in a 
generalised, unspecified form. It should be noted that Davidson is not 
maintaining that real economic output at macroeconomic level can be shifted in 
time through this means, which would be contrary to Keynes' principle of 
effective demand. Lerner (1961 :141) uses the term 'time machine' in a different 
sense to convey the point that such shifts are not possible for a closed economy 
as a whole: "the borrowing and the repayment do not make a Time Machine. 
There is no shift of resources or of burdens between different points in time." 
Davidson is using the term to describe the complex interplay of time-dated 
purchasing power interchanges between the participants in the economy, which 
can nevertheless have real economic effects through the maturity structures of 
debt and the terms on which it is provided. 
J 
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The view that the economy must be firmly tied to historical time for analysis 
purposes places Post Keynesians in the tradition of Marx and Hegel in this 
respect. Marx for instance regarded economics as fundamentally an interplay of 
historical economic and social forces, leading inexorably to long run structural 
changes. Keynes and Marx were both critical of the 'classical' view as an 
interpretation of the functioning of a capitalist economy. Althougti most of their 
criticism related to the rejection of Say's Law, it is interesting to note the 
additional commonality in their view that economics is best seen as a process in 
historical time. 
1.6 Notions of Equilibrium 
The historical conception of time has implications for the view of equilibrium 
taken and how this is deployed in economic analysis. Kaldor (1985a:62) for 
instance maintains that, "the exogenous variables that determine the nature of 
equilibrium are independent of history in their most important characteristics." 
Kaldor is arguing that equilibrium economics is economics without the notion of 
historical time. This implies that economic analysis must be able to deal with 
the economy in a state away from either short period or long period equilibrium 
to be able to incorporate the effects of historical time. It does not necessarily 
negate the usefulness of equilibrium concepts as states towards which the 
economic system will tend. It does, however, question the usefulness of model 
equilibria where it is not clear how the economy moves to such an equilibrium or 
what factors will come into play thereafter. 
The two concepts of macro-equilibrium in economics as identified by Chick 
(1983:21) are useful in examining the equilibrium concept used by Post 
Keynesians: (i) macro-equilibrium as a point of rest, in which economic forces 
which would give rise to change are either absent or in countervailing balance; 
and (ii) macro-equilibrium as a balance between supply and demand functions. 
The first concept is broader than th~ second (the second implies the first but not 
vice versa) and it is the first rather than the second which is used in Post 
Keynesian economic theory. The second, on the other hand, is the concept 
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adopted in general equilibrium analysis which has the implication that the labour 
market, in addition to commodity markets, clears and gives _rise to full 
employment in long-period equilibrium. Keynes and Ricardo use the first 
concept; Marshall uses the latter narrower concept in microeconomic analysis. 
A great deal of economic theory has been devoted to the, mathematical 
intricacies of general equilibrium models, often referred to as neo-Walrasian 
models, and general equilibrium assumptions pervade much of neoclassical 
economics. General equilibrium theorists view economic systems in terms of a 
comprehensive set of simultaneous equations reflecting supply and demand 
quantities and prices for each commodity and resource in the economy. 
Although obtaining the necessary coefficients and pricing data for such 
specifications is virtually impossible in practice, the theoretical formulation of 
such general equilibrium models can arguably yield useful insights into the 
possible workings of the economy. However, Post Keynesian writers take issue 
with the general equilibrium approach on several grounds. 
Post Keynesian writers point out that even the most sophisticated formulations 
of the general equilibrium framework, that of Arrow and Debreu in the 1950s for 
instance, cannot provide an essential role for money. The Arrow-Debreu 
specification consists of a complete set of futures markets for all time-dated 
commodities, with commodities being defined as contingent on the 'state of 
nature'. The states of nature cover everything that might affect the usefulness 
or availability of commodities, and are defined so that only and exactly one state 
must occur. This enables all decisions to be pre-reconciled at an initial instant 
in time. Trade then occurs as time unfolds in accordance with the equilibrium 
established at the outset. In this manner, the problems of uncertainty and 
expectations are avoided since all future quantities and prices are determined at 
the initial instant. However, such a system has no clear role for money since all 
future trades and prices at which they will occur have been determined and can 
be carried out without the presence of money. In the words of Hahn (1982:1) 
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"A world in which all contingent future contracts are possible neither wants nor 
needs intrinsically worthless money." 
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Davidson (1980:173) argues that general equilibrium model_s have no 
contribution to make in addressing actual situations and policy issues because 
of their lack of realistic assumptions. He considers their usefulness to be 
confined to examining certain categories of theoretical problems only. Moore 
(1988a:368) takes issue with the general equilibrium approach on similar 
grounds. In his view, economic processes have no pre-determinable long-run 
equilibrium position toward which they are tending, and he considers the 
concept of general equilibrium to be "misleading and unhelpful". His view is that 
an economy is in a continual state of flux, subject to non-recurring historical 
forces as well as intrinsic uncertainty. This is close to the 'kaleidic' view of 
Shackle (1974), and is more extreme than that of most Post Keynesians, who 
would accept the usefulness of certain concepts of equilibrium in economic 
theory, albeit not the general equilibrium framework. 
Post Keynesian theorists generally accept a partial equilibrium approach to 
analysis. This is an equilibrium in the tradition of Marshall, but also of Ricardo 
and Keynes himself. In a Post Keynesian view, the partial equilibrium approach 
should not be seen as only addressing a particular issue in the economy or as 
being confined to microeconomics. It should rather be seen as a method by 
which economic issues are examined using a one-problem-at-a-time, ceteris 
paribus approach, with the results being fed into the economic system as a 
whole (Chick, 1983:15). The method can be used in a variety of theories; hence 
there is no contradiction in its use by Ricardo and Marshall as well as by 
Keynes. The method is useful in its relation to causality, as well as in its 
interpretation of long-period equilibrium. It makes use of hypothetical thought 
experiments to examine what would happen as a result of a change in one 
causal factor, assuming other causal factors remained constant. In this respect, 
and in its long-period equilibrium application, it is a means to systematic and 
logical economic analysis, and need not imply that the economy actually attains 
the equilibrium state. 
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1. 7 Nonergodicity and Hysteresis 
Davidson, Moore and Rogers deploy the concept of hysteresis in viewing the 
nature of the economy and its passage through historical time. The concept is 
drawn from the physical sciences, in which it refers to the property (e.g. in 
magnetising iron) whereby the physical state of an object is dependent on the 
time path of influences as well as the variable magnitudes themselves. They 
are seeking to capture the notion that the future path of the economy is 
dependent on the historical path that it has traversed, that the economy cannot 
be analysed only in terms of its current state at a point in time. The concept 
also implies that economic variables may not be subject to (ahistorical) market 
forces that will propel them to their 'natural' levels, but need rather to be seen in 
terms of a process analysis in which the outcomes at any one point of time 
become initial conditions in the next (Chick, 1983:16). 
An interesting and hard-hitting debate was waged in the Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, particularly the issue of Spring 1993, concerning the 
nature and importance of the hysteresis concept to Post Keynesian economics. 
Cross (1993) took Davidson to task for not giving due recognition to hysteresis 
in expressing Post Keynesian views on the nature of economic processes. 
Cross expresses a hysteresis concept directly analogous to that of physics, in 
which a change or "shock" in one variable may lead to a changed value of a 
dependent variable even after the change or shock has been removed. The 
new dependent variable value remains indefinitely unless a reversing shock is 
applied. He cites the example of a contractionary shock on unemployment, 
which could leave a higher unemployment level after the shock has been 
removed. Cross maintains that hysteresis underpins the notion of uncertainty as 
used by Keynes and Post Keynesians. 
Davidson (1993) does not deny the validity or usefulness of the hysteresis 
concept. He provides a technical exposition to express the distinction between 
j 
the hysteresis and nonergodicity concepts. He defines nonergodicity to refer to 
stochastic processes in which space (cross-sectional) moments (e.g. averages) 
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do not coincide with time (longitudinal) moments for repeated realisations of the 
stochastic process. Nonstationarity is a sufficient condition for nonergodicity, 
though there are cases of stationary processes which are nonergodic (because 
cross-sectional moments don't coincide with longitudinal moments). 
Nonergodicity is the broader term. Davidson raises the point that it is difficult to 
determine what length of time should be used for a shock-induced change to be 
considered permanent. A change to a dependent variable may be enduring, but 
may gradually diminish over a period of ten or twenty years. Must one therefore 
distinguish between true (specific) hysteresis and persistent but temporary 
(general) hysteresis? Davidson also takes issue with the notion of "shocks" 
being necessary to change the path of the economy: he considers a more 
gradualistic unfolding of events which is influenced by changing expectations to 
be closer to the Post Keynesian view. In all, he considers that the nonergodicity 
concept better captures the view of uncertainty expressed by Keynes in which 
there is no scientific or mathematical basis for arriving at firm inferences about 
the future. 
Keynes himself did not make use of either the concept of nonergodicity or 
hysteresis. Both have been introduced subsequently to clarify and gain 
additional insights into the nature of the uncertainty which Post Keynesians 
maintain underpins economic reality. It does appear that both concepts can be 
embraced by Keynes' more general notion of uncertainty, and that nonergodicity 
comes closer to describing this notion due to its being the broader concept. 
Hysteresis, however, is a useful concept in recognising uncertainty due to 
historical time dependence, especially in its implication of time path 
dependence, which serves as a basis of criticism toward those such as neo-
Ricardians (as well as neoclassical economists) who examine long-period 
equilibrium positions without consideration of the effects of the previous time 
path in determining the equilibrium position. 
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1.8 Real Analysis versus Monetary Analysis 
The distinction made by Schumpeter (1954:276) between Real Analysis and 
Monetary Analysis provides a useful framework against which to examine 
monetary theories. Schumpeter defines Real Analysis as comprising those 
theories in which real forces only, and not monetary forces, determine 
long-period equilibrium positions. Theories in the Real Analysis tradition 
assume that all essential features of an economy can be understood in terms of 
real factor inputs, real goods produced and consumed, and real capital being 
utilised or expanded through investment, with markets responding in terms of 
real resource allocation. In Monetary Analysis, on the other hand, monetary 
forces are assumed to play an important role in determination of long-run 
equilibrium in addition to real forces. Monetary Analysis seeks to integrate real 
and monetary forces in economic theories. Variables such as money supply 
aggregates and interest rates are regarded as essential elements of a modern 
capitalist economy which can influence real magnitudes in the long as well as 
the short run. 
Neoclassical economists and monetarists fall into the Real Analysis stream, 
since the outcomes of their theories and models (at least in the long run) 
depend on real economic factors only. Keynes and Post Keynesians fall into 
the Monetary Analysis stream. There are some economists who can only be 
classified in terms of this distinction after careful examination of their theories. 
Wicksell is such an example, since it needs to be shown that his natural rate of 
interest is determined solely in the real economy before placing his theories in 
the Real Analysis category. The distinction assists in clarifying the essential 
nature of the theory in question and in expressing a fundamental characteristic 
of all Post Keynesian monetary theory. 
Rogers (1989), for instance, uses this distinction as the key principle for 
contrasting monetary theories built pn the precepts of Keynes with those arising 
from a neoclassical, particularly neo-Walrasian, foundation. He uses the 
Monetary Analysis concept to develop and present a monetary theory which 
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embraces the Post Keynesian conception of the working of a modern economy. 
Moore (1988a) endorses the distinction and the classification of Post Keynesian 
monetary theory in the Monetary Analysis camp. Fundamental to the distinction 
is the assumption adopted concerning the nature of money. Monetary theories 
in the tradition of Real Analysis adopt a commodity view of money. This view 
may well have been valid in the predominantly agricultural economies of two or 
more centuries ago when use of commodity money was widespread and the 
banking system at an early stage of development. Theories in the Monetary 
Analysis tradition regard the nature of money in a modern, capitalist economy to 
be best characterised as credit money, with very different properties from those 
of commodity money. Although modern theorists in the Real Analysis tradition 
recognise the existence of credit, they adopt the tacit assumption that credit 
behaves or can be made to behave in the same manner as commodity money 
(Rogers, 1989:4). 
The two main streams of neoclassical general equilibrium theory, Wicksellian 
and neo-Walrasian, can both be shown to fall into the Real Analysis tradition, 
and to have fundamental defects in providing a theoretical basis for analysing 
monetary issues. Recognition of money as being credit-money in character 
provides a basis for development of a theory of monetary equilibrium, which in 
conjunction with the principle of effective demand propounded by Keynes, leads 
to economic equilibrium in which monetary variables play an essential role. 
Monetary forces are able to determine both short-period and long-period 
equilibrium positions (Rogers, 1989:10). The arguments concerning theories in 
the Real Analysis tradition, and the development of an alternative Post 
Keynesian theory in the Monetary Analysis tradition, are taken forward in the 
next chapter. 
1.9 Concluding Remarks 
The Post Keynesian theory of mor,iey therefore has its roots in the work and 
insights of Keynes, but has been extended and further developed by economists 
who can broadly be regarded as in the Post Keynesian mould. Economic work 
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of this nature was undertaken from the-years following Keynes' General Theory, 
by economists such as Joan Robinson and Kaldor, but became more clearly 
consolidated as a Post Keynesian view in the late 1970s, particularly in 
response to the rise in monetarism and to dissatisfaction with the neoclassical 
synthesis as an interpretation of Keynes. Some of the underlying differences in 
viewing monetary issues can be traced historically to the Currency School -
Banking School division from the early 1800s, and more recent differences in 
conceptual frameworks can be identified, such as those relating to uncertainty, 
time, the nature of equilibrium and the best characterisation of money in a 
modern capitalist economy. Also apparent are differences in methodological 
approaches, with monetarists being inclined to instrumentalist views and Post 
Keynesians being strongly concerned with realism in assumptions, often 
drawing on 'stylised facts'. The distinction between Real Analysis and Monetary 
Analysis provides a useful framework in which to examine the Post Keynesian 
theory of money, and the Monetary Analysis perspective is used in the next 
chapter to examine further the theoretical aspects of the Post Keynesian view of 
money. 
32 
CHAPTER 2 
THE THEORY OF MONETARY ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
' In this chapter, the main theoretical aspects underlying a Post Keynesian view 
of money are examined. The work of four leading Post Keynesian writers is 
referred to extensively as representative of the Post Keynesian viewpoint: 
namely Davidson, Moore, Kaldor and Rogers. All four are widely recognised 
adherents to the Post Keynesian school, and all four have given considerable 
attention to monetary issues from a Post Keynesian perspective. The views and 
approaches of other Post Keynesian writers, for instance Minsky concerning 
financial instability, are drawn on where applicable to give additional viewpoints 
and comment. Writers from other schools (particularly monetarist and rational 
expectations) are drawn on to highlight the differences in viewpoints and nature 
of debates. The main themes which characterise a Post Keynesian view of 
money, and which differ from alternative views of money, are thereby presented. 
The chapter looks at the key issues of Post Keynesian monetary theory under 
the assumption of a closed economy: the non-neutrality of money with respect to 
real economic variables, the mechanism through which interest rates are 
determined, the path through monetary equilibrium to economic equilibrium in 
terms of the principle of effective demand, the interrelationship between 
investment behaviour and monetary variables, and the underlying causes of 
inflation. These strands are drawn together to express the Post Keynesian 
monetary view in a formal model in Section 2.7. In Section 2.8, an examination 
is made of why the IS/LM framework does not and cannot adequately portray 
the Post Keynesian monetary view. The theme running through these issues 
and models is the close interrelationship of monetary and real sectors, in 
accordance with the tradition of Monetary Analysis. 
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2.2 Non-Neutrality of Money 
As indicated in Chapter 1, monetary theories can be assessed in terms of the 
effects envisaged on the real economy as a result of changes in monetary 
variables. Monetarists, in the classical tradition, adopt the view that monetary 
aggregates have no effect on the real economy in the long run, with effects 
being confined to changes in aggregate price levels only. This reflects the 
classical view that money is a veil behind which the real economy operates, or 
the oil in the economic machine, necessary for its smooth operation, but without 
substantive effect. Monetarists therefore fall into Schumpeter's Real Analysis 
classification, as generally do all economists holding neoclassical views. Post 
Keynesians believe, on the other hand, that monetary variables have 
substantive real effects in the long run as well as in the short run and fall 
squarely into Schumpeter's Monetary Analysis classification. 
Marx and Keynes both held the view that the assumptions underlying Say's Law 
are not applicable to a capitalist economy: that they are applicable only to a 
barter or co-operative economy. In rejecting Say's Law and introducing the 
principle of effective demand, Keynes (1936) provided a substantive role for 
money in the real economy in the tradition of Monetary Analysis. The centrality 
of the interdependence of the role of money and capitalist production in Keynes' 
insights is captured by the original title of what was to become the General 
. 
Theory: a 'Monetary Theory of Production'. Keynes' view of money is one in 
which it is bound inextricably into the economic system in a capitalist economy, 
and it is this profound non-neutrality which is adopted by Post Keynesians. 
The manner in which money can be introduced into theoretical economic models 
in such a way that it plays a plausible role has been a longstanding puzzle and 
source of debate in economic discourse. Proponents of a general equilibrium 
approach to economic analysis face the barrier that their models cannot explain 
adequately the existence and be~aviour of money. The issues concerning 
incorporating money into the general equilibrium framework were debated 
particularly vigorously in the 1960s. The conventional manner of reflecting 
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money in a general equilibrium model is in the form of a commodity having 
demand and supply schedules in a similar manner to other commo~ities. It may 
be reflected as the nth commodity and serve as the numeraire to indicate its unit 
of account function, but this does not explain its behaviour as a medium of 
exchange or store of value. This was of particular concern to Keynesians who 
wished to combine a non-neutral view of money with a general equilibrium 
modelling approach. Patinkin (1965) for instance, as a Keynesian in this mould, 
sought to introduce money into a general equilibrium framework by positing a 
real-balance effect as the causative channel through which money affects real 
economic variables. Clower (1967) countered this approach by showing that 
introduction of money into a general equilibrium model in a logically coherent 
manner produces results no different from those under assumptions of barter. 
The arguments of each are outlined below. 
Patinkin (1965) highlighted the apparent contradiction arising from the quantity 
theory in which an equiproportionate increase in prices leaves relative prices 
unaffected and therefore does not affect real demand and supply of 
commodities (the homogeneity postulate); and yet the price level increase must 
have reduced the real purchasing power of the money supply. He put forward a 
real-balance (wealth) effect of money holding as an equilibrating force which 
can affect real magnitudes. He argued (as suggested by monetarists) that 
household durables should be included in considering the asset portfolio 
preferences of economic actors, rather than including financial assets only, as in 
Keynes' examination of liquidity preference. This leads to a theory in which real 
money balances have a direct effect on purchases of durable goods through 
portfolio rearrangement on the part of economic actors. Patinkin applied this 
principle in a neo-Walrasian general equilibrium framework to provide a role for 
money in which it is non-neutral. 
Clower (1967) took issue with this portrayal of money in a general equilibrium 
framework. His argument is based on extension of his dual decision hypothesis 
J 
(Clower, 1965) which suggests the separation of wage-earning and purchasing 
decisions as implicitly underlying the breaking of Say's Law in Keynes' principle 
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of effective demand. He maintains that money in a neo-Walrasian general 
equilibrium model needs to be reflected as a finance constraint_ (his term is 
expenditure constraint) indicating that economic actors need to be in possession 
of the required amount of money before they can effect an exchange 
transaction. He paraphrases this as a situation in which money buys goods, 
goods buy money, but goods cannot buy goods. This gives mor:iey its medium 
of exchange function. The finance constraint is additional to the budget 
constraint (which he terms the income constraint) which takes account of the 
total endowments of agents rather than money held. Clower uses a simple 
exchange model with discrete time periods and market equilibrium being 
established at the beginning of each period through a tatonnement process. 
Agents receive an endowment of commodities at the beginning of each period. 
Commodities cannot be carried over to subsequent periods, other than money 
which is the only durable commodity and therefore serves as a store of value 
between periods. The quantity of money is fixed. Equilibrium prices and 
quantities once established are irrevocable. 
For any one time period, an agent's endowment of each good is denoted as Sii . 
The initial money holding of each agent is mi . Agents determine their 
consumption requirement for each good for the period, dii, and money balances 
' 
to be carried forward, mi, in accordance with the price vector (reached through 
tatonnement), p. The budget constraint, indicating that the value of 
consumption and money balances carried forward cannot exceed the value of 
the initial endowment plus initial money balances, can be stated as: 
The finance constraint, which requires all transactions to be effected through the 
medium of money, can be stated as: 
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mi represents intra-period money balances held by the agent, consisting of the 
initial money balance less purchases and plus sales effected durinQ the period. 
The result of the finance constraint in Glower's model is that the inclusion of 
money plays a role only in the restriction of actual trades which are able to take 
place. It plays no role in the equilibrium set of prices and quar.1tities which is 
established by the auctioneer at the beginning of the period. The tatonnement 
process has already costlessly pre-reconciled all purchase and sale plans with 
an equilibrium price vector. Clower concludes that in spite of the introduction of 
the finance constraint, the general equilibrium model remains formally 
equivalent to one of barter. A model in which money restricts trading rather than 
improving efficiencies, and plays no part in determining equilibrium values, does 
not provide an adequate basis for a theory in which money plays an essential 
role. 
Rogers (1989:88) points out that both arguments are technically flawed in 
certain respects. He maintains that Patinkin's quantity equation addition to a 
neo-Walrasian model is similar in principle to the finance constraint proposed by 
Clower (1989:90). He argues that both writers were traversing barren ground, 
since the crucial characteristic of a neo-Walrasian model as far as monetary 
theory is concerned is that it is fundamentally a perfect barter model in which 
money cannot be accorded an essential role. 
Attempts have been made to find a role for money in neo-Walrasian models by 
dropping the assumption of a complete array of contingent futures markets. 
This gives rise to temporary equilibrium models, with trading occurring at every 
date. TE or sequence economies allow the introduction of expectations with 
trading at each TE point being dependent on the expectations of agents 
concerning prices and quantities at future equilibrium points. It does not, 
however, resolve how expectations are determined. Two approaches to 
formation of expectations in TE models have been adopted: the first is to 
J 
assume that expectations are formed exogenously to the model, the second is to 
assume that each agent predicts correctly, on average, all future prices and 
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quantities using the structure of the TE models. Neither of these approaches is 
able to produce an essential role for money in the model. Th~ first simply 
leaves expectations unexplained and is unable to move forward in considering 
monetary issues: most theorists now consider such a treatment as ad hoc and 
hence unsatisfactory (Rogers, 1989:49). The second, which incorporates the 
Rational Expectations Hypothesis, reduces the TE structure once again to one 
that is isomorphic to the Arrow-Debreu model - there is still no essential role 
for money to play. 
Rogers finds that in all cases a neo-Walrasian framework is unable to provide a 
suitable model for money to play an essential role in the economy. He 
concludes that neo-Walrasian models are fundamentally models of perfect 
barter and that we need to "resolve the dilemma of neo-Walrasian monetary 
theory by allowing that theory to disappear." (Rogers, 1989:67). This is one of 
the foundation stones in development of a Post Keynesian monetary theory: 
that the integral connection between monetary variables and the real sector 
cannot be captured through a neo-Walrasian set of equations being brought to 
equilibrium by a conceptual auctioneer through a price-adjusting tatonnement 
process. 
In view of the inability of the general equilibrium framework to allow the 
plausible inclusion of money in a non-neutral role, Post Keynesians believe that 
any non-neutral monetary theory needs to be built on an alternative theoretical 
foundation. The theoretical framework they consider provides a suitable basis 
for a non-neutral monetary theory is that put forward by Keynes, using the 
principle of effective demand concept and the notion of monetary equilibrium 
which underpins the equilibrium level at which the economy operates. This 
framework introduces monetary variables into the causal nexus determining real 
and monetary magnitudes in such a way that the non-neutrality of money is a 
fundamental aspect of theoretical models used. At the same time, this 
framework is able to preserve the notions of uncertainty and historical time 
J 
which are regarded as important components of a Post Keynesian analysis. 
lhis gives rise to a monetary theory which is squarely in the tradition of 
38 
Monetary Analysis and of Keynes' General Theory, as elaborated on in the 
remaining sections of this chapter. 
2.3 Interest Rate Mechanism 
Post Keynesian views on interest rates can best be seen against a backdrop of 
Wicksellian interest rate theory, together with the liquidity preference approach 
and marginal efficiency of capital (MEG) introduced by Keynes. Wicksell sought 
to extend the quantity theory of money to an economy which has moved beyond 
the use of commodity money to the use of credit and loans. Wicksell, writing his 
major work at the turn of the century (Wicksell, 1898:77-78), was fully cognisant 
of the growing importance of credit money and was seeking to develop a 
monetary theory that took account of the widespread use of credit in the 
economy. He argued that in: 
a pure credit economy, the exchange rate of money and the level of commodity prices 
must depend on the price at which 'money' (i.e. in this case credit itself) can be 
obtained, in other words on the rate of interest on money. A low rate of interest must 
lead to rising prices, a high rate to falling prices. And this is in full agreement with the 
basic principles of the quantity theory, because a surplus of material money would 
manifest itself, among other ways, in a lower interest on money. 
Wicksell put forward the concept of a natural rate of interest, determined by 
underlying real forces in the economy, in particular the marginal productivity of 
capital and propensity to save. Wicksell held the classical view of capital as 
being analysable as stored labour and land inputs. He regarded capital as 
being value capital, or exchange capital, rather than as individual physical 
machines. This was necessary to his approach in which movements of (value) 
capital take place in order to equalise returns to capital in the economy. In 
equilibrium, a single rate of return on capital prevails, and this equates to the 
natural rate of interest. The market rate may be above or below this natural 
rate. The effect of the market rate being below the natural rate is price inflation, 
resulting from the concomitant surplus of money in the economy, operating 
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through the quantity theory. Similarly, interest rates higher than the natural rate 
with corresponding restricted money supply lead to price defl_ation. This 
adjustment takes place until the inflation or deflation increases/decreases the 
real value of the money supply to the point where there is no longer a surplus or 
shortage and the market interest rate returns to being equal to the natural rate. 
Wicksell emphasised that it is the difference between the market and natural 
rates that gives rise to price inflation or deflation rather than the nominal value 
of the market interest rate itself. The natural rate serves as a centre of 
gravitation of the system, and it is the market rate that adjusts toward the natural 
rate. 
Wicksell preserved the classical notion of loanable funds as being the proximate 
determinant of the natural rate of interest. This entails the natural interest rate 
being determined at the point where the demand and supply schedules for 
loanable funds in the economy intersect. Although the loanable funds are in the 
form of money or credit, Wicksell "and other classical economists such as 
Dennis Robertson" adopt the view that the demand and supply of loanable 
funds continue to reflect the real forces of productivity and thrift (Rogers, 
1989:40). Rogers points out that, although it may make sense to talk in terms of 
real saving and investment in a one-commodity world, for instance using a 
simple corn model, difficulties arise once capital consists of machines which are 
produced rather than saved. Real saving is· then no longer equivalent to the 
retention of a produced commodity for use in production in a future period; it is 
not equivalent to seed corn in a one-commodity corn model. Rather, the money 
value of desired saving is supplied to the financial markets as loanable funds, 
and the notion of real saving is not tenable in a world in which capital goods are 
produced. Similarly, on the demand side, the consequences of the capital 
debate indicate that capital cannot be treated as real value capital outside a 
one-commodity model.1 The determination of a natural rate through the forces 
of productivity and thrift is thereby lost outside a one-commodity world. The 
The capital debate involved extensive discussion in the economic literature over a 
considerable period. Only the conclusion is mentioned here, since the debate is not 
central to this discussion. 
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intersection of demand and supply schedules for loanable funds needs to be 
interpreted as applying only to financial and monetary flows in the ~conomy, not 
to real commodities, to avoid the difficulties raised in the capital debate. It could 
still be logically valid to argue that their intersection determines the market rate 
of interest, but the natural rate is left without theoretical foundation. For this 
reason, Rogers (1989:43) argues that the natural rate of interest is "a concept 
which must be abandoned and the market rate of interest is left hanging by its 
own bootstraps". 
Keynes' liquidity preference theory provided a view of interest rate determination 
alternative to those based on loanable funds, such as that of Wicksell, and is 
central to economic analysis in the world of Keynes and the Post Keynesians. 
Keynes regarded interest as "the reward for parting with liquidity for a specified 
period" (1936:167). A liquidity preference schedule could be expressed as a 
smooth curve with the rate of interest falling as the quantity of money is 
increased (Keynes, 1936:171 ). The liquidity preference theory is based on the 
notion that economic actors will adjust their portfolios of financial assets 
(including money) through trading in such a way as to reach, in equilibrium, 
equality of money rates of returns on the spread of assets. Keynes expressed 
the portfolio composition as a combination of money balances and government 
bonds to simplify the analysis and explanation of money-related liquidity 
preference effects. The bonds category could, however, be expanded to include 
a wide range of marketable financial assets. Of the three motives for holding 
money put forward in the General Theory. transactions, precautionary and 
speculative, the latter is directly dependent on the interest rate level and is 
determined through the portfolio preference of economic actors between bonds 
(interest earning assets) and money. With an increase in the interest rate, 
agents increase their holding of bonds due to the reduction of bond prices, 
expectation of capital gain, and the higher opportunity cost of non-interest 
bearing money holding. Monetary effects are traced through this liquidity 
preference mechanism in Keynes and Keynesian exegesis; but the liquidity 
J 
preference theory can be seen as comprising a broader base according to which 
asset prices and therefore returns on capital move towards equilibrium through 
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portfolio adjustment processes, as developed in particular by Tobin (e.g. Tobin, 
1965). However, a concern raised with liquidity preference theory in its broad 
sense by for instance Moore (1989), is that there are classes of financial assets 
which are not marketable (e.g. bank loans). These could not form part of a 
continuous portfolio adjustment process as is applicable to marketable assets. 
Also crucial in the work of Keynes and Post Keynesians is the marginal 
efficiency of capital (MEG), defined by Keynes as the expected future return of a 
capital asset, equal to the discount rate which equate~ the future income and 
cost stream associated with the asset to the present capital cost of the asset 
(Keynes, 1936:135). The MEG will differ for individual assets; a schedule can 
be compiled ranking capital investments from highest to lowest, giving rise to a 
downward sloping MEG curve in return-investment space. It should be noted 
that the MEG could refer to the holding of existing capital assets as well as 
investment in new assets; it will be used to refer to the latter unless indicated to 
the contrary, in which case the abbreviation MEH provides greater clarity. 
The crucial contrast to Wicksellian theory that the combination of liquidity 
preference and the MEG provides in Keynes' and Post Keynesian analyses, is 
that the interest rate serves to determine the MEG at which capital investment 
projects become attractive for entrepreneurs to undertake. The Wicksellian 
mechanism is reversed, with the MEG tending towards the interest rate level, 
rather than the interest rate tending towards a natural (real) rate. This was a 
major component of Keynes' theory of investment and output determination, 
giving rise to a level which could be below full employment: 
the significant conclusion is that the output of new investment will be pushed to the 
point at which the marginal efficiency of capital becomes equal to the rate of interest; 
and what the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital tells us, is, not what the rate 
of interest is, but the point to which the output of new investment will be pushed, given 
the rate of interest. (Keynes, 1936: 184). 
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The Post Keynesian concept of monetary equilibrium is built on this point of 
departure. 
With the theory that investment would adjust in such a way as to bring the 
marginal efficiency of capital to equal the interest rate, Keynes (1936, Chapter 
17) sought to provide an explanation of why the interest rate wouJd not adjust in 
the long period so as to bring the economy to full employment. He regarded all 
assets as having an own rate of interest comprising a yield element (q), a 
carrying cost (c) and a liquidity premium (I), so that this net rate of return in 
terms of the asset itself can be expressed as q-c+I. As production and 
deployment of assets having higher own rates of interest is expanded, their 
returns will diminish due to the demand for their end products being increasingly 
fulfilled. In the long period, this should bring all own rates towards equality at a 
level approaching the own rate on money (with differentials to allow for relative 
risks). Keynes' explanation of why the money rate of interest would remain too 
high for the economy to reach full employment is not entirely convincing or clear 
(Chick, 1983:303). It is based on the own rate of interest on money declining 
less rapidly than that on other assets so that it eventually becomes the highest 
rate, rendering further investment in other assets unprofitable. The reasons 
advanced by Keynes for the peculiarity of money in this regard are its negligible 
elasticity of production and of substitution (Keynes, 1936:230-234). These, 
together with its being the numeraire in terms of which money wage rates are 
expressed, and its negligible carrying cost, result in its maintaining a significant 
own rate (through the liquidity premium) in spite of increases in its quantity. It is 
thus the very nature of money which causes it eventually to have the highest 
own rate of interest, so that further expansion of other assets is curtailed at a 
level below full employment. This somewhat obscure justification by Keynes 
can be avoided by taking the rate of interest to be determined exogenously, by 
convention or by the monetary authorities or a combination of the two, which is 
more in line with the interest rate view taken by Keynes in the Treatise and other 
parts of the General Theory. For example (1936:164), he refers to management 
j 
of the rate of interest as a means to stimulate the appropriate volume of 
investment. Full employment is then not reached in the long period due to the 
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exogenously determined interest rate not being at the rate which enables 
profitable expansion of assets towards full employment equilibrium. The 
exogenous determination of the interest rate is the view typically taken by Post 
Keynesians, as elaborated on below. 
Moore (1988a:263-270) is very explicit in expressing an exogenous interest rate 
view. He regards nominal interest rates as being determined by the central 
bank, as an administered policy variable. This is in accordance with his view of 
a horizontal short-run nominal money supply function in interest-money space, 
with the exogeneity being an intrinsic aspect of a credit-money economy. It is 
the counterpart of his view of strong endogeneity of monetary aggregates. 
Kaldor likewise clearly holds the view of the interest rate being under the control 
of the monetary authority, for instance 11a given stance of monetary policy is best 
expressed by a chosen rate of interest, and not by a chosen quantity of credit 
money in existence; and, whether the elasticity of the demand for money be 
large or small, the elasticity of supply of money, given the chosen rate of 
interest, is infinite." (Kaldor & Trevithick, 1981 :318). He is expressing a 
horizontalist view similar to that of Moore. He follows Keynes' view of long-term 
interest rates being a major determinant of investment levels and through this 
establishing an output level which may not necessarily be at full employment. 
He also holds the liquidity preference view of money demand as propounded by 
Keynes, for instance, "the distribution of wealth between liquid or illiquid assets 
is a portfolio decision which depends partly on wealth holders' preferences for 
liquidity and/or their expectation of the behaviour of interest rates in the future. 11 
(Kaldor & Trevithick, 1981 :323). Rogers likewise stresses the centrality of the 
exogenous nature of the interest rate, for instance "the fact that the rate of 
interest is an exogenous or independent variable cannot be overemphasised." 
(1989:251 ). Surprisingly, Davidson does not focus significantly on the 
determination of the interest rate in his major works (e.g. Davidson, 
1978, 1982, 1994). He clearly adopts the liquidity preference theory put forward 
by Keynes - and devotes considerable attention to supplementing it with a fourth 
l 
motive for holding money, the finance motive. Although not put forward in the 
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General Theory, Davidson points out that Keynes recognised this omission 
shortly after its publication. The finance motive is taken up in Chapter 3. 
It is thus apparent that exogenously determined short-term nominal interest 
rates, under the control of the central bank, are a key feature of a Post 
Keynesian monetary view, and that this is regarded as an intrim~ic feature of a 
credit-money economy, rather than an ·ideal or policy preference. The Post 
Keynesian view recognises, however, that there are limits within which this 
exogeneity must operate (Moore, 1988a:266). These depend on the economic 
circumstances faced by the country, as well as structural characteristics such as 
the size, degree of openness and government regulatory framework. The limits 
apply in particular to an open economy, since the interest rate has direct 
consequences for foreign capital inflows or outflows, and this is taken up in 
Chapter 3. But even in a closed economy, holding of short-term nominal 
interest rates at too low a level will result in investment projects being 
undertaken which are not sustainable in the long run, and to an excessive rate 
of expansion of economic activity with demand-led inflation (Moore, 1988a:269). 
Too high a rate would conversely have a severe dampening effect on economic 
activity and employment. In addition to inflationary/deflationary effects, large 
and frequent changes in the central bank administered rate is likely to cause 
severe economic disruption and uncertainty since the basis on which 
entrepreneurs take investment decisions changes significantly and 
unpredictably. A sound investment decision today may be rendered foolhardy 
within days or weeks. This similarly applies to transactions in financial asset 
markets. A central bank is constrained from moving too far from a current 
interest rate level in too short a time period in order to meet its goal of stability in 
the financial system. 
The interest rate exogeneity view applies, strictly speaking, to short-term 
nominal rates. However, Post Keynesian writers recognise a fairly strong 
relationship from short-term rates through the term structure to long-term rates. 
J 
This is in line with Keynes' view in which long-term rates are determined by 
expectations of the future path of short-term rates (Moore, 1988a:252). Moore 
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appears to regard the relation of interest rates across the term spectrum to the 
short-term rate as fairly direct, based on weighted expectations of future short 
rates. Rogers (1989:251 ), on the other hand, describes a transmission 
mechanism from short to long rates which "is somewhat elastic and 
manipulations of Bank rate to change long rates may not always be effective." 
This is more in line with the Radcliffe Report (1959) which. regarded the 
spectrum of financial assets from short to long term, and with different risk and 
liquidity characteristics, as being complex and subject to multiple influences. 
Whether more of less direct, the Post Keynesian view is generally one of 
causality from short to longer term, rather than short rates varying about a norm 
or convention in respect of long rates, for instance in the nature of a real rate 
norm as suggested by Fisher (Moore, 1988a:257), but which has been shown 
empirically not to be valid. Post Keynesian writers, however, recognise a 
conventional or psychological aspect to interest rates operating in conjunction 
with central bank determination. Rogers, for instance, maintains that the 
interest rate "reflects psychological, institutional and other historical factors 
which cannot be specified a priori." (1989:253). He distinguishes between 
transitory and persistent changes in market rates, with the former being 
temporary fluctuations which do not affect the long-term rate and through it 
investment. The long rate then has psychological and institutional factors built 
into it and the monetary authorities need to ensure ongoing confidence in the 
rate to avoid deviations which could cause elastic expectations with a 
destabilising result. 
The mechanism through which the money rate of interest plays its role in 
integrating real and monetary variables can be described using Keynes' concept 
of an own rate of interest on a commodity or asset. The own rate refers to a 
forward differential in terms of the commodity or asset itself rather than in terms 
of money or another commodity/asset (Keynes, 1936:222). It can be expressed 
as 
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where 01 and Os refer to future and present quantities respectively. Using 
Fisher's notion of the marginal rate of return over cost, which can oe expressed 
as 
(future value - present value)/present value 
the own rate of interest in terms of money can be expressed as ' 
where Pi and Ps refer to the forward and present (spot) prices of each. 
Keynes (1936: 140-141) regarded Fisher's rate of return over cost as identical 
with his definition of the marginal efficiency of capital. The own rate of interest 
(return) in terms of money can therefore be viewed as equivalent to Keynes' 
MEC. Monetary equilibrium is attained when the money rate of interest equals 
the money rate of return on durable assets, i.e.: 
for all durable assets, where im is the money rate of interest. For each asset, j, 
the money interest rate can be expressed as an own rate of own interest or 
MEC, fj, together with an adjustment factor, ai: 
\/ j, j = 1, .... ,n. 
For each asset, ai can then be expressed in terms of spot and forward prices 
and quantities of the asset as: 
The adjustment process can be examined using a Marshallian distinction 
between long period, short period and market period. In long-period 
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equilibrium, the adjustment factors in all cases are zero as spot and forward 
prices are identical. This means that the marginal efficiencies for all assets are 
equal, and equal in turn to the market rate of interest: 
im =Ii \;/ j, j = 1, .... ,n. 
The adjustment factors come into play in providing the price signals for 
adjustment when the economy is outside its long-period equilibrium. If, for 
instance, the interest rate is increased to im1 , lending money provides a higher 
return than holding durable assets, and the demand for these assets falls in the 
Marshallian market period. In market period equilibrium, with positive 
adjustment factors, 
( p -P.) Q 
f SJ f 
m 1 = !:..i + J p ( Q J } V j, j = 1, .... , n 
sj sj 
The fall of spot prices of durable assets below their long-period supply prices 
means that these assets can no longer be profitably produced, in accordance 
with Marshallian analysis. The long-period supply price represents the costs of 
production, including normal profits, and market prices below this imply lower 
than normal profits, or losses. 
The adjustment process in the short period occurs through the reduced 
production of durable assets, and thereby of output. This in turn tends to 
reverse the decrease in the spot prices of assets through reduced supply. The 
adjustment continues towards long-period equilibrium, at which the capital stock 
is lower than with the initial interest rate, im . Long-period equilibrium is re-
attained at the higher interest rate since the reduction in the capital stock has 
caused the marginal efficiencies of assets, the Ii , to rise. The new long-period 
equilibrium is 
im1 = f 1j V j, j = 1, .... ,·n 
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where r 1j > Ii for each asset. 
Neo-Ricardians (e.g. Garegnani) take issue with Keynes' analysis of the rate of 
interest, and correspondingly with the extension of Keynes' analysis as outlined 
above, on the grounds that it is simply a restatement of the neoclassical 
relationship between natural and market interest rates (Rogers, ·1989:229-234). 
They are also concerned that no theory is put forward for determination of the 
market rate of interest. It should be clear from the above, however, that the 
neoclassical natural rate of interest, which is determined by the real forces of 
productivity and thrift in the form of savings and investment in a loanable funds 
theory, is not equivalent to the marginal efficiencies of capital which are 
determined by expected future returns of durable assets compared to their initial 
cost. The second charge is readily answered by pointing out that Keynes 
regarded the market interest rate as being largely determined by convention, 
psychological and historical factors, and Post Keynesians generally regard it as 
exogenously determined by the monetary authorities within limits: there is 
therefore no requirement for an economic theory to explain the market interest 
rate level in the Keynes and Post Keynesian view. 
2.4 Principle of Effective Demand 
Keynes' principle of effective demand specifically refutes Say's Law. In a Say's 
Law economy, aggregate demand and aggregate supply schedules would be 
identically equal across their entire length, since supply at all points gives rise to 
demand sufficient to absorb the supply. In Keynes' theory, aggregate demand 
and supply curves are separate, intersecting at an equilibrium point (effective 
demand point) which is not necessarily at full employment of the economy in 
either the short or long run. Keynes expresses aggregate demand and supply 
curves as schedules of total proceeds against employment level. The 
aggregate supply curve is derived from Marshallian microeconomic 
underpinnings (Davidson, 1994:16,4). The aggregate demand curve comprises 
an income-related component (loosely referred to as consumption) and a 
component not related to income (loosely referred to as investment). The 
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consumption component is further analysed in terms of the marginal propensity 
to consume, which is assumed always to be less than one, giving rise to a 
non-consumption portion of income, defined as saving. The investment 
component depends on decisions by firms to acquire newly produced capital 
assets, and these decisions depend on the marginal efficiency of capital {MEG), 
interest rate and capital goods market conditions. The MEG in turn incorporates 
expected future demand conditions, expected costs, economic conditions 
generally, as well as Keynes' animal spirits. 
The investment component of aggregate demand is therefore integral to any 
Post Keynesian theory of money, since it provides the forum in which interest 
rate variables interact with capital investment markets to determine real 
economic outputs. Allied to this is Keynes' liquidity preference theory of interest 
rates through which funds are allocated to liquid assets {money and similar) or 
financial assets {bonds, equities, etc.). These views contrast strongly with 
classical and neoclassical theories, in which one or other variant of the loanable 
funds theory ensures that the supply of loanable funds is balanced with the 
requirement for funds for investment, by market adjustment of the interest rate, 
thereby propelling the economy to full employment equilibrium. No such 
adjustment takes place in Keynes' principle of effective demand. 
In the Post Keynesian analysis, monetary equilibrium is directly linked to 
determination of the point of effective demand, giving the level of output and 
employment at which the economy operates. This is crucial, since it is through 
the principle of effective demand that Keynes demonstrated the possibility of the 
economy operating at less than full employment, without there being forces to 
move it towards full employment. In accordance with the previous section, the 
money rate of interest is regarded as an exogenous-type variable, im, based on 
a combination of central bank determination, convention, psychological and 
historical factors. The exogenous interest rate gives rise to a particular 
investment level which balances, the marginal efficiencies of assets to the 
interest rate. This level of investment may or may not be such as to employ all 
resources in the economy. But since the investment rate is established by 
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monetary equilibrium, which is a long-period equilibrium, there are no further 
economic forces towards asset price changes, interest rate adjustment or 
investment which will cause either aggregate demand or aggregate supply curve 
to shift. The economy is therefore confined to this involuntary unemployment 
equilibrium unless the interest rate changes. At the equilibrium point, there is 
no incentive for entrepreneurs to expand production of capital due to there 
being no profit from doing so beyond Marshallian normal profits. Say's Law is 
broken since additional supply does not create its own demand if it cannot be 
sold at a profit. 
The Post Keynesian mechanism giving rise to the point of effective demand 
takes place through pricing of new capital assets in the fixed capital market. As 
Keynes pointed out (1936:186), the rate of interest does not equate the demand 
and supply of new capital investment. Instead, it is the prices of capital goods 
that bring about equality between the stock of capital goods demanded and that 
offered. The demand price of a capital good depends on the future income yield 
that it is expected to generate; the price is given by the future yield discounted 
at the prevailing interest rate. The supply price, on the other hand, is given by 
the producing firms' cost functions according to Marshallian short- or long-
period analysis. It should be noted that the supply refers to completed capital 
goods placed on the market, not only to the flow-supply of new capital goods 
produced. The supply of capital goods can be aggregated from representative 
capital producing and selling firms, to give a combined supply of existing assets 
(fixed) and newly produced assets (upward sloping), as shown by Sk +skin the 
diagram below (Davidson, 1994:56-62). 
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Figure 2.1 Capital goods market 
Capital 
The demand is a downward-sloping curve of functional form: 
Dk = f (Pk, i , cp, E) 
where Pk is the price of capital, i the rate of discount, cp the state of expectations 
about the future profits to be earned, and Ethe number of entrepreneurs able to 
obtain the finance required (Rogers, 1989:216). The latter three variables are 
treated as shift parameters in the price-capital schedule shown. The demand 
comprises a downward sloping curve, which shifts to the right when the discount 
rate, i, decreases. Equilibrium is then determined as the intersection of supply 
and demand curves in the capital goods market, with the interest rate as a 
parameter rather than an equilibrating variable. 
2.5 Investment Behaviour 
The marginal efficiency of capital (MEG) schedule of Keynes and the Post 
Keynesians has expectations and uncertainty built into it. The schedule is not 
built up from objective or ex post outcomes of capital investment decisions; nor 
is it based on statistical probability distributions of the likely future income 
streams of alternative capital investments. Keynes' animal spirits on the part of 
entrepreneurs therefore affect the MEG directly. Declining entrepreneurial 
confidence will shift the MEG downwards directly, leading to lower investment at 
a given interest rate. The schedule also incorporates uncertainty in the 
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Knightian sense used by Keynes. Entrepreneurs do not know what the outcome 
of their investment decisions will be, even stochastically in the form of a risk 
profile, and the MEC is a reflection of what entrepreneurs believe to be the likely 
outcome in an uncertain environment. Keynes relates uncertainty to the state of 
confidence, and indicates that, "There are not two separate factors affecting the 
rate of investment, namely, the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital and 
the state of confidence. The state of confidence is relevant because it is one of 
the major factors determining the former, which is the same thing as the 
investment demand-schedule." (1936:149). 
The rate of investment, i.e. new capital formation, in a Post Keynesian view is a 
critical determinant of the level of employment in the economy through the 
principle of effective demand. At the same time, it is subject to the precarious 
perceptions of the future on the part of entrepreneurs. Keynes devotes eight 
chapters of the General Theory to 'The Inducement to Invest' (Book IV), in which 
he places great emphasis on the psychological factors involved. The 
organisation of financial markets in Keynes' view lends itself to speculative 
gyrations, e.g. : "A conventional valuation which is established as the outcome 
of the mass psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals is liable to 
change violently as the result of a sudden fluctuation of opinion due to factors 
which do not really make much difference to the prospective yield; since there 
will be no strong roots of conviction to hold it steady." (Keynes, 1936:154). This 
is the notion taken up by Shackle (197 4:42) in coining the term Keynesian 
kaleidics, i.e. the view that the "expectations, which together with the drive of 
needs or ambitions make up the 'springs of action', are at all times so 
insubstantially founded upon data and so mutably suggested by the stream of 
'news', that is, of counter-expected or totally unthought-of events, that they can 
undergo complete transformation in an hour or even a moment, as the patterns 
in the kaleidoscope dissolve at a touch; .... ". 
The work of Minsky (1982, 1986, 1 ~97) is an important extension of the Keynes 
and Post Keynesian view of the economic world as being inherently subject to 
instability. Minsky developed the thesis that instability is bound into the very 
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nature of a capitalist economy through its financial system. This means that 
episodes of economic recession or depression will inevitably occur from time to 
time in a capitalist economy as a result of the interaction of financial variables, 
and alleviation of such episodes requires suitable government policies and 
interventions. Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is an example of 
monetary variables having a major impact on the real economy. rt is at complete 
variance with a neoclassical view that an economy will tend towards a stable 
equilibrium if market forces are allowed to operate freely and in the absence of 
continual shocks or disturbances. 
Minsky's point of departure is the Post Keynesian recognition that investment is 
determined in a capital asset market according to the supply price of existing 
capital assets, the flow-supply price of newly produced assets (investment) and 
the demand price of capital assets resulting from the expected profit (quasi-rent) 
stream arising through their productive use. The latter depends on the interest 
rate which is used to determine the present capitalised value of capital assets. 
The extent of new investment depends on the relation of demand to supply 
prices of capital assets: assets with a flow-supply price below the demand price 
will not be produced, i.e. the investment will not take place. Minsky (1986:191-
195) amends the asset supply and demand curves to reflect lenders and 
borrowers risk. Lenders risk is the risk of default by the investing entrepreneur 
due to the expected profit stream not being realised. Borrowers risk arises from 
the possibility that the profit yield from the asset expected by the entrepreneur 
does not materialise. Lenders risk increases the supply price of capital assets, 
borrowers risk decreases the demand price. The intersection of the risk 
adjusted curves gives the price at which capital assets are acquired. Minsky 
(1986:183-190) distinguishes between internal funds (generated within the 
enterprise) and external funds (raised from outside parties, typically in the form 
of bank borrowing). A prevailing combination of interest rates, profit 
expectations and perceived risks will justify a particular level of external funding 
by a representative enterprise. To continue the argument, Minsky (1986:206-
208) distinguishes between hedge financing, speculative financing and Ponzi 
financing. Hedge financing is such that expected cash flows from deployment of 
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the capital asset acquired are sufficient to meet both interest and principal 
repayments in each period over the duration of the financing. With speculative 
financing, a shortfall in cash flow yields is expected in some periods, but is 
expected to be made up in others, so that the financing is fully repayable from 
yields of the capital asset over the duration of the financing. Under Ponzi 
financing, yields are insufficient to meet interest and principal payments over the 
duration of the financing arrangement, so that additional financing will be 
required at some point to meet the repayment commitments of the initial 
financing arranged. Whereas entrepreneurs and bankers may enter into 
financing arrangements on a responsible basis according to the economic 
circumstances and information available at the time when the financing is 
provided, these circumstances can and do change over time. Under stable 
conditions, most financing will fall into the hedge and speculative categories, 
with Ponzi financing restricted to cases where entrepreneurs mislead bankers, 
or where investment projects are not adequately assessed. However, an 
increased interest rate beyond expectations, or other unanticipated adverse 
economic changes, can lead to hedge financing becoming speculative 
financing, and speculative financing becoming Ponzi financing. The higher the 
proportion of Ponzi financing in the economy, the more prone is the financial 
system to crisis or catastrophe. 
Minsky's argument goes further than this susceptibility to adverse economic 
changes. He argues that fully rational and responsible financing behaviour by 
bankers and entrepreneurs can build up the conditions for a crisis. This occurs 
because bankers are reliant on repayment records of the past for determining 
the terms and extent of financing provided, and profit yield expectations of 
entrepreneurs are likewise influenced by recent past experience. During 
relatively stable or growth periods, the risk perceptions of both parties steadily 
decrease, and the profit yield expectations of entrepreneurs increase, leading to 
greater leniency in the terms on which financing is provided. As leniency 
increases, there inevitably comes a time when a significant number of 
enterprises are not able to meet repayment requirements, even in the absence 
of other negative changes in the economy, and this can trigger a financial crisis: 
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enterprises try in vain to obtain additional financing, are placed in liquidation, 
having negative repercussions for creditors, leading to a downward spiral 
through reduced confidence on the part of bankers and entrepreneurs for further 
investment and its financing. 
Minsky's hypothesis is one in which the financial system of a capitalist economy 
carries within itself the seeds of crisis. The source of instability lies in the 
nature of entrepreneurial investment and its financing by the banking sector. 
Hart (1992) distinguishes between this view of incipient instability and that of 
Rogers (1989) which he refers to as potential instability arising from key 
monetary variables (e.g. interest rates) being conventional rather than 
determinate in nature. The difference is perhaps more one of emphasis than of 
theoretical viewpoints, since both regard uncertainty as fundamental and 
instability as being ever-present. Both regard the instability as arising in the 
interaction between monetary variables and investment behaviour. For both 
investment behaviour of entrepreneurs is subject to uncertainty and precarious 
expectations, as in Keynes, and is closely bound to the monetary sector in such 
a manner as to result in inherent instability which can lead to crises affecting 
both monetary and real sectors of the economy. Both consider that this 
instability needs to be recognised and addressed by adoption of appropriate 
institutional structures and policy measures. 
The investment level in a Post Keynesian framework therefore needs to be seen 
as precarious and volatile, being dependent on the long-period expectations of 
entrepreneurs in addition to the market rate of interest and lending terms of the 
banking sector. The former are subject to a multitude of influences according to 
the perceptions, assessments and feeling of confidence of the investing 
entrepreneurs. This view contrasts with a neo-Ricardian view in which the 
economy moves inexorably toward a long-period equilibrium in which profits 
(returns) on capital assets are uniform, driven by the investment decisions of 
entrepreneurs which reflect on average the ex post outcomes and profitability of 
the investments undertaken. It differs even more fundamentally from a 
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neoclassical view in which investment by entrepreneurs at or close to an optimal 
level is virtually assured through market forces. 
The Post Keynesian view of investment behaviour also implies that, although 
the market interest rate is an important variable in moving an economy closer to 
full employment through the level of investment, it cannot be ·regarded as a 
reliable variable in determining the investment level, due to the variety of 
additional, frequently unpredictable, influences on investment behaviour in a 
capitalist economy. 
2.6 Inflation 
The Post Keynesian view of the inflation process contrasts directly with that of 
monetarists. Monetarists maintain a causal view of the quantity equation in 
which increases in the price level are directly and causally related to increases 
in the money stock. Many pages of Post Keynesian writing have been devoted 
to attacking the tenets of monetarism (e.g. Kaldor, 1986, Moore, 1988a). Post 
Keynesians place the primary causal mechanisms of inflation outside the money 
creation process. Representative Post Keynesian expositions of the inflation 
process can be found in Davidson (1994), Kaldor (1978:214-230), Kaldor & 
Trevithick (1986), and Moore (1988a:378-381 ). 
Davidson (1994:143) identifies three possible causes of inflation: (1) 
diminishing returns, (2) increasing profit margins, and (3) increasing money 
wages relative to productivity improvements. 
Diminishing returns inflation refers to the increased costs incurred by firms as 
output is increased due to the hiring of less-skilled workers and utilisation of 
older, less efficient capital equipment. The increased marginal costs are 
passed oh in the form of higher prices. Davidson points out that this 
phenomenon was emphasised by, Keynes as "a main reason for rising supply 
prices before full employment." (1994:143). This form of inflation is unavoidable 
in the short run if output is increasing under diminishing returns, but may be 
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offset in the long run through improvements in technology, training programmes 
and increased capital utilisation per worker. 
Profits inflation refers to the increase by entrepreneurs of gross profit margins 
when market conditions render this possible or even necessary. This is related 
to the degree of monopoly (versus competition) in the market concerned and in 
the economy as a whole. It is not necessarily related to changes in aggregate 
demand, though diminishing price elasticity of demand could lead to rising profit 
margins with output growth (Davidson, 1994:144). Kaldor (1978:222) 
associates higher profit margins with higher rates of capital accumulation, and in 
turn with income re-distribution towards profit recipients and away from wage 
earners. 
Wage inflation refers to increases in money wage rates which are not offset by 
productivity improvements, and which, with profit margins maintained, are 
passed on in the form of higher prices. Although it may be easier for workers to 
obtain greater wage increases when unemployment is decreasing, this source of 
inflation, in the view of Post Keynesians, is not tied to changes in the level of 
aggregate output. Wage inflation is rather related primarily to the entire wage 
negotiation process which takes place in the economy. In this sense, it can be 
regarded as institutional in origin. Since wage inflation is considered by Post 
Keynesians to be the primary cause of inflation, the exposition below focusses 
on the mechanism of this form of inflation. 
Kaldor and Trevithick (1981 :328) identify the considerations which predominate 
when unions present their wage demands in the collective bargaining process 
as: (a) the desire to preserve the wage level of their members in relation to 
other groups of workers; (b) the desire to appropriate for their members what 
they consider a fair share of any increases in their companies' profits; (c) to 
resist any erosion of the standard of living of their members resulting from 
unfavourable external events suet\ as a rise in the price of fuel or of imported 
raw materials. (a) in particular plays a strong role in an inflation spiral. In each 
wage negotiation round, one or a few groups of workers serve as leading groups 
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due to their favourable bargaining position, which may be the result of rapid 
productivity growth, profit rises, or increased demand for the . skills of the 
workers concerned. These groups feel entitled to higher wages, and the 
employers will typically be fairly accommodating to their demands. Other 
groups, however, perceive the wage differentials between the leading groups 
and themselves being threatened; they resent the 'leap-frogging4 that seems to 
be taking place. Retaliatory or defensive wage claims are triggered on the part 
of the other groups. To the extent that wage agreements reached entail wage 
increases beyond productivity growth, an inflationary process is set in motion. 
Kaldor and Trevithick maintain that the above wage negotiation spiral is 
supplemented by the increased prevalence of oligopolies in modern economies. 
Owing to their dominance in their markets, oligopolies are not forced to pass on 
the effects of improved productivity to their customers in the form of lower 
prices. Leading oligopolies are frequently willing to increase wages in line with 
their increasing output, in order to enhance labour relations, enable them to 
select better workers to fill vacancies, and to promote a sense of good will and 
co-operation in the firm. The wage settlements of leading oligopolies set the 
standard to which other enterprises are placed under pressure to conform. The 
objectives of trade unions to increase the real earnings of members, maintain 
relative wage differentials and obtain a fair share in the value added of their 
employing firm, are not compatible, and are reconciled to the extent possible 
through wage-induced inflation. The spiral acquires a momentum due to the 
differing times and frequencies at which wage settlements take place, together 
with the discrete intervals at which finished goods prices are adjusted to take 
account of input costs. 
Davidson (1989:149) concurs with the model put forward by Weintraub (1977) 
which depicts the inflation arising from the struggle over distribution of current 
income: 
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PQ = kwN 
where Pis price level, Q is real output, w is the money wage rate, N the level of 
employment and k is a multiple of the wage bill (wN). This can be expressed 
as: 
P = k (w/A) 
where A is the average physical productivity of labour and w/A is unit labour 
costs of production. k can then be seen to be the gross profit mark-up on unit 
labour costs. Inflation takes place through rising unit labour cost as a result of 
the wage bargaining process (as described above) but also as a result of 
increases in the gross profit mark-up attained by firms which is the figure which 
determines the allocation of income to capital-owners relative to workers. 
Weintraub is thus extending the income struggle cause of inflation to include the 
struggle by the owners of capital to maintain or increase their appropriation of 
the output of productive enterprise relative to labour. 
Kaldor (1978) recognises deep-rooted structural trends as a possible additional 
contributor to inflation. He posits the relative trends of the primary and 
secondary sectors as a source of creeping inflation, due to the changing relative 
prices or terms of trade between the two. The primary sector is engaged in 
production of commodities for which prices are generally demand determined. 
The secondary sector produces manufactured goods for which prices are 
generally cost determined. Any imbalance between these two sectors which 
creates high demand for primary outputs leads to rising commodity prices, and 
these feed through the secondary sector due to its use of commodity raw 
materials, with prices· being increased in accordance with input costs of 
commodities. This initially causes an increase in the share of profits in value 
added, which is counteracted by trade union pressure for increased wages. The 
terms of trade are swung rapidly back in favour of the secondary sector, but at 
the expense of inflation. There is an asymmetry in the process due to the 
different pricing basis of the two sectors, so that a shift in terms of trade away 
from the primary sector, with requced commodity prices, does not have an 
equivalent deflationary effect on secondary sector prices. The process is 
exacerbated by trade union strength in wage negotiation and by the oligopolistic 
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nature of competition in the secondary sector, but the underlying source of this 
form of inflation is the relationship between the two sectors. 
It should be noted that money supply increases in the Post Keynesian inflation 
framework are by and large accommodatory only. The only effect of money 
supply changes is through the indirect route in the case of a restrictive monetary 
stance, whereby economic activity in general is restricted which in turn leads to 
a climate in which wage demands are less strident and settlements lower 
through economic necessity. This view is linked to the endogenous view of 
credit money, whereby money supply increases beyond credit requirements are 
simply extinguished through repayment of debt, as taken up in Chapter 3. 
2. 7 A Formal Model of the Post Keynesian Monetary Framework 
As suggested by Rogers (1989), the model put forward by Kaldor (1981) can be 
used to give a simple formal representation of the Post Keynesian monetary 
framework. This model makes use of five relationships as follows: 
PQ = MV (301) 
p 
= (1 + A.) dN!dQ w (302) 
y 
= 11(1 - c) IQ = r) (303) 
M = Y /V(i,i) (304) 
= i (305) 
where Q is real output, P the price level, M the money stock, V the velocity of 
money, N employment, w the money wage rate, A. the percent margin added to 
direct cost to cover overheads and profits, Y (= PQ) is output in monetary terms, 
c is the marginal propensity to consume, I investment, i the market rate of 
interest, i the exogenously set rate and r the MEC. 
Equation (301) is the traditional quantity equation which equates the monetary 
value of output with the money stock times velocity: it does not imply causality 
in either direction. Equation (302J relates the price level to the level of money 
wages (w) which is determined exogenously through business-labour 
negotiations. The price level is determined as a mark-up (A.) over the wage rate 
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multiplied by the marginal direct labour required per unit of output (dN!dQ, which 
is the inverse of marginal labour productivity). Although this expression 
resembles a neoclassical demand for labour function, it should not be 
interpreted as indicating a causative relation from real wages to employment. It 
should rather be interpreted as employment determination, based on the point of 
effective demand given by (303). Expression (303) intro'duces the principle of 
effective demand, in which monetary equilibrium, l = r. establishes a limit to the 
profitable expansion of output. Expression (304) is the liquidity preference 
relation in which the holding of money is dependent on the interest rate (market 
and exogenously set). Expression (305) sets the market interest rate 
exogenously equal to l. determined by the central bank and/or by convention. 
The exogenous variables in the model are: w, I, l. c and A.; Q(N) and V(i,l) are 
behavioural relations. The model has five equations in five independent 
unknowns and is therefore determinate. The model demonstrates the 
interaction by which monetary equilibrium leads to an unemployment equilibrium 
for the economy through monetary equilibrium and the principle of effective 
demand. The necessary role of expression (304), representing the liquidity 
preference theory, should be noted. Without this equation, together with (305), 
the model can be readily incorporated into a neoclassical framework with a 
loanable funds theory determining the interest rate. Unemployment could then 
appear as a special, disequilibrium case resulting from wage rigidity or a 
liquidity trap. 
Treating the long-term interest rate, l , as exogenous is consistent with the 
endogenous money view. Although the quantity equation is present, the 
quantity theory plays no role. The quantity equation (301) holds at the point of 
effective demand established by monetary equilibrium, but this is as an identity. 
Since the neutrality of money and the quantity theory do not apply, the model 
clearly falls into the category of Monetary Analysis rather than Real Analysis. 
The operation of the model can be illustrated using an aggregate demand and 
supply framework, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Monetary equilibrium : Aggregate demand and supply 
Expression (302) can be interpreted as an aggregate supply function, Z, relating 
expected proceeds, PQ, to employment, N, given the real wage rate, profit mark-
up, state of technology and labour productivity. This curve indicates the 
proceeds at each employment level required to produce normal profits. 
Expression (303) can be interpreted as an aggregate demand function, D, given 
the rate of interest, marginal propensity to consume, and long-term 
expectations. With the long term interest rate l given exogenously, the long 
period monetary equilibrium, i = r , establishes the point of effective demand at 
E. Competition ensures that this point is reached through the elimination of 
excess profits as long-period equilibrium is approached. The resulting 
equilibrium is at employment Ne , lower than full employment Nt . The labour 
market does not operate as an auction market in which entrepreneurs and 
workers co-operate to arrive at a market clearing wage rate. On the assumption 
of an entrepreneur economy, entrepreneurs determine employment in 
accordance with the expected demand for goods and services. With a point of 
effective demand established by monetary equilibrium below full employment, 
there is no rational basis for entrepreneurs to enter into negotiations with 
workers concerning real wage levels, since they are already earning normal 
profits. (Rogers, 1989:256.) 
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2.8 Critique of 15/LM Model 
Mainstream Keynesians embraced the IS/LM depiction of Keynes' 
unemployment equilibrium originally introduced by Hicks and have extended the 
IS/LM approach to analyse various macroeconomic issues. Post Keynesians 
are, however, critical of the IS/LM framework on several grourids. The main 
criticisms raised by Weintraub (1977) are that the framework lacks a price level, 
the money supply is exogenously determined, and real wage adjustments can 
lead to full employment. The price level argument is that aggregate demand 
and income components are expressed in real price terms, whereas Keynes 
defined and used the wage-unit, approximately equivalent to the average wage, 
as a key element of his analysis. This gave the IS/LM an inadequate basis for 
analysing aggregate price changes, leading to its supplementation with the 
Phillips curve relationship in the 1960s, which was shown to be no longer valid 
in subsequent stagflation conditions. The role of average wage rates in price 
level determination could not be incorporated into the IS/LM framework. The 
money supply exogeneity criticism is clearly in line with the Post Keynesian 
endogeneity view, but goes some way beyond this in that the construction of the 
LM curve requires an exogenous (vertical) money supply schedule. The 
possibility of an endogenous, or partly endogenous, money supply function 
cannot be accommodated. It is recognised that Keynes treated the money 
supply as exogenous in the General Theory, but Weintraub (1977:53) argues 
that even he did not envisage that the money supply would remain unaltered as 
aggregate income and employment increased. An even more fundamental 
argument is that, in the IS/LM framework, a reduction in the real wage level can 
drive the model to full employment equilibrium. This is contrary to Keynes' 
assertion that unemployment equilibrium would persist even under 
circumstances of fully flexible wages. The IS/LM framework thereby lends itself 
to the interpretation of Keynes' effective demand below full employment as 
being due to wage rigidity. Keynes was explicit in rejecting this view (1936:257). 
The IS/LM framework misses the crucial causal ingredient which gives rise to 
unemployment equilibrium in spite of full flexibility and adjustment in the labour 
market. 
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Patinkin (1990) put forward a defence of the IS/LM framework from. a Keynesian 
perspective. He separated the questions of whether it is a valid representation 
of the General Theory, and whether it is a useful analytical construct. Most of 
his argument is devoted to the latter, with examples of how the IS/LM framework 
has been adapted and extended to examine various important economic issues. 
The usefulness of the framework in analysis under a mainstream Keynesian set 
of assumptions is, however, not really in dispute by Post Keynesians. It is the 
former question that is pertinent. Patinkin points out correctly that Keynes 
himself accepted the IS/LM portrayal put forward by Hicks without protest, and 
further that Hicks' subsequent distancing from the framework was more on the 
basis of its being a simplistic and partial portrayal of an aspect of the General 
Theory, rather than denying its validity. The former is not a conclusive 
argument, since it its widely recognised that there are inconsistencies in the 
arguments of the General Theory and Keynes' perceptions relating to them. As 
a close colleague and disciple, Joan Robinson herself has commented that 
Keynes did not always appreciate the full significance of the framework he was 
putting forward (Coddington, 1976:1262). Further, Post Keynesians are not 
bound willy nilly to every view and argument put forward by Keynes: the 
exogenous money assumption is a clear example of Post Keynesian difference 
from Keynes, amongst others. Post Keynesians do, however, sometimes 
overemphasise Hicks' criticism of his own IS/LM portrayal. Hicks' distancing is 
more by way of stressing that the IS/LM portrayal only captures and formalises 
an important component of the General Theory, that it was never intended to be 
the centrepiece of macroeconomic analysis. This is clear for instance from " ... it 
was never intended as more than a representation of what appeared to be a 
central part of the Keynes theory. As such, I think it is still defensible." (Hicks, 
1974:6). Post Keynesian criticism of the IS/LM framework needs to be seen, 
therefore, as relating mainly to the inadequacies of the framework for dealing 
with economic issues and analyses based on a set of Post Keynesian economic 
assumptions (e.g. partly or fully, endogenous money, exogenous short-term 
interest rates, price inflation being related to wage rates), rather than as being 
logically or theoretically invalid for all purposes. 
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Davidson (1994:122-131), for instance, strongly criticises the IS/LM framework 
as "a failed representation of Keynes", primarily on the grounds that it depicts a 
separation and independence of real and monetary sectors. He adds the 
finance motive to develop an alternative IS/LM framework which he considers 
correctly reflects the interrelationship of real and monetary, sectors. He 
introduces an exogenous government expenditure component to give an ISG 
equation, and incorporates the finance motive in the form of an additional 
money demand component negatively related to the interest rate in the LM 
equation. He demonstrates that this amended IS/LM framework produces 
results in which any shift in one of the curves produces a shift in the other curve: 
the real and monetary schedules are interrelated. He uses this framework to 
illustrate the deficiency of the IS/LM approach, since in any particular analysis 
the outcome is indeterminate due to both curves shifting. Although not explicitly 
stated by Davidson, his revised IS/LM framework also clearly entails 
endogenous determination of the interest rate through the now more complex 
interaction of IS and LM curves. He does not incorporate a mechanism whereby 
the interest rate is related to an exogenous rate set by the monetary authorities, 
and does not take up the issue of the interest rate being exogenously 
determined. The exercise is nevertheless a demonstration of the difficulties 
incurred in attempting to use the IS/LM framework with Post Keynesian 
assumptions. 
A revision of the IS/LM framework which accords with an exogenous interest 
rate view, put forward by Rogers (1989), provides a closer representation of a 
Post Keynesian view of money using the IS/LM framework. Rogers suggests 
that, with the introduction of suitable modifications, the IS/LM framework can be 
used to convey a Post Keynesian point of effective demand equilibrium. He 
makes use of a model put forward by Meltzer which he considers a suitable 
basis for a Post Keynesian interpretation, in spite of Meltzer being a monetarist, 
since Meltzer is seeking to re-int~rpret the General Theory through an IS/LM 
model. Meltzer's model retains the features of a Say's Law economy, but 
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Rogers modifies this by appropriate specification of the principle of effective 
demand. 
The model can be expressed as follows: 
S/w =· l/w (311) 
S/w = S (Y /w, I) (312) 
l/w = I (I ,E} (313) 
M /w = L (i , l. Y /w) (314) 
Y /w = F (K, N) (315) 
Nd = f (w/P) (316) 
Ns = g (w) or g (w,P) (317) 
N = Nd ~ Ns (318) 
Nominal values are deflated by the money wage rate, w, where appropriate, with 
S, I, Y, and M having their usual referents of saving, investment, output/income 
and money stock in nominal terms. Kand N refer to capital stock and employed 
labour respectively. P refers to the price level of goods, E to entrepreneurial 
income expectations, r to natural rates of interest and i to market rates. 
This model is Wicksellian in nature, in which the IS curve generates a locus of 
quasi-natural rates, r , while the LM curve generates market rates, i . The 
adaptation that lends itself to a Post Keynesian interpretation is i in (314) which 
refers to the expected long rate of interest in Meltzer's model, but can be re-
interpreted as an exogenous rate set by convention or by the monetary 
authority. Monetary equilibrium can be illustrated as in Figure 2.3. 
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i , r 
LM* 
lo= Io 
i* = r* 
Yo1Wo YiW* YI# 
Figure 2.3 Monetary equilibrium : IS/LM 
Any improvement in entrepreneurial expectations causes the demand price for 
capital goods to increase, and the resulting investment reduces the natural rate 
(MEC), r. However, since lo has not changed, the additional investment results 
in losses, reducing the demand for capital goods, leading tor being re~tored to 
equality with lo . This process may well occur through cycles of expansion and 
contraction. If, however, the exogenous interest rate is reduced to i*, additional 
capital investments undertaken will generate profits and the IS curve will move 
out to IS*. The reduction in the exogenous interest rate will have shifted the LM 
curve to LM*. The new equilibrium is therefore at output Y*I#*, which could be 
at full employment with the exogenous interest rate set at its optimal level. 
Movements along the LM curve represent transitory or short-run disturbances of 
the money rate around the conventional or exogenous rate; a change in 
exogenous rate entails a shift in the LM curve. 
Use of the IS/LM framework as suggested by Rogers does at least give an 
indication of the difference bet)tveen the Post Keynesian view and the 
neoclassical synthesis view, in terms of the IS/LM framework which is used 
extensively in the neoclassical synthesis. However, Rogers does not address 
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the issues of the interdependence of IS and LM curves and resulting 
indeterminacy raised by Davidson, nor the more fundamental indeterminacy 
arising from money demand as well as investment being related to expected 
future levels of interest rate and income, with the expectations being 
characterised by uncertainty (Shackle, 197 4). Even though it may be usable for 
some purposes, especially to meet the neoclassical synthesis on its own 
ground, the IS/LM framework does not appear to provide the most appropriate 
analytical vehicle for Post Keynesian monetary analysis. The IS/LM model is 
therefore probably best not deployed in Post Keynesian monetary exegesis, 
which is the view adopted by most Post Keynesian writers. 
2.9 Concluding Remarks 
There is considerable diversity in the views of Post Keynesian writers on 
monetary issues: there are also differences in the issues which are emphasised 
and treated with analytical depth in their respective work. There is, however, a 
core of common ground which can be regarded as providing a representation of 
Post Keynesian thinking on monetary issues. Greater clarity of the Post 
Keynesian monetary view can be obtained through its contrasts with monetarist, 
neoclassical and Rational Expectations views, as well as its strong criticism of 
the neoclassical synthesis and related brands of Keynesianism. 
The Post Keynesian theory of money is one in which money plays an essential 
role in determining the level of economic activity at which equilibrium is reached, 
through the relationship between the marginal efficiency of capital schedule and 
an interest rate which is determined by convention or by the monetary 
authorities rather than as an equilibrating variable between the supply and 
demand of loanable funds. The nature of the interest rate and monetary 
equilibrium mechanism is such as to produce an equilibrium level of output 
through the principle of effecttve demand which will not automatically be at full 
employment. This remains true ,to Keynes' original insights of an economy 
which will not in general move to its full employment level, even though wage 
rates as well as other prices and markets may be perfectly flexible. ~he formal 
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model presented illustrates the Post Keynesian monetary framework which 
determines the level of aggregate demand, at a point generaUy below full 
employment. The critique of the IS/LM model indicates why the orthodox 
economics of the neoclassical synthesis does not provide a suitable analytical 
structure for the monetary mechanism put forward by Keynes and the Post 
Keynesians. 
This chapter has sought to bring together the theoretical aspects of the Post 
Keynesian monetary view under the simplifying assumption of a closed 
economy. In the next chapter, the issues of how money is created, expanded, 
contracted and controlled in the Post Keynesian view are examined, and these 
are taken forward to consider the implications when the assumption of a closed 
economy is relaxed to allow for international monetary flows between countries 
and changing exchange rates, especially in the case of a small open economy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MONEY SUPPLY PROCESS AND OPEN ECONOMY ISSUES 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the money supply process, first under the 
assumption of a closed economy, then with international monetary flows taking 
place. As shown in the previous chapter, monetary variables play a crucial role 
in determining economic output in the Post Keynesian monetary view, with 
output not moving to a full employment level though any automatic economic 
adjustment mechanism. This raises the question whether the monetary 
authorities are in a position to control monetary variables, and to what extent, 
especially with a view to moving the economy towards full employment. The 
monetarist school maintain that the money supply is under the direct control of 
the monetary authorities, and that they should use this control to apply a steady 
money supply growth rule to curb inflation. The Post Keynesian view is that, by 
and large, the authorities cannot control the money supply in a modern-day 
economy with a private enterprise banking system. This is a crucial difference 
with fundamental implications for monetary policy. 
The next section of this chapter examines the issue of control over the money 
supply, in terms of its endogeneity or exogeneity. Section 3.3 looks at the 
implications of the fourth motive introduced by Keynes for the holding of money, 
the finance motive, on the money supply process. These two sections are 
based on a closed economy. In Section 3.4 the closed economy assumption is 
relaxed and the effects of international monetary flows examined. Section 3.5 
looks at exchange rate issues under the Post Keynesian view, and Section 3.6 
addresses the effects of foreign monetary flows in the case of a small open 
economy. 
J 
This chapter complements Chapter 2 in drawing together a Post Keynesian view 
of money from a theoretical perspective. It paves the way for examining policy 
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implications and prescriptions arising from the Post Keynesian view, in Chapters 
4 and 5. 
3.2 Endogeneity versus Exogeneity 
The endogenous view of money creation is a major departure from the 
conventional wisdom of monetary theory as expressed in text books and 
mainstream writings and has generated considerable controversy and debate. 
The conventional wisdom expounded in text books and university teaching over 
decades has been along the lines of a high-powered monetary base determined 
directly by the central bank, and a money multiplier dependent on the reserve 
ratio (set by the monetary authorities) which determines the total size of the 
money stock. Factors such as preferences by households and firms for holding 
of physical money (notes and coins) are behavioural parameters which vary only 
gradually over time. These and other parameters are considered as 
contributing to a velocity of money (the V in the quantity equation) which is 
stable over time. According to the conventional explanation, therefore, the 
central bank is able to exercise tight control over the total money supply through 
its ability to determine the high-powered base. 
The endogenous money view as put forward by Post Keynesians such as Kaldor 
and Moore holds not only that changes in the velocity of money prevent the 
central bank from exercising close control over total monetary aggregates, but 
that the monetary control mechanism itself is such that central banks are unable 
to control the level of high-powered money. Cottrell (1994a) distinguishes 
between ways in which money is widely recognised as being endogenous to 
some degree, and the more deeply held endogeneity view of Post Keynesians. 
He cites two ways in which money is widely seen as partly endogenous: firstly, 
where the money supply is regarded as a multiplier times a monetary base, the 
money multiplier may be recognised as being partly determined by portfolio 
decisions of private sector actors; ~econdly, the central bank might be regarded 
as deliberately choosing to effect control of the money supply indirectly through 
use of interest rates, rather than through direct control, with money demand by 
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the private sector accommodating to the interest rate. Implied in the latter 
deliberate choice is that the central bank has the option to exercise direct 
quantitative control of the money supply when and to the extent that it wishes. 
Cottrell characterises a Post Keynesian view as going far beyond these two 
respects of endogeneity, in which "the central bank simply does not have the 
option of exercising genuine quantitative control over the stock -0f money: the 
accommodation of the private-sector demand for money, at an interest rate of 
the authorities' choosing, is not a political choice but a structural necessity in a 
modern credit-money system." (1994a:597). 
The endogenous money view has major implications for economic theory. For 
instance, Moore (1988a:xv) maintains as a consequence: 
that the entire literature of monetary control and monetary policy, IS/LM analysis, the 
Keynesian and the money multiplier, liquidity preference, interest rate determination, 
the influence of public sector deficits on the level of domestic interest rates, growth 
theory, and even the theory of inflation must be comprehensively reconsidered and 
rewritten. 
It implies shifting the focus from the magnitude of monetary aggregates to the 
terms on which money is provided, as well as to the flow of credit in the 
economy as taken up by Lavoie (1984, 1992) and Rousseas (1986). It implies 
abandoning the view that increases in monetary aggregates are a major cause 
of inflation. It implies changes in the monetary policy role of central banks and 
government treasuries. It also has significant implications for monetary issues 
in an open economy. These issues are taken up in subsequent sections of this 
dissertation. 
As previously noted, Keynes' own view on the endogeneity issue was unclear 
and has been subject to debate. In his Treatise on Money, and other works, the 
money supply appears to be treated as endogenous. He treats money as 
predominantly bank money, with the central bank's lending rate having various 
indirect effects on the volume of bank money (e.g. Keynes, 1930:194-197). In 
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the General Theory, however, Keynes seems to assume the money supply to be 
exogenously determined by the monetary authorities. Moore, after examining 
the evidence in various of Keynes' writings and the development of his views 
over time (1988a, Ch. 8), concedes Keynes treatment of money as exogenous in 
the General Theory, and offers possible explanations, such as that Keynes 
wished to provide every possible concession to 'classical' economists, or that 
this was a lapse in the direction of his thinking. He points out that Keynes 
introduced the finance motive for holding money into his analysis subsequent to 
publication of the General Theory, and maintains that the finance motive is the 
conclusive argument for the endogeneity of the money stock. Moore concludes 
(1988a:199) that, although Keynes did not put forward a clear and consistent 
endogenous theory of money: "One cannot help but feel confident that with time 
he would have succeeded in realising his final and full emancipation from the 
quantity theory .... ". 
The view that the supply of money is determined endogenously rather than 
exogenously is one of the most readily recognised characteristics of the Post 
Keynesian school, and places its adherents in sharp relief to those of 
monetarism. Long and intense debates took place over a numbers of years in 
the seventies and eighties between economists who became leading 
representatives of Post Keynesianism (such as Kaldor and Davidson) and 
leading monetarists, especially Milton Friedman, with the 
endogeneity/exogeneity issue being one of the primary points of contention. 
The title of Kaldor's book, The Scourge of Monetarism (1986), reflects the 
depth of difference between the two schools. The endogeneity view is closely 
tied to the perception of money as being primarily credit (rather than commodity) 
money. In terms of representation of money supply and demand curves in 
interest-money space, the endogenous money view entails an elastic money 
supply function. Post Keynesians such as Moore (1988a) regard the function as 
necessarily infinitely elastic at the interest rate set by the central bank, but 
others, for example Minsky, regard
1 
the function as upward sloping in a stepwise 
manner, albeit highly elastic (King, 1995:66). In a similar graphical 
representation, an exogenous view of money implies an inelastic money supply 
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function. Complete exogeneity would be represented by a perfectly inelastic or 
vertical money supply function. Moore coined the terms Horizontalist and 
Verticalist to depict these two contrasting views, which form the title of his book 
examining these issues (Moore, 1988a). It is the Verticalist view that is adopted 
by monetarists as well as in the neoclassical synthesis (Moore, 1988a:x-xi). 
The Post Keynesian endogeneity argument arises largely from the institutional 
nature of the provision of credit money. Commercial banks provide loans at a 
mark-up over cost to borrowers who in most cases have pre-arranged facilities 
(e.g. overdraft facilities). Borrowers are able to draw loan funds at their initiative 
up to their facility ceilings. The central bank has a lender-of-last-resort function 
and, although it can institute higher prices and penalties for commercial bank 
borrowing from its discount window, it cannot in the final instance refuse to 
provide funds to the banking system without imperilling the system. Open 
market operations (at least in the United States and South Africa) have the 
effect of reducing non-borrowed reserves of the banks, thus driving them to the 
discount window (directly or indirectly through the market for state bonds, 
Eurodollars and similar). The banks have neither the ability nor the incentive to 
call in or reduce their commercial loans, but bid for any funds needed to meet 
their liquidity requirements, ultimately from the discount window if necessary. 
Moore, reminiscent of the Banking School real bills doctrine, argues that credit 
money can never be in excess supply since any excess would simply be used to 
repay credit balances outstanding. The quantity of nominal money demanded is 
thus always and necessarily equal to the quantity of money supplied (1988a: 
pxiii). Moore examines the workings of the banking system, particularly that of 
the United States, to substantiate his contention that central banks cannot and 
do not control monetary aggregate quantitative variables directly. He draws on 
empirical evidence or stylised facts, partly of an institutional nature, in support of 
this claim, including the manner in which the monetary base, multiplier, bank 
lending and central bank actions and policies are determined. He uses 
J 
evidence from econometric studies to refute the monetarist proposition that a 
causal relationship exists from money supply aggregates to nominal income. He 
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argues that the endogeneity of money is not merely the consequence of a 
flexible monetary multiplier applied to an exogenous monetary base: he regards 
the base itself as endogenous. He considers central banks to be faced with an 
asymmetrical situation: "Central banks always possess the ability to increase 
the base, so as to support any increased nominal volume of bank 
intermediation. But they in general do not have the same ability to reduce the 
base, and with it restrict the nominal volume of bank intermediation." 
(1988a:15). 
Kaldor (1986:24) maintains that: "In the case of credit money the proper 
representation should be a horizontal 'supply curve' of money not a vertical one. 
Monetary policy is represented not by a given quantity of money stock but by a 
given rate of interest, and the amount of money in existence will be demand-
determined." He goes on to argue that the central bank cannot, even in 
principle, control the quantity of money directly, nor the monetary base. "The 
Central Bank cannot close the 'discount window' without endangering the 
solvency of the banking system; they must maintain their function as a 'lender of 
last resort'." (1986:25). His views on endogeneity are therefore similar to the 
Horizontalist views put forward by Moore as described above. 
Davidson places less emphasis on the endogeneity issue than Moore or Kaldor, 
but his view is clearly, one of endogenous money: for instance; " .... under the 
income generating-finance process, an increase in the demand for money 
induces an endogenous increase in supply if bankers are willing and able to 
expand under the rules of the game that regulate banking operations." 
(1994:136). He refers to the monetary authority being able to initiate action to 
increase the money supply, e.g. "the Monetary Authority can exogenously 
initiate action (open-market operations) to induce the public to hold more or less 
money balances. By bidding up the price of outstanding government debt 
(lowering the rate of interest), the Monetary Authority makes it profitable for 
bondholders to sell some government securities and substitute additional bank 
J 
deposits as an alternative liquid store of value" (1994:136). This appears to be 
in line with Moore's view of asymmetry in the monetary authorities' actions, 
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whereby they can initiate an increase but not a reduction in money supply 
through open market operations. Davidson does not, however, spell this out 
clearly. 
Rogers (1985:243) asserts that, "In Post Keynesian analysis the monetary base 
does not determine but is determined by the money supply. .In other words 
banks can always get the necessary reserves to support whatever level of 
liabilities they have incurred. The only influence that the central bank has on 
this process is to alter the price at which· these reserves are obtained." 
(1985:243). He contrasts this with the monetarist view of the direction of 
causality. He argues that monetary targeting could still be contemplated, 
primarily through the indirect means of adjusting interest rates, but that such 
actions could have unpredictable consequences due to money and credit 
multipliers not being stable. It is clear, however, from the above that Rogers 
regards the monetary base itself as being endogenously determined. 
The contrast between the Post Keynesian endogenous view and that of money 
supply exogeneity held by monetarists can be portrayed by the direction of 
causality in a Quantity Theory equation. Monetarists maintain that causality 
operates from the monetary base set by the authorities to the money supply: 
M = mB 
where Mis the money supply, B the monetary base and m the money multiplier 
(Rogers, 1985:244). Post Keynesians maintain that causality operates from the 
money supply determined by entrepreneurial demand to the monetary base: 
B = (1/m) M 
Post Keynesians accept the em.pirical results of the Chicago monetarist 
analyses, which showed strong c9rrelation between monetary aggregates and 
money income, but with causality running from planned output to money stock 
rather than vice versa. Post Keynesians regard increases in monetary 
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aggregates in advance of economic activity as explainable by the accumulation 
of funds to meet planned expenditures in the expansion of producUon. The Post 
Keynesian view of money creation is bound to the role which credit money plays 
in the production process. The nature of the money creation process as viewed 
by Post Keynesians described below is drawn primarily from Moore (1989). 
Moore's point of departure is to characterise commercial banks as essentially 
"retailers in the business of selling credit" (1989), seeking to maximise their 
profits through the interest rate spread between their average cost of funds (with 
funds being mainly in the form of bank deposits) and their average lending rate 
on bank loans provided. Banks seek to set their average lending rates at a 
mark-up to wholesale fund rates, and their average deposit rates paid as some 
mark-down to wholesale rates, so as to achieve a target spread on their total 
volume of intermediation which will generate their required rate of return on the 
bank's equity. Moore recognises the additional activities of banks, such as 
holding of marketable securities as assets, but considers the above to be the 
essential nature of commercial bank activity in view of its accounting for the bulk 
of bank transactions. Banks can then be regarded as two input, two output 
firms: with the two inputs being retail and wholesale deposits, and the two 
outputs retail and wholesale loans. Using the deposit and lending rates set 
through their mark-up and mark-down to wholesale rates, banks accept all cash 
and deposits supplied, and meet customer loan requests, provided that these 
comply with their minimum collateral and risk requirements (with credit ceilings 
being specified for each loan or facility). The result is that, once each bank has 
set its retail deposit and lending rates, the volume of deposits and lending is 
effectively demand-determined by bank customers rather than being directly 
determined by the bank. 
In the case of wholesale deposits and borrowing by the banks, individual banks 
are price takers and quantity setters in a wholesale funds market. Banks use 
the wholesale market to manage or balance their liquid asset and liability 
J 
position. Wholesale assets are used to provide a defensive margin to enable 
banks to meet cash and reserve requirements arising from high deposit 
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withdrawals or demand for loans. Banks have a variety of options in adjusting 
their wholesale funds position: they can draw down deposits in _other banks, 
present Treasury Bills for cash instead of for new Bills, borrow on collateral of 
eligible securities, sell NCDs, Treasury Bills and other term deposits, or borrow 
central bank funds. Wholesale assets and liabilities are generally readily 
substitutable between the various forms, enabling banks to aatively manage 
their wholesale funds position on an ongoing basis. 
Moore (1989:22) illustrates the workings of the model diagrammatically as 
follows: 
Rates 
roo 
·. 
.· 
.· 
.· 
... 
.· 
·.·· 
.· · .. 
DL 
0 Lo, Do Deposits, Loans: Volume 
Figure 3.1 Moore's bank intermediation model 
He characterises a bank's balance sheet relationship as: 
R + L + B = D + NW 
where R = Reserves, L = Loans, B = Net wholesale assets, D = Deposits and 
NW= Net worth. The demand for bank loans in the diagram is represented by 
DL, the demand for deposits by DD. The banks set their lending (rLo) and 
deposit (roo) rates, and the supply purves become the horizontal lines rLo and roo 
respectively. 
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The marginal cost of bank funds is determined in the wholesale market, shown 
as the wholesale rate rwo . As banks are price takers in the wholesale market, 
the supply curve for wholesale funds is given by the horizontal line rwo . Profit-
maximising banks will seek to set their rates in each market such that marginal 
revenue is equal to the marginal cost of funds. For profit maximisation, the 
marginal revenue of providing loans must be equal to the marginal cost of 
obtaining deposits, and in turn be equal to the market interest rate on wholesale 
funds. This gives the profit maximising equilibrium in the diagram at which 
loans and deposit volumes are Lo = Do. 
Within this framework, Moore maintains that the volume of bank loans or credit 
is determined by demand at the rate (price) set by the banks. Deposits in turn 
arise from the additional transactions resulting from the loans and credit 
advanced. The demand for loans and deposits are interdependent. This 
interdependence is enhanced by the practice of liability management, in which 
deposit vehicles are created or expanded as needed, and on suitable terms, to 
attract the volume of deposits required to meet the volume of loans and credit 
advanced. Also reinforcing the demand-driven nature of credit money is the 
extensive use of overdraft facilities. These entail banks allocating credit limits to 
their clients which at any one time are only partially utilised. Moore gives 
evidence (1988a:16) that the volume of overdraft credit allocated but not utilised 
at any time is of the order of 50% of the total overdraft credit available in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. This means that bank clients are able to 
draw down additional credit on demand in accordance with their requirements 
without reference to the banks. Banks cannot summarily terminate overdraft 
facilities or call in overdraft advances in order to reduce their total volume of 
lending. 
The role that Moore ascribes to the central bank in this model is primarily that of 
determining the wholesale funds rate. The central bank is not able to reduce or 
restrict the reserves placed with it by commercial banks in terms of reserve ratio 
J 
requirements. The reason for this is that the central bank is ultimately 
responsible for the stability of the financial and banking system of the country. If 
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it were to refuse to meet requirements by commercial banks for borrowed 
reserves, this would be likely to cause a liquidity crisis in the applicant bank, 
and this could readily have a domino effect on other banks, leading to a major 
banking crisis. In practice, Moore argues, central banks apply penalties and 
interest rate premiums to discourage commercial bank borrowing, but will 
always provide borrowed funds at some price to stave off a liquidity crisis. This 
then reinforces their price control role through the interest rate and any 
premiums or penalty costs applied to borrowing through the discount window. In 
this way, it is not only the broader money supply aggregates but the high-
powered base that is endogenous. 
Moore concedes an exception to this monetary base endogeneity in the case of 
a severe economic slump when interest rates have decreased to very low levels. 
Under these circumstances, banks may voluntarily hold substantial excess 
reserves since the marginal cost of doing so lies below the marginal cost of 
obtaining deposits. This situation prevailed in the United States in the late 
1930s. Under these circumstances, the money multiplier decreases, reflecting 
the higher ratio of base to money stock, but the base itself could be regarded as 
exogenously determined by the monetary authority. Moore also regards central 
banks as being able to initiate large increases in the monetary base during 
boom conditions. Commercial banks will readily absorb base funds through 
open market purchase by the central bank of government bills, since this will 
enable them to expand their lending activities. These are, however, the exact 
conditions under which the central bank needs to restrict growth of the monetary 
base. The central bank is therefore not able to set the monetary base 
exogenously in a way appropriate to the economic circumstances prevailing. 
The money supply in the above exposition could be either M1 (notes, coins and 
demand deposits) or a broader aggregate such as M3 (which includes in 
addition time deposits of short and long duration). The arguments apply 
similarly in both cases. Less clear is the situation of the narrow component of 
J 
money comprising notes and coins only. It would seem that Moore regards 
notes and coins in similar vein to the rest of the M1 or M3 aggregate. Notes and 
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coins form part of the high-powered monetary base. It is clear that the central 
bank can exercise direct control over notes and coins available in the sense that 
their physical issue and replacement is under the control of the central bank. 
Notes and coins, however, generally constitute only a small component by value 
of the M1 money supply (around 10%), and a lower proportion of M3. Even if 
the central bank were to exercise strict control over this component, it would not 
negate the endogeneity argument in respect of the M1 or M3 money supply as a 
whole. In practice, a central bank may allow the issue of notes and coins to be 
determined by the technical demand to meet transactions and cash holding 
requirements, even if it is seeking to exert control over the broader money 
supply, on the basis that notes and coins are a relatively small and stable 
component. Thus even a monetarist might concede that the notes and coins 
component of the money supply is frequently endogenous in practice, but this 
would not affect the substance of the argument in either direction concerning the 
broader monetary aggregates. 
As indicated, Moore's analysis entails a relatively strong view of money supply 
endogeneity within the Post Keynesian camp: some Post Keynesians (e.g. 
Davidson, Rousseas) regard the money supply as being partly exogenous, 
partly endogenous, with the fiat money component in particular being 
exogenously determined. These issues have been the subject of ongoing 
debate within the Post Keynesian camp: e.g. the mini-symposium held in 1989, 
as covered in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 1989, Vol 11 No 3. It is, 
however, a characteristic view of Post Keynesians in general that the broad 
money supply aggregates are not and cannot be directly controlled by the 
; monetary authority, owing to the nature of credit money. The Post Keynesian 
view is that broad money supply aggregates can only be controlled indirectly 
through the price mechanism of interest rates, with some additional influence 
through moral suasion and institutional factors. 
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3.3 The Finance Motive 
Keynes introduced the notion of a finance motive, as an additional cause for the 
holding of money balances over and above the transaction, precautionary and 
speculative motives, only after publication of the General Theory and in 
response to criticisms received of his theory of interest. He put forward the 
notion in three short articles in 1937 and 1938 (Azimakopolous, 1991:109). It 
appears that, in Keynes' mind, the finance motive was a relatively minor 
amendment to his liquidity preference theory. Certain Post Keynesian writers, 
however, regard the finance motive as a crucial link in the analysis of money 
holding when investment levels are changing, and in explaining the creation of 
credit independently from saving. Davidson in particular regards the money 
demand function as being miss-specified without the autonomous component 
provided by a finance motive (e.g. 1994:124). Rousseas (1986) and Moore 
(1988a) treat the finance motive as an essential element of a Post Keynesian 
monetary theory. 
The finance motive refers to the liquidity-preference of entrepreneurs with a 
view to meeting planned business activity. It relates to the liquidity required in 
advance of entering into forward contracts for new production or for the 
acquisition of new capital goods to be produced. The finance motive becomes 
crucial when the general level of economic activity is increasing or decreasing 
(Davidson, 1994:122). If output is unchanging over time, the requirement for 
liquidity to meet ex-ante business activity will be provided by the release of 
liquidity as payments are effected for previously planned business activity. The 
business activity referred to covers investment in particular, but may also 
include any other forms of autonomous expenditure (Keynes, 1937b). The 
increased demand for liquidity to meet the finance motive occurs prior to the 
additional employment and income being generated. Keynes saw his initial 
omission of the finance motive as a deficiency in not taking into account the 
effect of ex-ante output on money demand, as against the effect of ex-post, 
J 
realised output. 
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Davidson considers the inclusion of the finance motive to be of material 
significance because it renders the demand for money no longer directly 
proportional to output, but dependent in a more complex way as "a function of a 
function of current output" (1994:125). A demand for money function relative to 
output would need to be drawn with a positive intercept on the money axis, 
rather than as a 452 line through the origin, showing dependence on the 
autonomous component of ex-ante expenditure. This implies an income 
elasticity for money balances of less than unity along the entire money demand 
function, contrary to the monetarist assumption of unitary elasticity. It offers a 
ready explanation for the empirical finding that short-run income elasticities of 
money demand are less than unity, as an alternative to the permanent income 
hypothesis put forward by monetarists. It also underpins the interdependence of 
the real and monetary sectors of the economy, which can be shown with an 
IS/LM curve analysis in which the (re-specified) LM curve shifts when the IS 
curve shifts so that the final outcome of a movement of either curve is not 
readily apparent (Davidson, 1994:129). 
The finance motive provides a counter to any empirical evidence that the 
monetarist school may offer that money supply increases have occurred prior in 
time to output increases, thereby implying a causal relationship from money to 
output. The finance motive implies that money supply increases can occur in 
advance of output increases without being the cause of the latter. It is rather 
entrepreneurial expectations, together with ex-ante decisions to invest and 
produce in accordance with the expectations, that can cause an increased 
money supply in advance of economic activity. 
The finance motive, and whether the financial system meets liquidity demands 
arising from the finance motive, is a crucial issue in considering economic 
expansion. Any increase in economic activity forming part of the expansion 
process must be preceded by an increased demand for money in terms of the 
finance motive. But is this demand immediately and fully met by the financial 
J 
system, or could expansion be constrained by insufficient provision of liquidity? 
Keynes was certainly of the view that the banking system could serve as a 
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constraint in this way. He referred to a "stringency" or "congestion" in the 
money market resulting from the increased demand for liquid r_esources, with 
upward pressure on interest rates (1937b). Post Keynesians have taken this 
view forward with differences in the degree of emphasis placed on the 
constraining role of the banking system. Dow (1993:168) maintains that there is 
evidence of credit rationing by the banking system at both the micro level and in 
respect of international financing. Rousseas (1986:45) regards the restrictive 
effect of banks as a short-run phenomenon that comes into play under 
exceptional circumstances, partly because much of ex-ante demand for money 
by business enterprises is met from internal funds, partly because additional 
saving resulting from new investment expenditure soon contributes to meeting 
the demand for money. He places greater blame for monetary restriction on 
central banks, owing to their (mistaken) belief that money expansion is the 
cause of inflation. Davidson (1994: 124) appears to concur fully with Keynes' 
view of possible congestion in the money market, with finance motive 
requirements either not being fully met at the prevailing interest rate or 
restriction leading to an increase in the interest rate. He does not see this as 
contradictory to an endogenous view of money creation, since it is the 
commercial banks that are applying the restriction, if any, and not the central 
bank asserting control over the money supply. Moore (1988a:199), on the other 
hand, regards the finance motive as "the conclusive argument" for the 
endogeneity of the money stock in that it is the mechanism through which the 
banking system provides the additional money required to move to a higher 
level of economic activity, without a necessary role by the central bank. 
Keynes (1930:217) made the distinction between Industrial and Financial 
circulations, the former referring to bank deposits used to meet physical 
investment and business activity, the latter to those used to meet acquisition of 
financial instruments. The liquidity demands within the two circulations need not 
be closely related and the financial circulation could be far more volatile due to 
speculative movements in the holding of financial instruments. The finance 
' 
motive, however, applies to both circulations. This has the implication that 
increased speculative activity in financial markets could be met through the 
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banking system accommodating the finance motive of speculators in much the 
same ways as for increased physical investment and business activity. If the 
banking system is such as to readily accommodate the liquidity needs of 
expanding (real) economic activity, it may equally serve to fuel speculative 
activity. 
Perhaps the most vital characteristic of the finance motive is that it represents a 
fully autonomous increase in demand for money based on future expectations 
rather than any change in current economic variables. The fact that such an 
autonomous increase in money demand can, in the Post Keynesian view, be 
met by the banking system without necessary recourse to the central bank 
implies that the banks can play a major role in expanding the money supply 
without this being subject to control by the monetary authorities. The provision 
of money is separated from saving, either current or resulting from the additional 
business activity being financed. The finance motive appears to go further than 
Keynes' original intention to reinforce his argument that interest rates are 
determined by liquidity preference effects rather than as a price equilibrating 
supply and demand of loanable funds. It supports money supply endogeneity 
arguments, at least in the banking system portion of the monetary chain, as well 
as having implications for the financing of economic expansion and for the 
fuelling of speculative financial activity. The ready availability of unutilised 
overdrafts in the banking system, as referred to by Keynes and emphasised by 
Post Keynesians (e.g. Moore, 1988a), enables the finance motive requirement 
of entrepreneurs to be more easily and rapidly met, and reinforces the 
endogeneity and related credit-money provision views. 
3.4 The Impact of International Flows 
Davidson (1982, 1994) and Dow (1986, 1993) have sought to put forward a Post 
Keynesian monetary theory concerning international financial flows. This 
serves as a counter view to the "global monetarism" which is prevalent in the 
neoclassical synthesis (Dow, 1986:237). It emphasises the impact of monetary 
variables on the real domestic economy at any stage of the business cycle. 
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Whereas a monetarist view maintains a sharp dichotomy between fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes, with flexible rates enabling exogenous money 
supply determination by the domestic central bank, the Post Keynesian view 
finds little difference in end result across the fixed-flexible exchange rate 
spectrum. The Post Keynesian view finds international flows generally to be a 
contributor to economic instability in the domestic economy. 
Davidson (1982:97) identifies three adjustment mechanisms which are put 
forward in orthodox trade theory as tending to correct trade imbalances. They 
are (1) the real wealth mechanism, with the monetary approach to the balance 
of payments being a variation of this (2) the neoclassical relative price 
mechanism and (3) the 'Keynesian' foreign trade income multiplier mechanism. 
The real wealth or monetary approach, put forward by monetarists, postulates 
that trade deficits are always and only the result of an excess in real monetary 
balances in the domestic economy. They assume that there always exists a 
price vector which ensures simultaneous clearing of all markets, and hence that 
relative price movements between exports and imports will lead to a re-
balancing of the two, thereby eliminating the trade deficit. Equivalent reasoning 
is applied to a trade surplus. The relative price movements have the effect of 
increasing the real wealth held by the (temporarily) surplus country at the 
expense of the deficit country, but with total international wealth unchanged. 
Adjustments according to this view therefore take place through relative pricing 
without any significant effect on (overall) real economic variables, with the 
proviso that exchange rates are fully flexible to allow price movements through 
market forces. 
The neoclassical relative price mechanism relies on a variant of the 'price 
specie flow mechanism' of classical writers whereby an outflow of specie (gold) 
or international reserve assets from deficit to surplus country results in relative 
price adjustments, either directly or through devaluation by the deficit country of 
its currency. Provided the Marshall-Lerner condition, in which the sum of 
J 
elasticities of demand for imports and exports of the trading partners exceeds 
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unity, is met, the relative price adjustments would eliminate the trade deficit 
without reducing the combined real national income of the two countries. 
The Keynesian foreign trade multiplier mechanism assumes an income effect in 
the surplus country resulting from the increase in imports of the deficit country. 
Provided that the marginal propensity to import is equal to or greater than the 
marginal propensity to consume in each country, the income effect in the 
surplus country will result in an increase in its imports which will at least offset 
the original increase in imports of the deficit country. The interaction of these 
marginal propensities to spend in the two trading partners would have an 
equilibrating effect on the trade balance between them. 
Post Keynesians are critical of all three orthodox mechanisms as being based 
on unrealistic assumptions. The monetary approach assumes that excessive 
domestic money supply creation is the sole underlying cause of the trade deficit, 
and that the imbalance can always be resolved through flexible prices and 
exchange rates. The neoclassical relative price mecha.nism takes no account of 
income effects of exchange rate changes and assumes that there is strong 
cross substitution between goods across trading partners; it does not take into 
account the high proportion of goods in most economies which are not 
internationally tradable. The foreign trade multiplier mechanism assumes that 
marginal propensities to consume and import in each trading partner are such 
as to create offsetting trade balance effects. This is unlikely in two trading 
partners, and even less likely in a multinational trading environment. It is also 
possible that marginal propensities to spend are endogenous variables which 
are affected by trade imbalances and could have a destabilising rather than 
stabilising effect on the trade imbalance. The mechanism simply assumes that 
the magnitudes of propensities are such as to have a stabilising and 
equilibrating effect. 
The Post Keynesian view of international flows extends Keynes' concept of 
liquidity preference to the open economy and allows effects of monetary 
variables on real economy magnitudes. The exposition below covers fixed 
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exchange rate and flexible exchange rate cases separately before drawing 
together the strands of both. It is of course recognised that exchange rate 
regimes lie along a continuum of which fixed and flexible rates are the extremes. 
The exposition draws primarily from Dow (1986, 1993) and Davidson(1982). 
In an open economy with fixed exchange rates, the provision of finance in the 
domestic economy is enhanced by an overall balance of payments surplus and 
diminished by a deficit, unless countervailing action is taken by the monetary 
authorities. If expectations of income and profitability growth in the domestic 
economy are high relative to the rest of the world, both domestic and foreign 
investors will buy additional domestic financial and real assets and sell foreign 
assets. This increases the supply of credit in the domestic economy as well as 
the elasticity of supply relative to the expected returns. Domestic borrowers are 
not constrained by the financial capacity of the domestic banking system, as in 
the case of a closed economy. Funding for investment can be met by reducing 
foreign asset holdings as well as by decreasing idle balances of domestic 
money. These changes in asset holdings from foreign to domestic are 
undertaken without significant financial risk since the central banker serves as 
market maker at the specified fixed exchange rate. Assets can once again be 
converted from domestic to foreign at the same exchange rate at any future date 
that the asset holder chooses. The interaction between liquidity and productive 
asset acquisition operates in a manner similar to that in the closed economy, but 
with provision of financing, and liquidity preferences, occurring across 
international borders. This implies a vastly greater pool of funding being 
potentially available to finance asset acquisition in the case of favourable 
relative returns as well as wider alternatives for the holding of liquid funds 
(money or idle balances). It also implies the availability of credit in the domestic 
economy being outside the control of the monetary authorities (if indeed they 
are able to exercise any control over credit in the closed economy case). 
Foreign funding inflows will tend to supplement domestic funding during 
upswings in the business cycle, wt)ere perceived marginal efficiencies of capital 
on real investments are greater than prevailing domestic interest rates. This will 
have the greatest effect at the end of the upswing when financing is becoming 
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constrained (markets congested), serving to extend or prolong the final stages 
of the upswing. Conversely, foreign funding outflows during the dqwnswing of a 
business cycle will tend to extend and prolong the lowest portion of the cycle 
since the removal of liquid funds from the domestic economy delays the point at 
which short-term interest rates have fallen sufficiently for investment once again 
to start rising as a result of the MEG being above the interest rate. 
The above effects will be dampened by measures which the domestic monetary 
authority takes when foreign reserves fall to unacceptably low levels or increase 
excessively. Monetary authorities will seek to alleviate low foreign reserves 
• through increasing domestic interest rates to attract short-term foreign capital or 
through direct arrangement or encouragement of foreign borrowing. This 
excludes, of course, the more drastic actions of foreign exchange controls which 
would need to be separately considered. The analysis could be extended by 
treating the effect of the trade balance, short-term capital and long-term capital 
flows separately. Short-term capital flows are influenced primarily by interest 
rates, whereas long-term capital flows are influenced primarily by expected 
returns on physical investment (the MEG). This can result in short-term and 
long-term capital flows partially offsetting one another over certain stages of the 
business cycle. The MEG may improve through a positive trade balance 
increasing actual and expected returns on physical assets, in the form of greater 
export earnings, especially relative to import costs. 
In the case of purely flexible exchange rates, the balance of payments has no 
direct effect on the nominal money supply, since net international financial flows 
are assumed to be fully eliminated through the immediate adjustment of the 
exchange rate. The real value of the money supply is, however, affected 
through appreciation or depreciation of import prices through exchange rate 
changes. Domestic liquidity is also affected through differences in maturities of 
assets which are being bought or sold by foreigners: purchase of domestic long-
term assets by foreigners with contemporaneous sale of short-term assets, or 
J 
purchases by domestic residents of foreign bank deposits, would leave the 
overall balance of payments (and exchange rate) unaffected, but would affect 
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the domestic liquidity structure. These two indirect effects on the domestic 
money supply are strongly influenced by expectations of exchange rate 
appreciation or depreciation. It is money demand that is primarily affected, 
rather than supply as in the case of fixed exchange rates. 
Expectations of expansion in the domestic economy encourage purchase by 
foreigners of domestic medium- and long-term assets, which results in 
appreciation of the exchange rate_ Anticipated further exchange rate gains lead 
to further purchases of the domestic currency, to be held speculatively or for 
conversion to domestic longer-term assets. The indirect effect of increasing the 
real value of the money supply contributes to this process being pro-cyclical. 
When the domestic economy is close to its expected peak, sale of longer-term 
assets for currency results in increased monetary demand. The currency 
appreciation and its attendant indirect effects are thereby extended. As the 
currency is sold for a foreign currency, however, downward pressure is exerted 
on the exchange rate. With a reverse process occurring for the purchase of 
longer-term assets as the economy draws out of a trough, exchange rate 
depreciation is extended. Over the course of a business cycle, this view of 
international currency effects indicates an accentuation of the cyclical 
movements, with sharper upswings and declines. 
Dow (1993:67) maintains that, in the case of a largely self-sufficient economy, 
the trade and short-term capital flows tend to offset long-term capital flows over 
the course of the cycle. The rise in nominal short-term interest rates in the later 
stages of the upswing, lasting through to near the middle of the downswing, is 
likely to attract short-term capital inflows and encourage a continuation of 
exchange rate appreciation. Similarly, low interest rates prevailing well into the 
upswing will result in short-term capital outflows to practically offset longer-term 
inflows. This leads Dow to the view that there is no inherent tendency towards 
major instability in the exchange rate, even though international flows under 
flexible exchange rates increase ~he scope for instability across the business 
cycle. 
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The Post Keynesian view therefore finds that international monetary flows tend 
to increase instability in the domestic economy, with this being the case under a 
fixed or flexible exchange rate regime, and by implication any dispensation 
between the two. In both cases, international funding flows tend to be restricted 
when most needed in the domestic economy, and readily available when least 
needed. Although Post Keynesians generally view the money supply as already 
substantially or entirely endogenous in the case of a closed economy, the Post 
Keynesian analysis of the open economy case indicates additional sources of 
domestic monetary expansion or contraction outside the control of the monetary 
authorities. If any partial exogeneity view is held in the closed economy case, 
this is eroded to the extent that the economy is open, through international 
monetary flows, under fixed or flexible exchange rate regimes. The international 
monetary flows, as with domestic money, have significant and enduring effects 
on the real domestic economy. 
3.5 The Exchange Rate and Foreign Reserves 
Post Keynesians are generally supportive of exchange rate systems towards the 
fixed end of the flexible-fixed spectrum, typically favouring a strongly managed 
or fixed but adjustable exchange rate regime. Davidson and Dow have 
examined international monetary issues extensively from a Post Keynesian 
perspective, while other leading Post Keynesian writers such as Moore, Kaldor 
and Rogers comment on international flows in broader terms. The portrayal of a 
Post Keynesian view of exchange rates and international flows below draws 
mainly on Davidson (1982, 1993, 1994) and Dow (1986, 1993), incorporating 
views of Rogers (1989) as well as the debates at the Mini-symposium on 
Reforming the World's Monetary System, as covered in the Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics of Winter 1992-1993. 
Monetarists maintain that exchange rates are price-signal variables which tend 
to equilibrium values through the operation of market forces. They are therefore 
strong advocates of flexible exchange rates, a position enhanced by their view 
that flexible exchange rates are necessary for national monetary authorities to 
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exercise full control over the domestic money supply. Post Keynesians are 
sceptical of the assumption that exchange rates tend towards equilibrium values 
in a stable manner, and some (e.g. Rogers, 1989:287) argue that exchange 
rates, if allowed free rein, are inherently unstable. 
Davidson (1982, 1994) distinguishes between Unionised Monetary Systems 
(UMS) and Non-Unionised Monetary Systems (NUMS). A UMS is a monetary 
system in which spot or forward transactions are denominated in the same 
nominal unit, or in different nominal units with fixed conversion rates and 
negligible conversion costs, and in which the conversion rates are expected to 
remain unchanged over the life of contractual arrangements. Any regional 
monetary system within a single country is generally a UMS, but more 
pertinently it refers to an idealised system of fully fixed exchange rates between 
a group of international trading partners. A NUMS in contrast refers to a 
monetary system in which there are differing monetary units with varying 
conversion rates between them. This corresponds to the case of flexible 
exchange rates between trading partners. In similar fashion to measures of the 
degree of openness of an economy, Davidson suggests that there could be a 
measure of the degree to which a monetary system is non-unionised based on 
the variability of exchange rates between trading partners, though conceding 
that this could be an ex-post measure only, not taking into account expected 
variability. The UMS/NUMS distinction is essentially an abstraction of the 
contrast between fixed and flexible exchange rate systems, which Davidson 
uses to provide clarity to the characteristics of each. The terms emphasise the 
systemic nature of international monetary regimes across groups of trading 
countries, whereas- the terms fixed and flexible exchange rate may be construed 
as relating to a single economy trading with the world. The latter terms are used 
below because of their wide acceptance. 
Davidson draws a parallel between the motives for holding money put forward 
by Keynes for a closed economy, qnd the requirements for meeting international 
transactions. He emphasises the essential role of uncertainty in an international 
as well as domestic monetary context. Foreign reserves provide a means for 
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meeting transactions requirements which are characterised by uncertainty. 
Contrary to the monetarist view that flexible exchange rates reduce the need for 
foreign exchange holding by central banks to a negligible level, the Post 
Keynesian view anticipates that foreign reserve holdings are required under 
flexible exchange rates to much the same extent as with fixed exchange rates 
due to the uncertainty in rates and volumes of foreign transactions. 
Post Keynesians view flexible exchange rates as being a source of increased 
instability rather than stability compared to fixed rates. If the exchange rate of a 
currency changes, transactors have no basis on which to tell whether the 
currency will move further from its original rate, or whether the change will be 
reversed towards its original level. This renders exchange rate expectations 
elastic, and provides opportunities for speculators. Speculation can drive 
exchange rates far from any Purchasing Power Parity or similar equivalence. 
The Post Keynesian view is that there is no natural or equilibrium value to which 
exchange rates will tend. Changes in exchange rates relative to expected 
future values induce portfolio shifts, with consequent purchases or sale of 
foreign currencies, and price changes through these transactions, which may 
reinforce the initial exchange rate change. 
Post Keynesians counteract the monetarist view that flexible exchange rates 
enable the monetary authorities of a country to pursue a monetary policy 
independently of occurrences in trading partner countries. Monetarists assume 
implicitly that domestic residents do not view foreign currencies as a substitute 
for the local currency for holding of liquidity. This assumption implies that 
monetary authority actions such as open market operations will affect the 
holding of domestic currency only, without a secondary effect on foreign 
currency holding. In this view, the flexible exchange rates provide a price vector 
such that there are no net movements in foreign currency holdings by residents 
in response to domestic monetary policy measures. Post Keynesians argue, 
however, that economic agents will hold expectations of relative movements of 
foreign and local currency values and may well acquire or dispose of foreign 
currency holdings in response to monetary circumstances in the economy, 
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including those which are consequences of monetary policy actions. There is 
thus no insulation mechanism between domestic and foreign money supplies, 
even with purely flexible exchange rates. For instance, if there are expectations 
that the foreign currency will have greater stability in purchasing power than the 
local currency, then residents will place a greater proportion of their liquid funds 
in the foreign currency as a store of value, pending the future· time period in 
which contractual payments will fall due. This will create downward pressure on 
the domestic exchange rate, reducing imports and the corresponding exports of 
the foreign country, which may be alleviated by the foreign central bank through 
its creation of additional currency to meet the demand for its currency, thus 
increasing its money supply. If the foreign central bank does not respond by 
allowing an increase in its money supply, the upward pressure on its exchange 
rate will continue, with consequent reduction in its exports and increased 
unemployment. Monetary policy actions in the domestic economy will thereby 
have been translated into an increase in the foreign country's money supply and 
contraction in the domestic money supply, even though this may not have been 
the policy intent of the domestic monetary authorities. 
With fixed exchange rates, since alternative currencies are near-perfect 
substitutes for each other for purposes of a store of value (barring convenience 
and relatively small conversion costs), portfolio compositions between domestic 
and foreign currencies will be far less affected by monetary policy measures and 
changes in expectations, according to the Post Keynesian view. 
holdings will be predominantly determined by transaction flows. 
Currency 
The Post 
Keynesian view recognises that the central bank is not able to pursue an 
independent monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate regime, but maintains 
that monetary policy independence is also not achievable under flexible rates, 
and considers the flows under fixed exchange rates to be less volatile. For this 
reason, a near-fixed or strongly managed exchange rate regime is regarded as 
preferable. However, the implication of interdependence of monetary flows and 
hence of monetary policies, is that monetary authorities need to recognise this 
interdependence and seek monetary policy co-ordination between countries 
having extensive trade relationships. 
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Dow (1986) illustrates the international flows occurring in an open economy 
under fixed exchange rates. Expected income or profitability growth relative to 
the rest of the world encourages domestic and foreign investors to sell foreign 
assets and purchase domestic assets, which increases the domestic supply of 
finance. With domestic firms having direct access to foreign creditors, they are 
not constrained by the expansion capacity of the domestic banking system. In 
the case of a contraction, the reduced supply of money due to capital outflows is 
offset by a reduced demand for domestic balances as foreign financial assets 
are substituted. But the effect of this in reducing foreign exchange reserves 
forces implementation of measures aimed at restraining income, which worsens 
the contraction. All in all, the effect of the openness of the economy relative to a 
closed economy is that cyclical expansions and contractions tend to be 
amplified. The same applies to supply shocks and any other spurious changes: 
openness renders the economy less stable and exchange rate mechanisms 
need to be such as to achieve the greatest possible degree of stability. 
Davidson (1993:153) maintains that the flexible exchange rate system, set up 
from 1973 after the Bretton Woods international payments system was 
abandoned, has not served the global economy well, and was "sold to the public 
and the politicians under false advertising claims." Whereas monetarists 
favoured the complete flexibility of exchange- rates on the grounds that this 
would lead to efficient resource allocation through the pricing mechanism, the 
Post Keynesian viewpoint is that the inherent instability of financial markets and 
expectations renders such a system subject to large speculative flows and 
exchange rate changes which are not based on underlying economic realities. 
Rogers (1989:291) maintains that, "Under these conditions foreign exchange 
markets attract speculators who can exploit the elasticity of expectations to 
make gains. The volatility of interest and exchange rates under these 
conditions serves no useful purpose in promoting capital accumulation and 
growth - if anything it discourage,s it." Rogers' argument implies that there is 
no natural rate that can be objectively determined to which actual exchange 
rates will adjust. Unbridled flexibility brings to the fore the indeterminacy of 
96 
Shackle's kaleidic world, or the shifting equilibrium in the classification of Kregel 
(1976). 
The view taken on the exchange rate mechanism stems from the underlying 
theoretical view of economic reality held by Post Keynesians. With the 
economic world being characterised by uncertainty and nonergodicity, "there 
need not exist any simultaneous internal and external equilibrium to which the 
economy can converge." (Davidson, 1993:171). This implies that a Purchasing 
Power Parity system as suggested for instance by McKinnon (1990), in which 
exchange rates are calculated according to PPP rates in the respective 
countries and money supplies adjusted to maintain these rates, would not be 
sustainable due to the large speculative flows which would take place. Post 
Keynesians advocate, rather, what amounts to exogenous determination of 
exchange rates. This implies setting or targeting of exchange rates by monetary 
authorities, but with adjustments made according to economic circumstances. 
Davidson (1993) points out that in the post-Bretton Woods flexible exchange 
rate system, the onus is placed on the debtor country to adopt adjustment 
measures when its currency is weakening and foreign reserves running low. He 
quotes Keynes in support of shifting this burden to creditor countries, rather 
than "on the country which is (in this context) by hypothesis the weaker and 
above all smaller in comparison with the other side of the scales which (for this 
purpose) is the rest of the world." (Davidson, 1993:155). These issues are 
taken up in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The Post Keynesian view is thus broadly in favour of a fixed but adjustable, or 
strongly managed, exchange rate system, with the onus placed on surplus 
trading nations to initiate corrections to payments imbalances, without relieving 
the deficit trading nations of all discipline to restore balance. 
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3.6 Monetary Effects of Flows on a Small Open Economy 
As noted by Hawkins (1995), various views and definitions have been 
expounded as to the characteristics which categorise an economy as "small and 
open", focusing on both the size and openness aspects. The alternative 
definitions are not central to this dissertation. The concern for the small open 
economy situation lies with the possibility that the South African economy is 
best examined using this characterisation when considering international trade 
and monetary issues. For this purpose, the analytic approach and classification 
of a small open economy is most pertinent. According to this classification, an 
economy is small and open if its international trade relations are best 
characterised as price-taking (due to relative smallness in the world economy), 
with the world economy not significantly affected by its actions, but with 
international trade forming a large enough proportion of economic activity to 
have a material impact on the domestic economy (Hawkins, 1995:51 ). 
This classification forms a parallel to the individual firm of microeconomics in an 
environment of perfect competition. It is similarly a device to allow systematic 
analysis under a set of assumptions rather than a rigid classification system. 
With this approach, the degree of openness is a more important consideration 
than absolute size (whether measured by GDP, population, or another 
aggregate), and an economy is typically taken to be 'open' if the ratio of imports 
to Gross Domestic Expenditure, or exports to Gross Domestic Product, is 
greater than 20% (e.g. Mohr & Rogers, 1991 ). On this criterion, the South 
African economy could certainly be classified as 'open' with a ratio of around 
30% in 1996. Its classification as 'small' can be argued on the grounds, using 
the analytic approach, that it is generally a price-taker in world markets with a 
relatively small effect on the world economy. 
The implications of a Small Open Economy (SOE) classification for international 
monetary flows and effects lie in jts heavy dependence on international trade 
flows, at prices over which it has minimal control. An typical characteristic of a 
SOE is a bias towards capital and intermediate goods in its imports, due to the 
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domestic capital equipment production sector being relatively smaller than in 
large economies. These characteristics do not change the general Post 
Keynesian open economy analysis in respect of monetary issues as presented 
above, but do have some specific implications. 
The price-taker characteristic of a SOE, together with the large' component of 
imported goods in the economy, has the effect of transferring price changes in 
the rest of the world into the domestic economy. This is exacerbated by the 
imported products for the most part not having close substitutes in the domestic 
economy. Imports therefore tend to be price inelastic. A consequence of this is 
that an exchange rate appreciation has little effect in reducing import volumes 
but is fully reflected in increased import value through the price effect. Monetary 
authorities are therefore frequently forced to adopt deflationary measures in the 
domestic economy in order to reduce import demand. This affects the 
investment component of domestic aggregate demand in particular, since this is 
the component with the strongest propensity to import. Under flexible exchange 
rates, rather than a rapid correction of import volumes through exchange rate 
changes as would be predicted by the monetarist approach to the balance of 
payments, a higher exchange rate is likely to cause higher domestic prices 
(contributing to inflation) without improvement in the trade balance until 
domestic economic activity is dampened sufficiently to reduce import values. 
This renders domestic monetary policy strongly subject to exchange rate 
movements rather than being under independent control of the domestic 
authorities. Contrary to the monetarist view, this implies reduced control over 
monetary' aggregates by the monetary authorities rather than leading to money 
supply exogeneity. It does, however, also restrict the latitude of the monetary 
authorities in determining interest rates. Under fixed exchange rates, greater 
stability is achievable since import values are affected only by import volumes 
and price effects occur only through relative price movements in domestic and 
trading partner economies. Balance of payments correction can be effected 
through volume adjustments in the domestic economy, for example through 
export promotion or through a strong interest rate to dampen new investment, 
without the price and value effects of exchange rate movements. 
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The above situation under flexible exchange rates is exacerbated by the fact 
that SOEs typically use net foreign inflows on the capital account of the balance 
of payments to finance a deficit on current account. Within limits, this is an 
appropriate policy for an SOE to adopt, since the foreign capital inflows are 
financing imports of real capital equipment, enabling the domestic economy to 
expand. Fluctuations in international perceptions and expectations can, 
however, lead to rapid changes in the willingness of foreigners to provide 
financial capital, with corresponding changes in the exchange rate, and slow 
changes in import volumes even with policy intervention. The SOE is therefore 
tied further to having its domestic monetary, and fiscal, policies strongly affected 
by international perceptions of the domestic economy. 
Given the 'small' aspect of the SOE classification, the feedback effects of the 
domestic economy via the world economies is negligible. An increase in import 
value of the domestic economy, for instance, implies a higher value of exports 
from its trading partners, which, without the 'small' assumption, could result in 
increased export demand for products of the domestic economy. Under the 
'small' assumption, this mechanism, however, provides no alleviation for a deficit 
on the balance of payments current account Measures to depreciate the 
currency in order to stem imports have no easing effect on foreign prices 
resulting from the reduction in demand for imported goods. The price 
inelasticity of imports implies significant depreciation of the domestic currency to 
achieve a required reduction in import value. The export-promoting effect of the 
currency depreciation may be constrained as a consequence of the curbing of 
imports, both through reducing capital equipment imported, which is needed to 
expand production for exports, and through the increased price effect of 
imported materials and equipment which forms part of the cost of production of 
exported products. The combination of these effects gives rise to a situation in 
which balance of payments issues are a major factor in domestic economic 
policy and progress in a small op8in economy, and may be the limiting factor to 
the rate of economic growth, as argued by Thirlwall (1978, 1997). 
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3. 7 Concluding Remarks 
The money supply process in a Post Keynesian world entails primarily 
endogenous money creation through financial credit extension in a closed 
economy, with money holding being dependent on the motives of transactions, 
precautionary, speculative and finance. The addition of the finance motive in 
meeting new expenditure funding plays an important role in the Post Keynesian 
framework, and contributes to the argument that money is created 
endogenously through the banking system. Extending the analysis to the case 
of an open economy provides further sources of money creation to meet the 
above four motives, with the introduction of possible destabilising forces on the 
domestic economy, especially under a regime of flexible exchange rates. A 
fixed exchange rate regime, or a Unionised Monetary System, is shown to be 
theoretically preferable in a Post Keynesian analysis due to the greater stability 
afforded through the effects of international monetary flows. This translates into 
a strongly managed exchange rate regime, rather than flexible rates, in practice. 
The Small Open Economy exhibits features which make effects of flexible 
exchange rates in the Post Keynesian analysis even more deleterious to the 
domestic economy. The conclusions of the Post Keynesian analysis are 
strongly at variance with those of the global monetarist view, or the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments, in which the independence of domestic 
monetary policy can be attained through perfectly flexible exchange rates. 
Likewise, the implications for monetary policy of the Post Keynesian view of 
money are in many respects diametrically opposed to the policy prescriptions of 
monetarism. In the following chapter, the implications of Post Keynesian 
monetary theory for monetary policy in general is explored, before examining 
the implications for South Africa specifically in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MONETARY POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The Post Keynesian view of money has significant implications for monetary 
policy, arising both from its theoretical analyses and from its precepts 
concerning the nature and functioning of a capitalist economic system. Many 
Post Keynesians have followed in the tradition of Keynes, who was active in 
considering economic policy issues as well as contributing to the advancement 
of economic theory. Contributions on policy issues are further supported by the 
commitment in the Post Keynesian camp to examination of real-world economic 
behaviour, to the use of stylised facts from economic experience, and to taking 
into account the role of economic institutions. Post Keynesian writings on policy 
issues have been particularly strongly addressed to counteracting the views and 
policy prescriptions put forward by the monetarist and similar groupings, but 
include a broad set of policy aspects which follow logically from the school's 
theoretical precepts. Although views on monetary policy expressed by 
adherents to a Post Keynesian view share much common ground, there is again 
considerable variety in specific views and policy prescriptions advocated. There 
are also aspects of monetary policy in which little has been put forward by 
writers who are clearly identifiable as Post Keynesians. 
This chapter seeks to draw together Post Keynesian work concerning monetary 
policy issues, supplemented where necessary with implications drawn from the 
Post Keynesian monetary theory as put forward in the previous chapters. The 
chapter looks at the policy variables regarded as important in a Post Keynesian 
view, the role of interest rates in monetary policy, implications of the 
endogenous view for money supply and credit extension policies, the combating 
of inflation, exchange rates and foreign flows. It concludes with issues 
concerning the role of the central oank in monetary policy, and the effects which 
the investment and deficit financing activities of the central government can 
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have on monetary policy. The chapter concerns itself with policy implications of 
Post Keynesian monetary theory in general, prior to the ex_amination of 
implications for South Africa in particular which are taken up in Chapter 5. 
4.2 Policy Variables 
The implication of an endogenous theory of money, together with an interest 
rate determined by convention or exogenously by the monetary authorities, is a 
reversal of the key policy variables as viewed by monetarists and neoclassical 
economists. The money supply or money stock (by any defined aggregate) is 
no longer the key monetary variable over which close scrutiny and control by the 
central bank is imperative, as in the monetarist view. Whereas monetarists see 
growth of monetary aggregates as directly causally connected to inflation 
(through time lags) as well as a potential source of economic instability, Post 
Keynesians view monetary aggregates as passively adjusting to the demand for 
money and credit according to interest rate levels, investment activity and 
income. The level and growth of monetary aggregates are thus taken off centre 
stage in a Post Keynesian policy view as being neither controllable by the 
authorities nor crucial in any economic causal chain. This should not, however, 
be seen as diminishing the importance of money in the Post Keynesian scheme: 
the existence and attributes of money remain crucial. It is simply that other 
aspects of money are regarded as most appropriate for policy intervention 
purposes. In Post Keynesian monetary policy analyses, the interest rate takes 
centre stage as being both controllable by the monetary authorities and a key 
determinant of the level of investment activity through which, in terms of the 
principle of effective demand, the economy can be brought closer to full 
employment. The central bank is regarded as exercising monetary policy 
primarily through the level of interest rates, using as its instrument variable the 
discount rate, and any penalty premiums applied, at which the banking system 
can obtain borrowed reserves (taking account of foreign reserve issues, 
especially in the case of a small qpen economy). This operates in conjunction 
with the reserve requirement placed on commercial banks, as well as open 
market operations which have some impact on interest rates at the margin. The 
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central bank has its primary effect on short-term rates through the discount 
window structure, but can also have an effect on the interest rate structure (yield 
curve) through open market operations and other financial market activities. 
Post Keynesians deny the causal validity of the quantity theory and place 
virtually no role with monetary aggregates in combating inflation: With inflation 
regarded as an institutional phenomenon through the money-wage contracting 
process, anti-inflation measures are not considered a key component of central 
bank policies. Combating inflation instead becomes the primary responsibility of 
executive government (the Treasury or Ministry of Finance, with co-operation 
from other ministries). This places Post Keynesians in direct opposition to 
monetarists in respect of policy prescriptions for combating inflation. 
The principle of effective demand, together with the view of entrepreneurial 
expectations as being subject to a variety of influences under conditions of 
uncertainty and therefore unpredictable, places investment as an important 
policy variable in the Post Keynesian framework. This raises the possibility of 
state involvement either to stabilise investment, or to adopt measures to bring 
the level of investment closer to a full employment level. Keynes referred to the 
'socialisation of investment' as a policy option which he favoured (Keynes, 
1936:378). This should not be seen as a socialistic stance, as taken up further 
in Section 4.8 below. 
Although the money supply as a whole, whether broad (M3) or narrow (M1 ), is 
not an important policy variable in the Post Keynesian framework, importance is 
accorded to the extension of domestic credit to the private sector. This is not 
regarded as a control variable, being demand driven, but serves as an indicator 
of new credit generation in the economy. It is a variable to be monitored, 
through which monetary policy measures can then be determined. 
Also contrary to the monetarist view, the exchange rate of the country's currency 
is regarded as a policy variable in a Post Keynesian framework. The typical 
monetarist view is that the exchange rate is best left to find its own market level 
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under a freely floating exchange rate system. The Post Keynesian view is that 
the exchange rate should be either set, and adjusted when necessary, under a 
fixed exchange rate system, or strongly managed, with the level and 
adjustments to it being determined by appropriate monetary policy for the 
circumstances of the economy, and in support of other economic policy 
measures. The exchange rate is therefore regarded as an important monetary 
policy instrument under the control or influence of the central bank, in conjuction 
with other aspects of monetary policy. 
4.3 Interest Rates 
As shown in Chapter 2, Post Keynesians by and large adopt the liquidity 
preference theory of interest rates, rather than a loanable funds view in which 
interest rates are market determined through equilibrium between demand and 
supply of credit. The central bank plays a crucial role in interest rate 
determination: in the words of Moore (1988a:258) "Credit money is not 
supplied according to some production function, with a real resource cost and a 
rising supply price. Rather it is supplied on demand by the central bank as the 
residual provider of system liquidity, at a supply price determined exogenously 
within wide limits as a policy variable by the central bank itself.". This is the 
Horizontalist view whereby, whenever the central bank adjusts its discount rate 
(alternatively referred to as bank rate or minimum lending rate), the money 
supply function, which is horizontal in interest-money space, shifts vertically 
upwards or downwards. 
It is the nominal interest rate which is being adjusted by the central bank. 
However, when it comes to the determination of investment and therefore the 
demand for credit, it is ex ante real rates which entrepreneurs are relating to the 
marginal efficiency of capital on alternative investments (Moore, 1988a:264). 
Inflation and inflation expectations therefore play a role in the credit demand 
process. 
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Central banks are subject to several factors which limit the range over which 
they can set the discount rate. A zero nominal rate provides a technical 
limitation, since bank depositors can always maintain their deposits in the form 
of money, with a zero interest rate. But even in a deflationary environment in 
which a zero nominal rate may be a significantly positive rate in real terms, 
central banks cannot set a rate substantially below the rate of inflation without 
risking excessive credit-driven money growth which could lead to high inflation 
and even hyperinflation. Setting the rate too high, conversely, will discourage 
potential borrowers due to the high ex ante real costs of borrowing, relative to 
expected investment returns. Aggregate demand growth will fall below its 
potential, with rising unemployment and falling capacity utilisation. 
Thus the interest rate is a monetary policy instrument which the central bank 
can use to exercise an expansionary or restrictive credit policy. This bears 
some resemblance to the expansionary or restrictive monetary policy in a 
monetarist framework, with the crucial difference that here the effect on credit 
and the money aggregates is occurring indirectly through changes in the 
interest rate. The interest rate gives rise to higher or lower monetary 
aggregates through its effect on the demand for credit; there is no direct 
influence by the central bank on the monetary aggregates. The monetary 
aggregates are regarded as only a minor contributing factor in the inflation 
process, as against being the sole or primary ultimate factor as in monetarism. 
Increases in monetary aggregates are regarded as a consequence of additional 
credit extension and expenditure rather than a cause of increased expenditure. 
Although the clear-cut implication of the Post Keynesian view is that central 
banks need to focus their attention on the interest rate as the primary monetary 
policy variable, the issue of what constitutes the appropriate interest rate level 
under any given economic circumstances is far more complex. With complete 
knowledge of economic variables and a closed economy, central banks should 
be striving for that interest rate wh,ich draws forth the maximum investment rate 
which the economy's consumption demand, and its growth, can sustain. 
However, the authorities generally do not have full knowledge of the linkages 
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between consumption demand and investment requirements, and in any event 
the investment function is subject to the vagaries of expectations of 
entrepreneurs. Added to this are the complications of too low a rate contributing 
to increased inflation, and, once the openness of the economy is taken into 
account, of interest rate differentials relative to other countries and the effects 
these have on the exchange rate and foreign reserves. The setting of the 
discount rate by the central bank therefore becomes a matter of fine judgement, 
using the information which the bank does have together with its understanding 
of likely effects of rate changes according to its conceptual framework and the 
priorities of objectives to which it is committed. 
Post Keynesians generally take the view that it is the entire spectrum of liquid 
assets that is important to economic policy rather than a particular money supply 
aggregate, however defined. This accords with the Radcliffe Committee view, 
following its investigation into the monetary ~ystem of the United Kingdom 
completed in 1959 : "Our view is different. Though we do not regard the supply 
of money as an unimportant quantity, we view it as only part of a wider structure 
of liquidity in the economy ... It is the whole liquidity position that is relevant to 
spending decisions and our interest in the supply of money is due to its 
significance in the whole liquidity picture . . . . The decision to spend thus 
depends upon liquidity in the broad sense, not upon immediate access to the 
money .... ": (Radcliffe report, 1959:132). The relative proportions of funds held 
in alternative financial assets influences economic behaviour, given that each 
has differing degrees of liquidity, risk and return. The spectrum of liquid assets 
has a range of interrelated interest rates; although the discount rate as a short-
term marginal rate to banks has a dominant influence, the central bank is able to 
exercise influence over the interest rate structure, from short to long rate, 
through open market operations and reserve asset policies. The Radcliffe 
Committee regarded debt management policies covering the spectrum of 
interest-bearing, marketabl~ financial assets as the fundamental domestic task 
of the central bank in which it seeks to "provide various types of debt in the 
J 
amounts and proportions in which the public desires to hold them - subject to 
the Bank's powers to influence the public's preferences by altering the relative 
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yield on various types of debt." (Kaldor, · 1986:13). The Radcliffe view, 
supported by Kaldor, is that the central bank should have a positive policy 
concerning interest rates from short to long term and the relationship between 
them. 
With the prominence of monetarist views in the late 1970s and the adoption of 
outward monetarist targets and terminology, the question has been raised by 
Post Keynesians as to whether the behaviour of central banks was in fact 
monetarist in accordance with their rhetoric. Kaldor (1985b) points to the 
episode, from May 1979, when Britain's Conservative government adopted 
outwardly monetarist policies. Money supply targets were set, using Sterling 
M3, with the initial target set at 7-11%. Actual money supply grew by 22%. 
With re-based targets the following year, money supply growth was again far in 
excess of the target. The attempts to restrict money supply growth were 
accompanied by increases in the Bank's minimum lending rate, and a severe 
recession ensued. The question arises as to why, if it was exerting control over 
an exogenous money supply, the Bank could not achieve the target set even 
within a broad margin for error. Did this not indicate that it was in fact using the 
interest rate as the policy instrument, with only an indirect influence on the 
money supply? Kaldor cites a similar episode for the United States, covering its 
adoption of an outwardly monetarist policy stance over approximately the same 
period. Rogers (1985a:245) also quotes from a senior official of the South 
African central bank on how monetary measures are actually effected (as in 
1984/85) to show that these are effected through interest rates, e.g. "Realisation 
of the monetary targets is to be effected by the authorities' operating on the 
level of interest rates rather than on the amount of banks' cash reserve 
holdings. The banks' cash reserve holdings in fact, will continue to be a derived 
quantity ... " (Meijer, 1984:12). There is thus considerable evidence for the 
proposition that central banks use the interest rate as the primary policy 
instrument even when they are adopting an avowedly monetarist policy of 
money supply control. 
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4.4 Money Supply and Credit 
The endogenous view of money adopted by Post Keynesians implies that the 
monetary aggregates cannot be used directly as an instrument of monetary 
policy by the central bank. At most, monetary aggregates can be used as an 
indicator variable of credit activity in the economy from which a policy stance 
using other instruments can be adopted. Lavoie (1984) makes the point that it 
is new credit extension to the private sector which is the more important 
indicator variable for monitoring expansionary economic activity: for example, 
"the decisive factor according to the post Keynesian view is the flow of credits. 
In talking of the 'stock of money', we are yielding to convention and habit of 
mind. The money stock is in fact the resulting factor of the expansion of credit." 
(1984:775). This stems from recognition that money is introduced into the 
economy through the embarking on new productive activity on the part of 
entrepreneurs. New credit extension is therefore a forerunner to expanded 
economic output. 
Post Keynesians do not deny that central banks can and do set reserve 
requirements with which commercial banks must comply. However, they 
maintain that the textbook base-multiplier causality process does not occur in 
practice because central banks always provide a lender-of-last-resort function, 
through which banks can supplement their reserves with borrowed reserves, at 
a price equal or related to the discount rate. Post Keynesians are not 
necessarily advocating a change to the reserve requirement system itself; 
simply a recognition that it does not serve as a quantity control device over the 
money stock. 
Post Keynesians do, however, advocate some degree of control over the 
spectrum of marketable financial assets in the banking system. Rousseas 
(1986:103) for instance feels that the Radcliffe Committee was on the right track 
with: 
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It might be supposed that we should substitute for the traditional control of the money 
supply a complex of controls over that wide range of financial institutions. Such a 
prospect would be unwelcome except as a last resort, not mainly because of its 
administrative burdens, but because the further growth of new financial institutions 
would allow the situation continually to slip from the grip of the authorities. (Radcliffe 
report, 1959:134). 
The concern which the Committee expresses here is that the financial system is 
so innovative as to be able to introduce new credit vehicles to circumvent any 
controls placed on existing vehicles. The Radcliffe Committee recommended 
instead that interest rates, including the term structure applicable across 
different financial assets, should be used as an indirect means of changing the 
liquidity composition in the banking system. Rousseas (1986:106) maintains 
that the very attempts by authorities to exert direct control over the money 
supply have resulted in an ever-expanding plethora of money market 
instruments (CDs, NCDs, sweep accounts, NOW accounts, Super NOW 
accounts, etc.) which have made the: money supply concept less and less 
clearly definable and open market operations more and more difficult to 
undertake effectively. With this background, Rousseas proposes direct, 
selective controls on financial assets to influence the allocation of credit 
between forms of economic activity. This could be in favour of new investment 
activity in preference to financial speculation, or could be in favour of certain 
economic sectors the expansion of which would be economically beneficial to 
the country. 
Although Rousseas may be going further than most Post Keynesians would 
venture concerning direct liquid asset controls by monetary authorities, such a 
view is a logical extension to the widely held Post Keynesian view that the 
monetary authorities should be engaged in the financial asset market in order to 
influence the extent and direction of credit flows. This in turn is a consequence 
of the Post Keynesian view that the level of activity in the economy is 
determined by the principle of effective demand, which will not ensure full 
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employment, necessitating appropriate intervention by the state to bring the 
economy closer to its full potential. 
Two other money/credit related policy interventions which find favour with Post 
Keynesians are the use of supplementary reserves in over-full employment 
circumstances and the use of an asset related reserve requirement. The first 
requires banking institutions to hold a certain proportion of their deposit 
liabilities in specified government securities, in addition to the normal reserve 
requirement. The so-called 'corset' operative in Britain in the 1970s is an 
example of this. The second entails basing reserve requirements on assets 
held by banking institutions rather than their deposit liabilities. The advantage 
of this approach is that it would give the monetary authority control over the 
liquid asset structure of the banking system, enabling it to influence the flow of 
credit in the economy. Differentiation of reserve requirements for different 
classes of assets would enable the monetary authority to exercise its influence 
ovsr the forms of credit which need to be expanded or restricted according to 
the circumstances of the economy. 
The softer endogeneity view of money adopted for example by Davidson and 
Rousseas allows for an exogenous component of the money supply. Davidson 
(1989:489) identifies two money supply increase processes: (1) the "income-
generating finance process" involving planned increases in expenditure relating 
to future income generation, and (2) the "portfolio change process" whereby 
bank deposit liabilities are provided in exchange for other financial assets. 
Davidson regards the former as endogenous, the latter as exogenous. He is 
thus allowing for the possibility that the central bank could maintain control of a 
portion of the money supply through the base-multiplier, reserve asset process. 
This may be of little significance to monetary policy since the overall money 
supply generated by the two processes would be indistinguishable between the 
two. The monetary authority would still not have a definable magnitude which it 
could monitor and control, and , a major portion of the combined money 
aggregate would be endogenously determined. This is tantamount to 
recognising the money supply as endogenous for monetary policy purposes. 
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4.5 Combating Inflation 
With the Post Keynesian view of the inflation process as being primarily in the 
money-wage negotiation sphere and economic institutional structure, the 
emphasis moves from the control of money supply aggregates by the central 
bank (in a monetarist framework) to a broader range of policieS' and initiatives 
on the part of executive government. Central bank measures need to support 
government anti-inflation policies, but are not the primary weapon for 
addressing inflation. In the words of Rousseas, "The solution to the problem of 
maintaining a stable price level is not to be found in monetary policy, but 'in the 
realm of wage negotiations.' In short, an incomes policy is a prerequisite for 
price stability." (1986:101 ). 
Post Keynesians have proposed several incomes-type policies to reduce 
inflation, of which the Tax-based Incomes Policy (TIP) (which Davidson 
attributes to Weintraub) is perhaps the best known (Davidson, 1994:149). The 
philosophy of this policy is that wage increases in excess of productivity growth 
are harmful to society as a whole, and therefore justify a tax in a similar way to 
taxes imposed on firms for contributing to environmental pollution. The 
proposed tax would operate through the corporate tax structure and be applied 
to firms awarding wage increases above a specified norm based on average 
labour productivity increases. To counteract the additional administrative 
burden of such a tax, Weintraub recommended that it be applied only to firms 
above a specified size: in the case of the United States, he recommended the 
largest (approximately) 2000 firms, which account for over 50% of GDP. This 
would cover sufficient of the firms playing a lead role in wage setting to be 
effective through the economy as a whole. The administrative burden would not 
be great for large corporates, which already maintain the record-keeping 
required for such a tax. Small enterprises, which would be negatively affected 
by the administrative requirements, would be entirely exempt from the tax. To 
counteract any deflationary efjects of the additional tax, Weintraub 
recommended that TIP taxes collected be re-channelled back to firms in the 
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form of tax reductions, with a net benefit to those firms not awarding inflationary 
wage increases. 
Incomes policies could be of various forms, from voluntary agreements by major 
representative bodies, to reward based or penalty based (tax) variations. Post 
Keynesians generally regard some form of incomes policy to be necessary to 
counteract the incipient inflation-generating wage bargaining tendencies in the 
economy. They furthermore maintain that such a policy needs to be established 
as a permanent institution if inflation rates are to be curtailed on an ongoing 
basis, since relaxation will allow self-interest and the struggle over income 
distribution to ignite the inflation process. Post Keynesians regard an incomes 
policy as preferable by far to a monetarist policy which "can fight inflation only if 
it indiscriminately reduces aggregate demand sufficiently to inflict widespread 
economic losses to convince entrepreneurs that they must fight workers' wage 
demands for they will not be able to pass along inflationary wage demands." 
(Davidson, 1994:150). 
In placing incomes policies at the forefront of inflation control, Post Keynesians 
are not denying a role for monetary policy entirely. It is, however, a role in the 
context of an endogenous money supply with focus on credit flows, instruments, 
and interest rates. Rousseas (1986: 116) concedes that Post Keynesian 
monetary theory has not addressed flow of credit issues adequately: "The 
problem of controlling the paths it takes by controlling the flow of credit through 
the economy remains - a problem most Post Keynesian monetary theorists 
have ignored. Post Keynesian theory must therefore move in the direction of 
combining selective credit controls with a permanent incomes policy. 11 Moore 
(1988a:264) accords an inflation-related role for monetary policy via interest 
rates, for instance, "It follows that nominal interest rates should not be 
administered by central banks substantially below the expected inflation rate, in 
order to prevent excessive credit-driven monetary growth and the possibility of 
hyperinflation." He is implicitly recognising that excessive credit creation can 
lead to demand inflation: this is apparent for instance from, "In a closed 
economy the growth rate of potential output imposes a somewhat flexible ceiling 
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on the rate at which real output can expand, after which any excessive growth of 
aggregate demand financed by bank credit must become . inflationary." 
(1988a:267). But interest rates are clearly the key policy control variable. 
Moore also makes the point that, under inflation, in order to have the same 
effect on the level of planned net deficit spending and so on the growth rate of 
real aggregate demand, nominal interest rates established by the monetary 
authorities must be proportionately higher than they would be if prices were 
stable (1988a:387). This means that aggregate output achievable under 
inflation is lower than that achievable with stable prices due to the higher real 
interest rate required. Inflation control through an incomes policy enables a 
more expansionist monetary policy to be pursued, leading to higher aggregate 
output growth. 
The Post Keynesian view fully recognises import prices as a contributing cause 
of inflation, and advocates policies to ameliorate import price effects. This is 
contrary to the monetarist view in which import price increases constitute 
relative price changes only, unless the money supply is increased to 
accommodate them. Under a fixed exchange rate system, any price increases 
in a foreign country translate into higher import prices in the domestic country 
when goods from it are imported. A general price inflation in a foreign country is 
transmitted to the domestic economy to the extent that goods are imported from 
it. Under a flexible exchange rate system, there may be a degree of 
compensation for inflation rate differentials through adjustments to exchange 
rates, though Post Keynesians are sceptical of this in view of the degree of 
speculation in foreign currency transactions. Post Keynesians maintain that 
inflation could be transmitted under either exchange rate regime, and that the 
domestic economy cannot be insulated through flexible interest rates. They 
advocate targeting of the country's exchange rate, under a fixed but adjustable, 
or strongly managed, exchange rate system, as the preferable policy alternative 
relative to flexible rates. Foreign country price increases and inflation 
differentials can then be accommodated as best possible through an 
J 
appropriate domestic currency exchange rate, without being subject to 
speculative swings. It is recognised that management of the exchange rate is 
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complex, needing to take account of interest rate differentials between countries 
as well as financial flows. Exchange rate policy is covered separately below. 
4.6 Exchange Rates and Foreign Flows 
In support of their preference for a fixed but adjustable, or strongly managed, 
exchange rate mechanism, Post Keynesians cite the stronger world trade 
performance in the Bretton Woods period from 1947 to 1973 than either prior or 
subsequent periods. For instance, after considering average growth and 
inflation figures, Davidson (1993:154) asserts: "The free world's economic 
performance in terms of both real growth and price level stability during the 
Bretton Woods period was unprecedented. Moreover, even the record during 
the earlier gold standard-fixed exchange rate period was better than the 
experience during the 1973-1991 period of flexible exchange rates." 
Davidson (1993) puts forward a proposed world monetary system in accordance 
with Post Keynesian monetary views. The main components of such a system 
are: (1) Creation of an international unit of account and reserve asset (referred 
to below as the IMCU) held only by central banks. (2) Guaranteed convertibility 
by each central bank of IMCUs to its domestic currency, with international 
transactions ultimately clearing via an international clearing institution (ICI). 
The IMCUs would provide an international reserve with no leakages since it 
would be held only by central banks. (3) Initial exchange rates for each 
currency would be set by the central bank concerned, probably based on 
prevailing rates. (4) Private contracts would be denominated in a domestic 
currency agreed by the parties involved. (5) Provision by the ICI of advances to 
central banks on agreed terms. (6) A mechanism to encourage creditor 
countries to spend excess credit balances on imports, direct investment or 
foreign aid. (7) A system to stabilise the purchasing power of domestic 
currencies relative to the IMCU. This would be based on fixed exchange rates 
with adjustments to reflect 'permanent' changes to efficiency wages. (8) A 
J 
mechanism, by agreement, to adjust the exchange rate (relative to the IMCU) of 
a country in increments where it incurs persistent deficits or surpluses on its 
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current account. This would (systematically) adjust the terms of trade and 
overall standard of living of the country. 
Key aspects of such an approach are the fixed exchange rate system, with 
incremental adjustments to reflect underlying economic variables, and the onus 
placed on creditor (rather than debtor) countries to address ongoing surplus 
accumulations. In arguing against flexible rates, Post Keynesians maintain that, 
rather than allowing countries to pursue independent monetary policies, they 
have forced linkages of money supply and interest rate policies between trading 
countries. Flexible rates have also been subject to major speculative pressures, 
often requiring joint remedial action by central banks to alleviate the adverse 
trends, supporting the Post Keynesian view that such markets are inherently 
subject to elastic expectations and volatility. 
The Post Keynesian model can be contrasted with two proposals submitted by 
neoclassical economists, McKinnon (1990) and Williamson (1987). These seek 
to address the difficulties experienced in international currency flows under 
flexible exchange rates, but implicitly assume the (long-run) neutrality of money 
and a quantity theory of inflation causation. 
McKinnon's proposal can be characterised as a fixed nominal purchasing power 
parity system, and Williamson's as a target zone fixed real rate system. 
McKinnon (1990) recommends a system in which central banks announce 
targeted fixed nominal exchange rates set at approximately sustainable 
purchasing power parities. Once set, central banks would adjust their domestic 
money supplies to maintain these nominal exchange rates, and consequently, 
the domestic inflation rate in internationally traded goods relative to the 
country's trading partners. Williamson (1987) recommends a system in which 
countries negotiate mutually consistent targets for real exchange rates and 
nominal domestic demand growth -such as to achieve internal and external 
balance in the medium run. Internal balance is associated with the non-,. 
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) concept, external balance 
with a sustainable current account balance. Under the arrangement, exchange 
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rates would be permitted to fluctuate within a broad range (approximately 10%) 
around the target 'fundamental equilibrium exchange rate' (FEER). This is 
regarded as a buffer zone within which countries would not be required to take 
adjustive action. 
Along the continuum between fully flexible and fully fixed .systems, both 
proposals involve substantial shifts towards the fixed end, relative to previous 
monetarist proposals and the existing post-Bretton Woods system. The 
proposals do recognise the need for a greater role by central banks in managing 
exchange rates, based on underlying economic variables. Both proposals, 
however, are based on the premises that money is neutral in the long run, 
inflation is determined by money supply growth under the control of monetary 
authorities and that markets produce stable outcomes. It is only under money 
neutrality that McKinnon's nominal exchange rates based on purchasing power 
parity could remain applicable: the process relies on monetary policy 
adjustments by central banks to maintain the rates, but if these measures are 
non-neutral, the resulting changes in the real economy would necessitate a 
different set of PPP-based exchange rates. Similarly, Williamson is assuming 
that monetary authorities can achieve internal balance through monetary policy 
to control inflation, without affecting the long-run NAIRU of the economy. If 
monetary policy effects are non-neutral, economies may move ineluctably 
beyond the buffer zone. Williamson's system would also be susceptible to 
sustained speculative pressures: he concedes the proviso for operation of the 
system that speculative changes do not lead to prolonged and substantial 
movements away from equilibrium. 
Although Post Keynesians would no doubt support the shift towards fixed 
exchange rate systems on the part of monetarist and neoclassical economists, 
the crucial policy proposal differences therefore lie in the role accorded 
-monetary policy in the respective domestic economies. The monetarist-aligned 
proposals accord central banks the role of inflation control via an exogenous 
J 
money supply, as a means to achieve stable parities between exchange rates. 
The Post Keynesian approach entails a direct mechanism of exchange rate 
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adjustment, based on changes in relative real costs of production between 
trading countries, inflation rate differentials, and on excessive _surpluses or 
deficits built up by particular countries. The Post Keynesian approach caters to 
the possibility of speculative pressures by enabling countries to exercise control 
over capital flows and through having an international reserve currency of stable 
value, held by all central banks. 
Moore (1988a:271) focuses on the interaction between interest rates and 
exchange rate in an economy, particularly if it is in the 'small open' category. In 
free capital markets, arbitrage adjusts the differential between domestic and 
foreign interest rates to be equal to the expected capital gain or loss through 
changes in the exchange rate over a period, given by the spot-forward 
exchange rate differential. With free capital movements, a change in domestic 
interest rates provides the opportunity for domestic borrowers to source funds 
from foreign countries with lower interest rates, or foreign countries to source 
funds from the domestic economy at lower interest rates, leading to large flows 
through the foreign reserves market. This can cause significant increases or 
reductions in the country's exchange rate. Although Moore advocates that the 
exchange rate be treated as a policy variable by the monetary authority, he is 
recognising that there are limitations on the range over which the exchange rate 
can be varied due to the necessity to maintain foreign reserves at an adequate 
level, and that the authority's interest rate policy needs to be co-ordinated with 
its exchange rate policy. He suggests the possibility of some degree of interest 
rate co-ordination between central banks of trading partners to enable exchange 
rates to be better co-ordinated, but recognises the difficulties of having central 
banks co-ordinate measures which are primarily their domestic preserve. 
4. 7 The Role of the Central Bank 
The Post Keynesian monetary view has major implications for the economic 
policy role to be filled by central banks. The monetarist influence has led to the 
J 
role of central banks in many countries being more narrowly defined in recent 
years, with an overriding focus being given to the stability of the country's 
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currency both domestically and in terms of foreign trade. Allied to this has been 
vehement monetarist appeals for independence of the central b«?-nk, in which 
their primary concern is to ensure that central banks can maintain a strict growth 
rule on monetary aggregates in order to minimise inflation, without being subject 
to wider government economic policies or political pressures. The monetarists 
recognise that a strict monetary growth rule will in most cases involve economic 
restriction and hardship in the short run, which is likely to be politically 
unpopular, leading to pressures on executive government to alleviate the 
monetary policy stringency. The arguments concerning central bank 
independence need to be examined against the backdrop of this monetarist 
influence. 
The institutional framework adopted in New Zealand for conduct of monetary 
policy from 1989 is a leading example of practical implementation of the narrow 
overall goal and independence of the central bank in accordance with 
monetarist-inspired thinking. Inflation targets of long duration are agreed 
between Government and the Reserve Bank, with the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank being held accountable for meeting the targets, to the extent that the 
incumbent may be dismissed from his position if the targets are not met. The 
Reserve Bank is accorded the sole overall objective of price stability; real 
economic objectives are explicitly excluded from its ambit (Archer, 1997). 
Within this restricted framework, it is free to use any monetary instruments and 
measures to attain the inflation targets set. Archer regards this as a forma~ rule 
system at the ultimate target level, with the Reserve Bank having discretion at 
the instrument and intermediate target level. The rule system is clearly and 
explicitly intended to remove any possible political influence from Reserve Bank 
measures to combat inflation. At the same time, the monetarist persuasion of 
the system is evident from its presumption that the Reserve Bank's monetary 
policy is the sole or primary determinant of inflation and that its monetary policy 
has no significant effect on real economic magnitudes. 
With the Post Keynesian view that the primary causes of inflation lie in the 
money-wage negotiation process and institutions, rather than money supply 
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growth, domestic stability of the country's currency cannot be regarded as the 
major goal of the central bank. At most, the central bank would p~ay a support 
role in combating inflation, with executive government playing the primary role in 
initiating incomes policies, promotion of business competition, and other anti-
inflationary policies. In the Post Keynesian framework, the intermediate targets 
of the central bank relate to interest rates, exchange rates and the composition 
of credit instruments in the financial system. The goals of its monetary policy 
measures relate to the enhancement of sustainable investment and economic 
expansion as well as currency and financial stability. The objectives of the 
central bank therefore need to be defined more broadly, and differently, 
compared to those under a monetarist persuasion. 
In a Post Keynesian dispensation, the central bank is, by the very nature of 
monetary policy actions, concerned with national economic growth and 
investment issues. These cannot be readily divorced from government 
economic objectives, and pursuit of differing objectives on the part of executive 
government and the central bank would be disruptive and counter-productive. 
This implies that the central bank needs to pursue its monetary policy objectives 
within overall economic growth objectives and policies set by executive 
government. In such a dispensation, the central bank could not be considered 
goal independent. It could, however, maintain operational independence, i.e. 
freedom to implement monetary policy measures in the most effective possible 
manner, within overall economic policy objectives agreed with executive 
government. 
Some Post Keynesian adherents have put forward the possibility that central 
banks do not need to be institutionally separated from executive government, 
and could form a parallel structure to the Treasury under a single Minister of 
Economic Affairs/Finance (see Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Winter 
1995-96). Although this may be an extreme view, it indicates the inevitable 
relationship between monetary policy and broader economic issues in the Post 
)' 
Keynesian framework. 
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4.8 Government and Free Markets 
As can be seen from some of the preceding policy implications, Post Keynesian 
views do entail certain forms of intervention by governments in the operation of 
the economy, as against a laissez faire, free market view of the economy. This, 
however, does not have at its roots a socialistic political and economic world 
view. Post Keynesian views are generally in favour of free enterprise, open 
markets and a high degree of economic competition in a capitalist economy. 
There is considerable focus on entrepreneurial decision making and its 
importance in investment levels and therefore economic growth. The 
government policy intervention recommendations of Post Keynesians stem 
rather from their belief that the invisible hand of free markets does not 
necessarily draw the activities of the economy steadfastly towards an optimum 
arrangement for the participants. This results from the principle of effective 
demand as put forward by Keynes, together with the view that markets are 
inherently subject to uncertainty, divergent expectations and hysteresis, and 
may therefore be volatile and unstable. It is to cater for this perceived economic 
reality that Post Keynesians explore and propose government policy measures 
which can best move the economy towards fulfilment of its productive potential 
under conditions of stability and distributional fairness amongst participants. 
Government policy and intervention relating to investment in the economy needs 
to be seen in this light. Keynes was concerned with the fragility of 
entrepreneurial expectatio11s, which led to large swings in the propensity to 
invest, with the economy operating far below full employment for long periods, 
as in the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was to address this situation that he 
regarded a degree of 'socialisation of investment' as being necessary: 
I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment will 
prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment; though this 
need not exclude all manners of compromises and of devices by which public authority 
' will cooperate with private initiative. But beyond this no obvious case is made out for a 
system of State Socialism. It is not the instruments of production which is important for 
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the State to assume. If the state is able to determine the aggregate amount of 
resources to augment the instruments and the basic reward to those who own them, it 
will have accomplished all that is necessary. (Keynes, 1936:378). 
It is clear that Keynes does not have a socialistic production system in mind, 
and is advocating supportive intervention by government to reduce the defects 
' 
arising from a laissez-faire economic system. His ideological support of a free 
enterprise, entrepreneurial economy is apparent from: 
But, above all, individualism, if it can be purged of its defects and its abuses, is the 
best safeguard of personal liberty in the sense that, compared with any other system, it 
greatly widens the field for the exercise of personal choice. It is also the best 
safeguard of the variety of life, which emerges precisely from this extended field of 
personal choice, and the loss of which is the greatest of all the losses of the 
homogenous or totalitarian state. (Keynes, 1936:380). 
Davidson (1991) elaborates on the nature of government intervention envisaged 
in the Post Keynesian approach. He regards the role of government as being to 
foster conditions which reduce uncertainties in financial matters, to provide 
financial incentives when entrepreneurial animal spirits are flagging in order to 
generate more investment and hiring of personnel, and to use fiscal means to 
curb the rate of investment when it becomes excessive relative to a sustainable 
level. He expresses it in forthright terms: 
All civilised governments must assume the obligation to assure that: 
(a) current aggregate demand is sufficient to encourage business firms to create 
productive employment for all those who wish to work; and 
(b) guarantee that future effective demand will be sufficient to reward 
entrepreneurs who develop new plant and equipment to improve worker productivity. 
(1991 :77). 
It is clear that Keynes and Post Keynesians envisage direct investment by 
government as well as incentive or' disincentive measures as being an important 
government policy component. Keynes advocated a proportion of investment 
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being in the hands of government, the size of which can be varied according to 
the level of investment being undertaken by private sector entrepreneurs. He 
advocated public sector investment programmes (e.g. public works 
programmes) in times of significant and widespread unemployment. Post 
Keynesians likewise generally support this view in varying forms: for example, 
Rousseas (1986:114) suggests that similar effects could be produced through 
selective controls over the flow of private sector credit in the economy. 
Such policy prescriptions inevitably entail deficit funding by the government to 
stimulate demand without increasing taxation commensurately. The views on 
the effects of government deficit funding on the economy differ sharply between 
Post Keynesians and neoclassical economists. Since the neoclassical view of 
the economy is predicated on its being in a condition of full employment, other 
than through minor and temporary disturbances, it follows that additional 
aggregate demand created through government deficit spending is at the 
expense of private sector spending. Mainstream Keynesians are typically more 
in favour of deficit financing, but still on the basis that it is a measure to alleviate 
the recessionary phase of a business cycle: it is a matter of stabilisation, with a 
compensating budget surplus occurring during the expansionary phase of the 
cycle. A less than compensatory budget surplus is expected to have inflationary 
consequences: balanced government budgets over the business cycle are 
regarded as a necessary condition for eliminating inflation. (Davidson, 1991 :80). 
In the Post Keynesian view, on the other hand, government deficit spending can 
be maintained as long as there are idle resources in the economy. It is one of 
the means to increase the level of effective demand determined by the principle 
of effective demand, which is a secular rather than cyclical phenomenon. Chick 
(1983:338) nevertheless views the sustained use of government stimulatory 
expenditure as a possible cause of the incipient inflation during the 1960s and 
1970s. She regards Keynes' policy prescription as intended to address 
particular unemployment situations, and to be inappropriate for application over 
a long period. 
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4.9 Deficit Financing and Crowding Out 
The issue of crowding out became prominent in the 1970s in debates between 
monetarists and mainstream Keynesians (Davidson, 1994: 132). The 
monetarists claimed that any attempt by government to stimulate the economy 
through additional expenditure financed by a budget deficit would simply have 
the effect of reducing private sector investment by the amount of the borrowings. 
Higher government investment (or other) expenditure would crowd out private 
sector investment from the market for loans, rendering the stimulatory policy 
ineffective. The mainstream Keynesians denied that such crowding out would 
occur, or maintained that it would occur only partly, so that the overall impact of 
the deficit-financed government expenditure would still be positive. In 
conventional IS/LM analysis, the debate appeared to revolve around the slope 
of the LM curve. If regarded as vertical, an outward shift in the IS curve would 
result in a higher interest rate with aggregate output unchanged. With a 
horizontal LIV curve, output would be increased with interest rates unchanged. 
An upward-sloping LM curve would produce some increase in output 
ameliorated by an increase in interest rates. Friedman maintained that the 
crowding out effect could be avoided by an outward shift in the LM curve, i.e. an 
increase in the money supply - but that a once-off shift in the IS curve would 
require continuous outward shifts in the LM curve to avoid crowding out, with 
dire consequences for inflation. These would be likely to nullify the government 
expenditure stimulus. 
The Post Keynesian view on crowding out is based on Keynes' finance motive 
(Davidson, 1994:135). It regards any crowding out effect as taking place 
through stringency in the provision of new finance by the banking system. This 
means that crowding out will only occur to the extent that there is excessive 
pressure in the money market which the banking system is unwilling to meet in 
full in accordance with its prudential lending assessments. In -the event of 
recessionary conditions, with finan9e motive liquidity requirements of the private 
sector for investment purposes being low, the crowding out effect of (moderate) 
government borrowing is unlikely to be significant. In IS/LM terms, the initial 
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outward shift in the IS curve due to the deficit-financed government expenditure 
is accompanied by an inward shift in the LM curve through the int~rrelationship 
between the two curves (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3). If the government debt is 
monetised, the increase in money supply may only partly restore the LM curve 
to its previous position, implying little effect on interest rates. The end result will 
depend on the marginal propensity to purchase securities out of saving on the 
part of the private sector. A low propensity gives rise to higher money balances, 
a high propensity conversely, but in general the outward shift in the LM curve 
will not continue indefinitely. 
The Post Keynesian policy viewpoint concerning government deficit financing is 
therefore far more accommodating than the monetarist or neoclassical view. 
Whereas monetarists and neoclassical economists virtually rule out the benefits 
of government deficit financing by assumption, since the presumption that the 
economy is operating at full resource utilisation implies that any transfer of 
activity to the government sector must be at the expense of the private sector, 
the Post Keynesian framework allows a beneficial role for deficit financing 
without necessarily creating negative effects through money supply expansion 
or through crowding out of private sector investment expenditure. The extent to 
which it is prudent to undertake government expenditure using deficit financing 
will depend on the level of economic activity relative to full employment and on 
money market propensities. 
The monetarist, mainstream Keynesian and Post Keynesian views can be 
characterised in terms of the IS/LM framework as follows. The monetarists seek 
to stabilise the economy by fixing the money supply, i.e. stabilising the LM 
curve. Price and wage flexibility are then expected to ensure continued full 
employment over the long period. Mainstream Keynesians adopt a similar 
framework, but consider that the adjustment process through prices and wages 
is slow, justifying government intervention to speed up the adjustment to long-
period full employment. For this ,Purpose they favour fiscal policy measures, 
including built-in (automatic) stabilisers as well as revenue and expenditure 
adjustments in the government budget. Post Keynesians, on the other hand, 
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view private investment as being the most volatile component of aggregate 
demand, being subject to expectations of yields and uncertainty,_ and seek to 
stabilise the level of investment through supplementing private sector 
investment with compensating government investment, at the same time moving 
the level of aggregate demand towards full employment. This entails 
'socialisation of investment' as put forward by Keynes in respect· of a portion of 
total investment sufficient for government to exercise this stabilising and 
stimulatory role. As Rogers (1989:289) points out, this does not imply a highly 
active countercyclical fiscal or monetary policy, and Keynes himself did not 
regard government budget deficits as a necessary component of such a policy. 
The emphasis is on increasing stability rather than on meeting economic shocks 
with countervailing economic shocks which may themselves be destabilising. 
In the Post Keynesian view, monetarist policies of seeking to fix the level of the 
money supply are likely to be destabilising. The reason for this lies in the effect 
on interest rates of efforts to restrict the money supply. Interest rates may 
increase markedly as a result, seriously affecting the monetary equilibrium at 
which new investment projects are being undertaken, with decrease in 
investment levels both as a result of the high interest rate relative to marginal 
efficiency of capital and the additional uncertainty introduced by a rapidly 
changing interest rate. This would take the economy further away from its full 
employment level. Contrary to the monetarist view, which assumes a natural 
rate of interest and of unemployment, interest rates are not regarded as bound 
to a firm underlying value, and their rapid change can unsettle any expected or 
conventional level and lead to severe instability with consequent increased 
levels of unemployment. 
4.1 O Concluding Remarks 
The Post Keynesian view implies a focus on interest rates as the primary 
instrument variable of monetary policy, together with a managed exchange rate 
j 
in accordance with domestic economic circumstances. Money supply 
aggregates are regarded as no more than indicator variables, useful for 
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monitoring purposes. These views contrast starkly with monetarist growth rules 
for money supply variables and a fully flexible exchange rate. Anti-inflationary 
policies are regarded as mainly in the domain of executive government, with a 
consequently differing view of the role of the central bank in pursuing broader 
economic goals. The Post Keynesian view entails a greater perceived effect of 
executive government activities on monetary aspects of the 1economy, and 
hence a greater responsibility of executive government towards certain aspects 
of monetary policy (in addition to the role played by the central bank). The Post 
Keynesian view is not, however, socialistic in that the interventions by 
government advocated are limited in extent and have the aim of assisting the 
economy towards full employment as well as improving economic stability 
. through which private sector economic activity is enhanced. A positive role is 
envisaged for government investment which is not regarded as necessarily 
being to the detriment of private sector investment. 
This examination of policy implications of the Post Keynesian view of money in 
general provides the basis for considering the implications for monetary policy in 
South Africa in particular, which is taken up in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MONET ARY POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 Introduction 
' This chapter examines the implications of the Post Keynesian view of money, as 
developed in the preceding chapters, and of Post Keynesian monetary policy 
prescriptions, for monetary policy in South Africa. It first of all considers and 
characterises the nature of the South African monetary system as it currently 
operates, and looks at the extent to which monetary policy can already be 
regarded as Post Keynesian as opposed to monetarist or neoclassical. The 
implications of a Post Keynesian view are then examined for specific elements 
and spheres of monetary policy (interest rates, exchange rates, money supply, 
open market operations, inflation) as well as of the management of the public 
sector funding debt and deficit (budget deficit). These strands are drawn 
together to examine the implications for the role played by the Reserve Bank in 
conducting monetary policy. 
A major influencing factor leading to the current structure of the South African 
monetary system was the Commission of enquiry into the monetary system and 
monetary policy in South Africa, conducted under the chairmanship of Dr G. de 
Kock, then Governor of the Reserve Bank. The Commission commenced its 
work in 1977 and issued its final report in 1985. The recommendations of this 
Commission were substantially adopted by the South African government and 
implemented, in some cases while the Commission was still in progress. The 
work of the Commission is fully documented and serves as a reference point for 
the rationale and philosophies underlying the current South African monetary 
system. Although various changes have been made to the monetary system 
since implementation of the De Kock report recommendations, these have not 
been so wide-ranging as to change the essential nature of the system. 
J' 
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5.2 The South African Monetary System 
The Treasury arm of government and the central bank are fully separated in 
South African, with the former being part of the government Department of 
Finance and the latter a parastatal institution established by statute in 1921 (in 
terms of the Currency and Banking Act of 1920) and having its own legal 
persona. The Bank was established in response to the need to co-ordinate 
banking activities in the then four provinces of South Africa, each of which had 
its own banking laws and ability to issue currency, as well as to counteract the 
effects on the banking system of large illegal outflows of gold from South Africa 
after the abandonment of the fixed sterling-dollar exchange rate which applied 
during the first world war (Falkena, Fourie & Kok, 1995:62). The Bank was 
given the exclusive right to issue currency in South Africa as well as to engage 
in financial transactions through which it could carry out monetary policy 
measures. The powers of the Bank were extended and consolidated in the 
Reserve Bank Act of 1944, and changes to provide for greater flexibility and 
freedom in its operations combined into the Reserve Bank Act of 1989. The 
latter act brought together the main institutional changes arising from the De 
Kock Commission Report and remains the primary governing act, although 
certain amendments have since been introduced. The Reserve Bank is 
managed by a board of 14 directors, including a full time Governor and three 
Deputy Governors, with these members and a further three being appointed by 
government and the remaining seven being elected by the Bank's stockholders 
to represent stockholder constituencies. The stockholders comprise some 700 
companies and individuals, with stock being quoted and traded on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, so that appointments to its controlling board 
can be considered to be determined by government and private sector parties in 
approximately equal numbers, though with government determining full time 
executive appointments. 
A major theme of the De Kock Cpmmission and its 1985 final report was an 
emphasis on market-oriented monetary policies working through freely-
operating, efficient financial markets. This led accordingly to the abolition of 
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virtually all direct control measures and forms of intervention by the Reserve 
Bank during the course of the 1980s. The Commission recommended a cash-
reserve control system of the 'classical' variety in which the central bank exerts 
control over bank credit creation through setting the cost of cash reserves 
obtainable at its discount window rather than seeking to control the volume of 
reserve assets directly. This system was implemented from the early 1980s with 
step-wise reduction in reserve asset requirements of banks to a level 
approximately in accordance with banks' prudential and operating requirements 
for liquid assets. Banks ceased to be constrained by the volume of liquid assets 
available, but faced instead the demand constraint for credit arising from the 
interest rates applicable (Meijer, 1995:368). This is essentially the system 
presently in force 1• The Reserve Bank determines the interest rate (Bank Rate) 
at which overnight borrowing or discounting by commercial banks can take 
place. A somewhat higher penalty rate applies to a second-tier of (less liquid) 
reserves assets in the event of a bank having insufficient first-tier liquid assets 
available to meet its discount window borrowing requirement. The system relies 
on the Reserve Bank maintaining a money market shortage situation, i.e. with 
commercial banks permanently holding borrowed funds from the discount 
window, in order for it to be able to exert control over short-term interest rates by 
market orientated means. Reserve Bank accommodation rates set a floor to 
short-term commercial bank rates since they determine the cost of funds to the 
banks at the margin. Banks are not legally constrained from increasing or 
decreasing their use of Reserve Bank rediscount facilities; discount window 
accommodation in practice is automatic and unconditional in the sense that 
banks are not refused discount window borrowing on the terms stipulated 
(Meijer, 1995). 
In the present South African monetary system, open market operations are used 
primarily as a supporting policy instrument. The Reserve Bank sells securities 
(mainly of government or semi-government origin) into the money market to 
ensure a continued money market shortage, which banks re-finance via the 
J' 
An arrangement involving a repurchase agreement rate and marginal lending rate was 
introduced from 9 March 1998. The implications of the new arrangement are indicated in 
Postscript (Section 5-12) below. 
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discount window, and uses money market transactions to increase or decrease 
the money market shortage in accordance with its monetary policy stance. 
Open market operations are used to a lesser extent to influence the level of 
money holdings directly. 
Although public debt management is formally under the control e:>f the Treasury 
in South Africa, the securities transactions to meet the Treasury's requirements 
are handled primarily by the Reserve Bank on its behalf. The Reserve Bank is 
able to make use of public debt management transactions as an instrument of 
monetary policy, within the broad parameters set by government's budget deficit 
and borrowing requirement. The latter it accepts as "external data" to its 
monetary policy actions (Meijer, 1995:386). Purchase or sale of government 
debt instruments serves to maintain and manage the level of the money market 
shortage as well as being a means to influence the maturity structure of money 
market debt. 
Two significant changes were introduced into the monetary control system in 
1993. Firstly, the provision of borrowed reserves from the discount window was 
changed from a predominantly discounting procedure of liquid assets, to one of 
borrowing using liquid assets as collateral, with bankers acceptances no longer 
qualifying for rediscounting I collateral purposes. The main consequence of this 
was to reduce the ease with which banks could obtain accommodation through 
issuing of acceptances as well as to allow market related interest rate 
differentials to develop between the Reserve Bank accommodation rate and 
market rates of eligible liquid assets (Schoombee, 1996:86). Secondly, a 
system of Tax and Loan Accounts was introduced whereby the Treasury is able 
to conduct certain bank accounts with private sector banks rather than using the 
Reserve Bank exclusively. The effect of this is to greatly reduce the large 
fluctuation in the liquidity of the money market resulting from taxation revenues 
flowing into government, being withdrawn from the money market by placement 
with the Reserve Bank, and corr
1
esponding outflows when large government 
expenditures take place. With use of private sector banks, the taxation and 
' . 
expenditures take place as transfers of deposits within the commercial banking 
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system without significant effect on money market liquidity. In addition to 
removing fluctuations which render monetary policy more difficult .to effect, the 
introduction of Tax and Loan Accounts provides an additional means through 
which monetary policy can be exercised. Funds can be shifted between the Tax 
and Loan Accounts and the Exchequer Account held with the Reserve Bank, 
thereby reducing or increasing the level of non-borrowed cash teserves in the 
money market. The Reserve Bank has made extensive use of this monetary 
control instrument since 1993 (Schoombee, 1996:91 ), as have industrialised 
countries such as Canada in which government funds are held with private 
banks. 
As with many countries since the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange 
rate system in the early 1970s, South Africa has used a system of managed 
floating since the mid 1970s. The political circumstances of South Africa, 
however, led to exchange controls, in one form or another, being in effect from 
1961. Prior to that, South Africa was sub!~t to the controls of the Sterling 
monetary area. During most of this period, South Africa has placed controls 
over flows to and from non-residents, with a corresponding dual exchange rate 
covering commercial transactions and investment flows respectively 
(commercial rand and financial or securities/blocked rand). The financial rand 
was abolished in 1983, but had to be re-introduced in 1985 due to the foreign 
debt repayment crisis faced by South Africa. It was eventually abolished once 
again in 1995 to give the present single exchange rate. A gradual approach has 
been adopted to the lifting of other foreign exchange controls. 
In addition to holding and making a spot market in foreign reserves, the Reserve 
Bank plays an active role in the forward exchange rate market. It does so to 
influence foreign flows and thereby to influence the level of foreign reserves, as 
well as to serve as a secondary means of influencing the exchange rate for 
stabilising of fluctuations. The Reserve Bank has for the most part adopted an 
interest rate parity stance in the forward market, rendering the purchaser 
approximately neutral between holding rands or the foreign currency, but has 
during certain periods adopted a lower forward rand discount in order to 
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encourage use of overseas credit. It incurs losses on such transactions which 
are met by the Treasury and have an easing effect on the domestic money 
market. The Reserve Bank may also use sale or purchases of foreign exchange 
to influence domestic money holdings, or may neutralise the effects of foreign 
flows on the domestic currency through countervailing sale or purchase of other 
financial assets. 
The Reserve Bank has used the approach of setting and publicising money 
supply (M3) growth guidelines (rather than targets), and has emphasised the 
broad and approximate nature of these as an indication of the growth range that 
the Bank considers desirable. It does not follow any strict monetary growth rule, 
and states clearly that it does not subscribe to the principle of a strict growth 
rule. As with many central banks in advanced economies over the past decade, 
the Reserve Bank has moved to a narrower conception of its role as relating to 
the stability of domestic prices and the exchange rate, with goals concerning 
employnient and economic growth regarded as being in the ambit of other arms 
of government, to be supported by a stable currency and financial system. 
5.3 Monetarist or Post Keynesian? 
As shown above, the monetary control mechanism recommend by the De Kock 
Commission and subsequently adopted is essentially one of using short-term 
interest rates to influence credit behaviour on the part of banks and the non-
bank private sector. The volume of borrowed reserves available through the 
Reserve Bank's discount window is not restricted, but a money market shortage 
is maintained to ensure that the Reserve Bank's refinancing rate has a direct 
influence on short-term money market rates. As pointed out by Rogers (1985a), 
this is in accordance with a Post Keynesian view of money in which monetary 
aggregates can only be influenced indirectly through the effects of interest rate 
levels on economic and financial market activity. It does not accord with a 
monetarist view in which the central bank exercises direct control over the size 
J 
of the monetary base which in turn determines monetary aggregates through a 
monetary multiplier. In spite of some apparently monetarist terminology used, 
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the De Kock Commission and Reserve Bank appear implicitly to accept that they 
are not determining the money supply as an exogenous variable, but are 
influencing it indirectly through the interest rate. Kantor (1986) as a monetarist 
concedes that the De Kock Commission Report is not a monetarist document. 
Although finding encouragement in the Report's advocacy of market forces in 
determining credit allocation and exchange rates, and its view ,that control of 
money aggregates is the essence of an anti-inflationary strategy, Kantor 
criticises the Report for not advocating a money supply growth rule in 
accordance with monetarist thinking. He argues that control of monetary 
aggregates indirectly through interest rates in an open economy is a formidable 
task. 
In spite of the core monetary control mechanism of the Reserve Bank according 
more with Post Keynesian than monetarist thinking, the view that price inflation 
has its causative roots in the size and expansion of monetary aggregates, and 
the view that anti-inflation policies are a primary goal of the central bank, appear 
to be firmly entrenched both in the De Kock Report and in the ongoing operation 
of the Bank. This is not in accordance with the Post Keynesian view, which, 
although providing some role to monetary aggregates in the inflation process, 
regards the primary causation of inflation as lying with forces in the wage 
bargaining process of the economy. Evidence of the Reserve Bank view 
abound in the De Kock Report as well as in the ongoing statements by the 
Governor: for example "the only way to restore and maintain reasonable stability 
of the price level in South Africa is to exert better control over money creation 
and total spending (De Kock Commission, 1985:A26) and "Inflation, however, 
lags behind changes in the monetary aggregates and is, at this stage, still 
stimulated by ... the relatively large increases in the money supply during the 
1995/96 period." (Stals, 1997:33). 
In the case of anti-inflation policy, the Reserve Bank does appear to adopt a 
quantity-theory view in practice, beyond mere deference to monetarism in its 
J 
chosen semantics. The Post Keynesian view is that restrictive monetary policy 
with consequent reduction in the growth of monetary aggregates, can indeed 
134 
contribute to curbing inflation, but that this takes place with the unnecessary 
sacrifice of economic activity, growth and employment. The monetary influence 
on this aspect of monetary policy is therefore negative and economically 
damaging in a Post Keynesian view. 
In the case of the "managed floating" stance towards exchange' rates adopted 
by the De Kock Commission and Reserve Bank, the Post Keynesian view does 
not depart from the approach in principle, but differs from the monetarist 
rationale for flexible rates as well as the nature of policy intervention (Rogers, 
1986a). Post Keynesians recognise that endogenous money, differing monetary 
policy stances and differing wage negotiation dispensations are likely to lead to 
differing inflation rates between countries, and these will require adjustment ·of 
exchange rates to reflect underlying changes in currency values. The 
monetarist rationale, however, is that a fixed, exogenously determined money 
supply will imply a corresponding exchange rate to which a completely freely 
floating currency will tend. Monetarists therefore advocate little or no policy 
intervention or management of the exchange rate. Post Keynesians hold that, 
especially since money supplies are not exogenously fixed in practice, the 
exchange rate needs to be managed. The approach adopted by the Reserve 
Bank is therefore not directly contrary to either a monetarist or Post Keynesian 
position, and the degree to which it is aligned to either will depend on the extent 
to which foreign exchange rates are left to be determined entirely by market 
transactions, and the extent to which the Reserve Bank acts in the market to 
manage the rate or expresses a rate, or range, which it considers desirable or 
realistic considering prevailing monetary and fiscal circumstances in the 
economy. 
In overall terms, the De Kock Commission sought to express views which were 
not avowedly monetarist, or strongly associated with any particular economic 
school of thought, preferring to adopt an eclectic and pragmatic view in line with 
trends evident in central banking, of advanced, industrialised countries. The 
Reserve Bank has continued in this tradition. Although the monetary control 
mechanism adopted is in line with Post Keynesian thinking, the approach to 
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inflation is more aligned to a monetarist view, and the approach to exchange 
rate policy, while closer to a monetarist view in the degree. of flexibility 
espoused, does not depart radically from a Post Keynesian view. 
5.4 Money Supply Targets/Guidelines 
The money supply targets introduced by the Reserve Bank from 1986 are 
clearly and avowedly in the form of broad indicative guidelines and do not 
constitute a monetary growth rule as espoused by monetarists. If the Reserve 
Bank actively sought to attain stated money supply targets, it would require use 
of a volume-directed monetary control mechanism to set an appropriate level for 
the monetary base. The American cash reserve system, rejected by the De 
Kock Commission in favour of the classical system, would have been more 
appropriate for this purpose - but even then it is doubtful whether monetary 
targets could be achieved (Rogers, 1986a:74). The use by the Reserve Bank of 
money supply guidelines, although possibly an outward partial accommodation 
of monetarist thinking, does not constitute a departure from the interest rate 
monetary control mechanism advocated by Post Keynesians. 
The implications of a Post Keynesian monetary view for the use of money 
supply targeting in the broad guideline form used by t.he Reserve Bank are 
therefore relatively minor. The Post Keynesian view recognises the role of 
monetary aggregates in demand-led inflations, albeit according them a 
secondary role to wage negotiation processes. Attempts to assert an indirect 
influence on monetary aggregates through the interest rate mechanism, and 
through money market transactions, therefore accords with a Post Keynesian 
view. Stating the monetary aggregate levels which the Reserve Bank considers 
desirable serves to communicate to financial markets its policy intent. 
The communication is a useful contribution to planning and decision making in 
the financial sector, and may have some effect in moving monetary aggregates 
closer to the stated guideline levels through recognition by the banking sector of 
J 
a more or less stringent policy stance being taken by the Reserve Bank. 
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Post Keynesian criticism of the use of monetary guidelines would lie more on 
the emphasis placed in comparing them to aggregate levels achieved. The 
Reserve Bank regards money aggregate growth (including increases in private 
sector credit extension) as being a significant factor in its decisions to increase 
or reduce Bank Rate and adopt more of less strict policy measures. The Post 
Keynesian viewpoint implies less emphasis on the monetary aggregates and 
more on the interest rate itself, in relation to real economic activity taking place. 
Post Keynesians would also show little concern if the Reserve Bank is generally 
not able to achieve the guideline monetary growth rates which it announces, 
both because they regard the Reserve Bank's influence on monetary 
aggregates to be indirect and tenuous, and because they do not regard 
monetary aggregate levels as being the causative variable in the inflation 
process. 
5.5 Interest Rate Policy 
Interest rate policy is crucial in the Post Keynesian monetary framework. As 
shown in Section 5.2, the interest rate set by the Reserve Bank is the key 
monetary policy instrument in the South African monetary policy structure, and 
this is inherent in the structure of the monetary system adopted. The Post 
Keynesian view is thus not only that the interest rate is inherently the key 
monetary policy instrument, but also that it is the most appropriate central 
instrument of domestic monetary policy. It recognises that there is a 
relationship between domestic interest rates and the exchange rate. This 
necessitates an exchange rate policy being conducted in tandem with the 
interest rate policy, which is taken up in the section on exchange rate policy 
below. 
Although Bank Rate is rendered as a direct influence on short-term interest 
rates through the Reserve Bank maintaining a money market shortage, with the 
Bank Rate determining the cost ,of a major source of funds to the banking 
system at the margin, some writers argue that the influence of the Reserve Bank 
on the term structure of interest rates is far more comprehensive than this. 
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Whittaker and Theunissen (1987) for instance maintain that the very nature of 
the Reserve Bank as the sole ultimate provider of money en_sures that it 
determines the market call rate of interest in addition to Bank Rate. Their 
argument uses the thought experiment of a separate institution being 
established with sole powers to issue currency at a specified interest rate. They 
show that, in this situation, the overnight call rate for funds in1 the wholesale 
money market will move to the rate specified by the new institution as a result of 
arbitrage. If any bank owes another funds at a higher rate, it will be rational for 
such a bank to borrow funds from the new institution at its specified rate to 
repay its indebtedness. This applies similarly to the Reserve Bank in the 
thought experiment which, now stripped of its currency issuing powers, cannot 
bring the market to any rate other than that specified by the new institution. 
Whittaker and Theunissen go so far as to say that the Reserve Bank does not 
need to rely on keeping the banking system continuously in a borrowed reserve 
asset position to maintain its control over short-term interest rates. Their view is 
that similar reasoning would apply (conversely) if the Reserve Bank allowed a 
'negative accommodation' situation to develop, i.e. one in which the banks hold 
excess reserves with the Reserve Bank, provided that the Reserve Bank paid 
interest on the excess reserves. It would then be the interest rate on excess 
reserves that would set short-term rates in the money market. If no interest is 
paid on excess reserves, however, this would be equivalent to the Reserve 
Bank setting the short-term interest rate to zero, with a destabilising effect 
occurring as the market shortage moved into a surplus due to the change 
between a significantly positive Bank Rate for accommodation and zero. 
The view expressed by Whittaker and Theunissen is that the Reserve Bank 
(whether it openly recognises this or not) determines short-term risk-free money 
market rates directly through the setting of Bank Rate, and that interest rates for 
money market instruments of longer duration, and higher risk, are determined in 
efficient, rational markets in a manner that can be closely predicted by 
mathematical formulas taking accqunt of duration and risk. Long-term rates are 
in turn determined as the expected trajectory of the short-term rates. Whether 
one adopts this strong view of market interest rates being determined by the 
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Reserve Bank across the duration spectrum or a more indirect view such as that 
expressed by Meijer (1995:376) in which market forces determine _interest rates 
across the term spectrum by relation to Bank Rate at the short end, the Post 
Keynesian view places the Reserve Bank squarely in the driving seat in 
determination of interest rate levels across the term and risk spectrum. 
It is noteworthy that the Governor of the Reserve Bank frequently downplays the 
role of the Bank in establishing market rates, in public statements. References 
are frequently made to market trends in interest rates which are portrayed as a 
significant factor in the Reserve Bank's setting of the Bank Rate. In the Post 
Keynesian thesis, these statements would appear to be primarily for public 
relations purposes: the Reserve Bank would prefer not to be seen as too 
strongly in control of interest rates, since this intensifies criticism when rates are 
uncomfortably high and could heighten public pressures on the Reserve Bank. 
When market interest rates soften in advance of a Bank Rate decrease, Post 
Keynesians would ascribe this to expectations by the market of a Bank Rate 
decrease (and equivalently for an increase), based partly on its perceptions of 
the factors which it expects the Reserve Bank to be considering in its interest-
setting policy. The danger exists that the Reserve Bank at least partly believes 
its own rhetoric, which would lead it to adopt less than full responsibility for the 
level of interest rates in the economy, with consequently less than maximally 
beneficial interest rate levels in pursuing the economic objectives of monetary 
policy. 
5.6 Exchange Rate Policy 
Most economic schools recognise an interrelationship between interest rate, 
exchange rate and money supply variables. Monetarists advocate the setting of 
money supply aggregates, through a growth rule, with interest rates and 
exchange rates allowed free reign according to market forces. With this line of 
reasoning, they advocate completely flexible exchange rates, on the grounds 
l 
that exchange rates will move to an equilibrium value in accordance with the 
relationship to the money supply. Post Keynesians likewise recognise the 
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interrelationship between the three variables (Moore, 1988a:271 ). Since they 
regard the interest rate as exogenously determined by the central bank, and the 
money supply as endogenous, their view of exchange rates as a policy variable 
needs careful examination. 
Some Post Keynesians, such as Davidson (1994:270), recommend a fixed 
exchange rate system, with periodic adjustments to reflect domestic economic 
circumstances relative to those of trading partners, based primarily on changes 
in efficiency wages. This is, however, in the context of an international 
payments system in which all participating countries adopt a fixed rate regime in 
mutual co-operation. Others, such as Moore (1988a:275), suggest a strongly 
managed float as a compromise between the volatility of completely free rates 
and the need to take changes in domestic economies into account (e.g. differing 
inflation pressures and interest rates). Moore suggests that a target exchange 
rate be set by the central bank in conjunction with the interest rate policy which 
it is pursuing. Moore, and most Post Keynesians, regard both interest rates and 
exchange rates as being potentially controllable by the monetary authorities, 
rather than exchange rates as being endogenously determined once interest 
rate levels have been set. Moore applies the term exogenous to exchange rates 
as well as to interest rates: "Nominal foreign exchange rates, like nominal 
interest rates, thus must be viewed as an additional exogenous central bank 
policy variable." (Moore, 1988a:273). The third variable, money supply, 
however, is regarded as inherently endogenous. This means that the nature of 
the policy target advocated for the exchange rate differs from that used for 
money supply aggregates. The exchange rate target is seen as an achievable 
policy variable, provided it is realistically set, whereas the money supply 
aggregate targets are seen as broad indications of the authorities' monetary 
policy stance which may at best be attained within wide bands of approximation. 
The relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate has market 
expectations of future movements of the exchange rate as a major component. 
These expectations may fluctuate
1
widely with changing market sentiment, and 
may be elastic and unpredictable. Indication by the monetary authorities of a 
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target or preferred exchange rate level is advocated as a means to manage 
market expectations and reduce volatility. 
The Reserve Bank does not currently stipulate any target exchange rate 
between the Rand and any other currency, and only comments with the utmost 
caution from time to time whether it considers the prevailing exchange rate to be 
at an appropriate level or not. The Post Keynesian monetary view therefore has 
significant implications for exchange rate policy as conducted by the South 
African Reserve Bank. Strydom (1986) points out that, whereas the monetary 
control framework adopted following the De Kock Commission Report is 
Keynesian or Post Keynesian, the approach in respect of exchange rate policy 
is monetarist in nature. There are hence two conflicting analytical frameworks 
used side by side in interrelated aspects of monetary policy. Strydom claims 
that this logical inconsistency casts doubt on the likely effectiveness of the 
approach advocated to exchange rate policy. The monetarist approach referred 
to is one of allowing the exchange rate of the Rand to find its own level through 
market forces, with intervention by the Reserve Bank being confined purely to 
iron out minor fluctuations. This approach would be consistent with a monetarist 
approach to control of monetary aggregates in which direct quantitative controls 
were applied (if this were possible in a modern economy). 
Although Strydom uses the inconsistency argument to defend the dual 
exchange rate system which had to be re-introduced in 1985 following the debt 
repayment crisis, similar arguments can be used in favour of a single exchange 
rate with an exchange rate policy framework that accords greater stability to the 
rate. Whereas a dual exchange rate system provides greater stability to the 
commercial exchange rate (for trade and current transactions) by insulating it 
from foreign capital movements, a more typical Post Keynesian approach would 
advocate maintaining stability for a unitary exchange rate through the Reserve 
Bank announcing specifically the exchange rate (or narrow range) which it 
considers appropriate to its inter,est rate and related monetary policy, and 
actively seeking to attain and sustain this exchange rate through its engagement 
in foreign exchange transactions. 
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The monetarist view of balance of payments adjustment through the price 
mechanism of rapid exchange rate adjustment implies, in theory, that a minimal 
level of foreign reserves is required since exchange rate adjustments are 
allowed to occur without significant policy intervention. The South African 
Reserve Bank has, however, been expressly concerned with the ~evel of foreign 
reserves. In the early 1990s, when net reserves equated approximately to the 
value of one month of imports, the level was considered to be dangerously low. 
In more recent times, with the level equivalent to approximately three months of 
imports, foreign reserves have been considered adequate. The concern for 
maintaining a significant level of foreign reserves, in spite of adopting a flexible 
exchange rate regime, seems tacitly to corroborate the Post Keynesian view of 
exchange rate behaviour under flexible rates. Davidson (1982:261) for instance 
holds that exchange rate expectations tend to be elastic under a flexible regime 
without the intervention of the monetary authorities. This means that a change 
in exchange rate generally leads to expectations of a further change in the same 
direction rather than a compensating change. The tendency towards elastic 
expectations requires significant foreign reserve levels to prevent small 
fluctuations from becoming large swings. Also, the presence of a significant 
level of foreign reserves together with the perception that the central bank will 
use these to stabilise the currency, has the effect of diminishing the elasticity of 
expectations (Davidson, 1982:262). In this respect the Reserve Bank seems to 
adopt a Post Keynesian view in practice, in spite of the exchange rate 
mechanism being monetarist in nature. 
The Reserve Bank has from time to time expressed its satisfaction with the rand 
exchange rate moving in line with its purchasing power parity value relative to 
the weighted combination of major trading partner currencies. This does not, 
however, appear to have been the expression of a deliberate intervention policy. 
The Reserve Bank states its exchange rate policy as. being no more than 
reducing fluctuations or 'leaning against the wind'. In addition, the trade 
J 
weighted effective exchange rate of the rand has not generally tracked inflation 
differentials, so that purchasing power parity has not been closely adhered to in 
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practice. For instance, the real effective rand exchange rate (trade weighted) 
decreased by 15 percent between 1992 and 1996. It would appear that the 
Reserve Bank does not actively pursue a purchasing power parity target, such 
as that suggested by McKinnon outlined in Chapter 4, even unobtrusively. 
The Reserve Bank does frequently, and expressly, adopt compromises to its 
preferred monetary policy in view of exchange rate and balance of payments 
considerations. This is at variance with the monetarist view under flexible 
exchange rates, which maintains that domestic monetary policy can be pursued 
independently of foreign flows occurring. The reasoning provided is that 
interest rates need to be held higher than would otherwise be desirable in order 
to attract foreign capital inflows to compensate for a current account deficit 
and/or bolster reserves. An income effect is also recognised whereby a higher 
domestic interest rate dampens economic activity, especially investment, 
leading to reduced expenditure on imports, assisting towards current account 
deficit reduction. A high domestic interest rate may be justifiable as an 
emergency measure in terr11S of the Post Keynesian analysis, since interest rate 
differentials may not be immediately neutralised through exchange rate 
changes. However, it is not a valid measure on a sustained basis in the Post 
Keynesian analysis, since long-term direct investment funding occurs on the 
basis of the marginal efficiency of capital which is more attractive the lower is 
the rate of interest. If the Reserve Bank were to deploy stronger management 
policies to stabilise the rand exchange rate, it would be likely to achieve greater 
discretion over the domestic interest rate level. 
In adopting such an approach, cognisance needs to be taken of the possibility 
of large-scale speculative forays by international funds. The size of such funds 
has become so large that a single fund could deplete the entire foreign reserve 
holdings of the South African Reserve Bank. This is a reason for avoiding a 
fully fixed exchange- rate regime, as well as avoiding too firm a commitment to a 
stated rate. If a fixed rate were adopted and defended by the Reserve Bank, 
J 
and international speculators considered the rand value to be unsustainably 
high, they would be in a position to sell rands for a strong currency to an extent 
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which would force the Reserve Bank to devalue the rand to avoid its reserves 
being depleted. The speculators would then be able to achieve financial gains 
by repurchasing rands at the lower exchange rate value. The managed 
exchange rate approach implies that the rand value would be driven down 
steadily by such speculative forces rather than as a step change. It would 
reduce the speculative gains achievable compared to a step depreciation in 
exchange rate value and thereby decrease the incentive to speculative activity. 
However, neither a managed float nor a completely flexible rate would eliminate 
speculative activity. Exchange rate management may best be regarded as lying 
partly in the ambit of game theory, in which interventions need to be strong 
enough to improve exchange rate stability at a rate at or close to that regarded 
as appropriate by the monetary authorities, but without so firm and explicit a 
commitment to a rate that speculators are attracted to take advantage of official 
support for the rate. With this proviso, the Post Keynesian view holds that a 
strongly managed rate is likely to result in lower speculative activity since it 
decreases the degree of exchange rate volatility on which speculative gains are 
made. 
5. 7 Open Market Operations 
Although writers such as Whittaker and Theunissen (1983) may be correct in 
their view that the predominant effect of open market transactions by the 
Reserve Bank is to ensure that the accommodation rate set at the discount 
window becomes effective in the market, the extent and diversity of transactions 
that the Reserve Bank is able to engage in may well enable it to influence the 
interest rate structure across longer term financial instruments and to exert 
some influence on the flow of credit in the banking system. This would be in 
accordance with Lavoie's assertion (1984) that it is the flow of credit, rather than 
monetary stock aggregates, that needs to be emphasised. It would also be in 
accordance with the Radcliffe Committee (1959) view that monetary authorities 
need to concern themselves with ,the entire spectrum of credit provision (from 
call lending to long-term advances), and with the advocacy by Rousseas (1986) 
of direct influence by monetary authorities on credit provision as part of a Post 
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Keynesian approach to monetary policy. Although Rousseas recommends 
direct credit controls on certain categories of lending, he concedes the direct 
effect which open market operations can have on credit provision at different 
portions of the term structure, primarily through interest rate changes. 
The De Kock Commission (1985:A 17) accorded open market, operations an 
important role as an instrument of monetary policy. Although it recognised the 
primacy of the effect on cash reserve levels in ensuring that the Reserve Bank's 
refinancing rate at the discount window prevails in the banking system, it is clear 
that the Commission regarded other aspects of open market operations to be 
important. This is apparent in its recommendation that the Reserve Bank 
conduct open market operations in the full range of maturities of financial 
instruments. Sale of short maturity instruments, for instance, would be sufficient 
to ensure a desired level of market shortage. Transactions across the maturity 
spectrum are clearly intended to influence credit markets directly. Part of this 
motivation lies in the technical objectives of smoothing out seasonal and other 
short-term fluctuations in market conditions, and of promoting development and 
expansion in use of financial instruments to the benefit of the South African 
monetary system. But it does also appear that the De Kock Commission 
envisaged influence on monetary aggregates, and interest rates, across the 
money market maturity spectrum, albeit purely through market-related 
transactions. It appears that the Commission envisaged direct quantitative 
effects on components of money supply aggregates, not only price effects 
through interest rates. Open market operations would therefore, in its view, 
serve as a policy instrument to influence monetary aggregates towards stated 
target or guideline levels. 
The Post Keynesian view would be extremely sceptical of any significant 
quantity effects being achievable by open market operations. This arises 
primarily from the endogenous view of money, in which the banking system is 
able to generate credit instruments in accordance with demand over the full 
J 
range of the maturity spectrum. Any quantitative shortage generated by the 
Reserve Bank would be rapidly met by additional credit instruments of the 
145 
appropriate maturity provided by the banks, ultimately sustained by borrowing at 
the discount window. In this view, quantitative effects are likely to_ be transitory 
only. On the other hand, pricing effects could be more enduring through the 
Reserve Bank serving as market-maker for particular classes of securities at a 
stipulated interest rate, provided that the interest rate does not depart 
significantly from the spectrum of rates implied by the Reserve Bank refinancing 
rate. The scope for open market operations in the Post Keynesian view is 
therefore limited to the technical functions for stability, market development and 
fine-tuning of the interest rate spectrum rather than having a major quantitative 
or interest-setting role. The non-technical or policy role is mainly one of 
supporting the short-term interest rate (Bank Rate) set by the central bank, and 
the spectrum of rates flowing from this. 
5.8 Public Debt Management 
Government borrowing to meet budgetary requirements and the ongoing 
management of the public debt can have major monetary effects in addition to 
their fiscal consequences. Issue of government debt instruments to private 
sector parties has the effect of drawing money from the financial system, and 
expenditure or repayment increases money holdings. Effects are made more 
complex by Treasury Bills issued being eligible reserve assets for 
discounting/collateral purposes at the Reserve Bank's discount window, as well 
as government borrowing and repayment activities taking place across the 
maturity spectrum of debt instruments. It was in recognition of these monetary 
policy effects that, in accordance with the De Kock Commission's 
recommendation, the Reserve Bank was increasingly used as the agent on 
behalf of the Treasury to conduct public debt transactions. This provides the 
Reserve Bank with the means to be able to co-ordinate public debt management 
activities with other monetary policy measures, though public borrowing levels 
and structures remain under the ultimate control of the central government 
Treasury. The Reserve Bank ha~ actively used the public debt management 
transactions under its control as an instrument of monetary policy since the mid-
1980s. 
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The Post Keynesian view of government playing a role in stabilising, and 
stimulating where appropriate, investment activity in the economy implies 
recognition of public debt management as a policy instrument for both fiscal and 
monetary purposes. A typical Post Keynesian policy stance in this respect is 
that of Moore (1988a:386), in which he considers capital expenditure by 
government to be always appropriately funded by borrowing, with the proviso 
that the estimated social rate of return exceeds the borrowing cost. Current 
expenditure, on the other hand, should always be fully covered by current 
revenues obtained. One implication of this approach is that a universal norm for 
the public deficit as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, of say 3%, is 
somewhat simplistic. Deficit funding could be taken higher in the event of public 
investment being higher, and would need to be further constrained with low 
public investment. Moore regards monetary policy measures as the appropriate 
avenue for aggregate demand management, so that deficit financing for 
government investment expenditure would need to be held fairly stable over 
time. 
Although not overly concerned with the exact level of monetary aggregates, the 
Post Keynesian view would strongly support the co-ordination of public debt 
management activities in view of their effects on interest rates, both through 
influencing the money market shortage and the term structure of interest rates, 
as well as direct effects on credit extension in different maturity/risk portions of 
the money and capital markets. Although the Post Keynesian view does not 
regard full crowding out of private sector investment to be a danger in a 
situation of fiscal moderation (in accordance with the above guidelines), it 
recognises the consequences which public debt management may have, 
primarily through interest rate effects on purchase and sale of government 
securities in the market. 
Issues concerning the government deficit, total debt and interest commitments 
]' 
may also have an effect on money markets and the economy in general through 
fears of what could occur in the extreme. Under a policy of fiscal moderation, 
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deficit financing to fund government capital expenditure, with co-ordination of 
monetary policy-related instruments, is unlikely to cause inflationary concerns 
and expectations. However, Post Keynesians would concur with the possible 
danger of government borrowing becoming excessive, generating fears that 
borrowing requirements will not be able to.be met through the financial markets, 
leading to borrowing from the Reserve Bank, which becomes fully monetised 
debt. This could conceivably result in a demand-led inflationary spiral with the 
central bank losing control of monetary policy instruments. The Treasury, 
supported by the Reserve Bank, does therefore need to exercise caution insofar 
as market perceptions, as well as actual occurrences, are concerned. 
The needs of the Treasury for funding from financial markets, and the Reserve 
Bank's monetary policy considerations, will not in general coincide. The 
Treasury will seek to arrange its debt portfolio in such a manner as to provide 
funding, and require repayments, in accordance with the expected duration and 
flows of its use of funds. The financial market transactions necessary for these 
portfolio requirements may bear little or no relation to transactions required for 
monetary policy purposes, and yet have monetary policy consequences. 
Although the treasury makes use of the Reserve Bank to conduct transactions 
on its behalf, this is by no means a streamlined process (Meijer, 1995:388). The 
Bank currently manages four separate funds on behalf of the Treasury, with 
differing objectives. Borrowing in excess of requirements through issue of 
Treasury Bills for monetary policy purposes, and similar transactions not directly 
related to the Treasury's requirements, require the permission of the Treasury. 
The Reserve Bank may in most cases be able to arrange a combination of 
transactions on behalf of the Treasury, and of its own open market operations, 
to conduct monetary policy as it considers appropriate. This situation, however, 
underlines the fact that the monetary policy measures of the Reserve Bank 
cannot be regarded as fully independent from central government in practice. 
Some Post Keynesians have questioned the necessity of having complete 
J 
separation between a (legally distinct) central bank and the treasury function of 
government (e.g. Rousseas, 1986:112). The alternative is put forward of central 
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banking and treasury arms falling within a single ministry. Most, however, 
appear to accept a separate central bank as preferable, but with the 
interdependence of certain spheres of operation being fully recognised, and 
mechanisms being established to ensure a high degree of co-ordination for 
monetary policy purposes. The dual nature of treasury debt and its 
management, as a financing portfolio and as an instrument of monetary policy, 
is a prime example of this interdependence. The implication in the case of 
South Africa is therefore the adoption of structures and co-ordination 
mechanisms to prevent any unintended consequence of public debt 
management on monetary policy, and to enable the use of public debt 
management transactions to support prevailing monetary policy as far as is 
possible. 
5.9 Anti-Inflation Policy 
Current Reserve Bank objectives place great emphasis on protecting the value 
of the domestic currency, and this is reflected in the policy statements and 
media communication of the Bank. The implication of the Post Keynesian view 
that the primary causative arena for price inflation lies in the wage-negotiation 
process, is a much reduced emphasis on this objective by the Reserve Bank. 
Combined with this is the assumption of responsibility by executive government 
departments, in particular Department of Finance and Department of Trade and 
Industry, for inflation combating measures. They would need to adopt measures 
such as incomes policies, for example the Tax-based Incomes Policy referred to 
in Chapter 4, and promotion of business competition to accord with a Post 
Keynesian view of inflation. They would need to promote a wage-bargaining 
framework in the economy in which the relationship between nominal wage 
increases, productivity improvement and inflation are recognised. Certain 
measures of these kinds have been adopted in recent times in South Africa (and 
at times historically): the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy 
introduced by Government in 1996 (South Africa, 1996) contains an incomes 
l 
policy by consensus through a national social agreement, legislation exists and 
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is actively used to promote competition, and an increasing number of wage 
agreements contain a productivity-related element. 
This does not imply that the Reserve Bank has no role in combating inflation. 
Stability in the monetary system is an important supporting factor in curbing 
inflation. The Reserve Bank also needs to ensure that e)$:cessive credit 
creation, particularly through monetisation of government debt, does not lead to 
a demand-driven component of inflation. A further important Reserve Bank 
support role in curbing inflation lies in maintaining a stable rand exchange rate, 
in line with inflation rate and interest rate differentials relative to trading 
partners, to reduce to a minimum the price increase effects of falls in the 
exchange rate. This needs to be combined with foreign reserve management 
which avoids the ratchet effect of balance of payments surpluses contributing to 
domestic monetary expansion, which is not reversed during a subsequent 
balance of payments deficit. 
The Post Keynesian view recognises that restrictive monetary policy can have 
the effect of curbing inflation (e.g. Moore, 1988a:389). The problem in the Post 
Keynesian perception is that this occurs through unnecessary restriction of 
aggregate output, with the consequences of reduced employment, wages, 
profits and investment. Economic activity and growth is being constrained to 
below its potential through placing the full burden of inflation reduction on 
monetary policy. In a Post Keynesian view, this loss of potential output, 
employment and growth can be avoided by placing inflation control primarily in 
the ambit of the wage negotiation process and the departments of government 
concerned with this process. 
5.1 O The Role and Independence of the Reserve Bank 
The Post Keynesian theory of money implies a reversal of the trend over the last 
decade in which the Reserve Bank's objectives have become more narrowly 
J' 
defined, being focussed almost exclusively on the protection of the domestic 
and external value of the Rand. This trend has been in line with the 
150 
international trends in industrialised countries, in which low inflation (a stable 
value of the domestic currency) has been increasingly regarded as the primary 
ultimate objective of a central bank and concentration on additional ultimate 
objectives as likely to detract from the central bank's ability to meet this primary 
objective. The trend has been closely related to the emphasis on independence 
of the central bank, with the reasoning that monetary control measures in the 
short term may have negative consequences for participants in the economy, 
which may be politically unpopular, so that any possibility of influence by other 
economic stakeholders over the central bank in administering remedies needs 
to be avoided. 
The view that the central bank should focus almost exclusively on currency 
value stability (low inflation}, with independence from executive government or 
other concerns, appears to be strongly influenced by monetarist thinking. It is 
, based on the premise (in conjunction with the natural rate of unemployment 
hypothesis) that the primary cause of inflation is excessive growth in monetary 
aggregates, and that the central bank is in a position to control these 
aggregates and needs to devote its full attention to doing so. The emphasis on 
independence appears likewise to refer generally to the ability of the central 
bank to pursue policies which control or limit growth of monetary aggregates 
without needing to take other or broader economic issues into account. 
Prior to this trend, the Reserve Bank (as with most central banks) had a broader 
set of ultimate policy objectives, covering (Meijer, 1995: 364): 
a) Relative stability of the general price level 
b) A high and stable level of employment and resource utilisation 
c) A satisfactorily high real growth rate of the domestic economy 
d) A satisfactory balance of payments, foreign reserves and exchange rate 
position. 
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The Reserve Bank was thus a close partner to executive government in 
pursuing economic policies, albeit operationally independent in carrying out the 
monetary actions and measures within its ambit. 
As pointed out in the previous section, the Post Keynesian' view certainly 
removes the emphasis on domestic currency stability (low inflation) as an 
ultimate objective of the Reserve Bank, since anti-inflation measures are 
regarded as primarily outside this sphere of monetary policy controlled by the 
Reserve Bank. Control of interest rates by the Reserve Bank, however, implies 
a much greater emphasis on the employment level and economic growth rate as 
ultimate objectives. Since short-term interest rates are regarded as the major 
determinant of expected long rates, and expected long rates are an important 
factor in new investment decisions in the Post Keynesian view, the Reserve 
Bank's control of short-term interest rates becomes central in determining levels 
of economic output through monetary equilibrium an:I the point of effective 
demand. 
Carvalho (1996) maintains that calls for the independence of central banks rest 
on two fundamental theoretical propositions: (1) The natural rate hypothesis 
together with the neutrality of money, implying that the economy is always at, or 
close to, its full employment level and that monetary policy has no durable effect 
on real variables and (2) that central banks have a natural, intrinsic goal which 
is one of price stability. The first proposition gives rise to the view that central 
banks have no role in broader economic policy issues and that any attempts to 
draw central banks into such a role have negative economic consequences. 
The second proposition is based on Carvalho's observation that, in calls for 
central bank independence, there is invariably the tacit assumption that the 
central bank, completely unfettered, will devote its full attention to the goal of 
price stability, rather than seeking to maximise its influence, pecuniary gains, or 
any number of other conceivable objectives. He poses the question from whom 
or what the independence is being advocated, and concludes, using evidence of 
how the degree of independence is measured in the various studies which have 
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been conducted, that it is generally from executive government. He questions to 
whom or what a completely independent central bank would be accountable. 
These debates highlight the differing meanings of the term independence. A 
distinction is frequently made between goal independence and operational 
independence. As Carvalho points out, calls for independence generally 
assume the central bank will pursue the single goal of price stability. But what 
of the possibility of a central bank with goal independence pursuing a 
combination of economic growth, distribution and employment goals in addition 
to price stability (let alone the more perverse objectives mentioned above)? 
Apart from these goals being so central to the fabric of society that they are 
generally the concern of government as a whole, there are invariably political 
balances which need to be found between alternative approaches. If the central 
bank pursues one or more of these goals independently of the policy framework 
of government as a whole, conflicting measures and economic inefficiencies are 
bound to result. 
On the other hand, the activities of central banks are specialised in nature, with 
economic consequences which may not always be apparent to a non-specialist. 
It is therefore important that a central bank be free of pressures to take actions 
which will benefit partisan groups or provide short-term benefits with eventual 
negative consequences. This could apply for instance to unjustifiably low 
interest rate levels or measures to extend credit provision to politically favoured 
groups. It is therefore preferable for a central bank to have operational 
independence in the sense of being able to engage in the actions of monetary 
policy, and its technical activities, without direct intervention by government or 
other parties. 
Since the Post Keynesian view of money holds that monetary policy actions 
affect directly broader economic variables of growth, investment, employment 
-
and even income distribution, it fqllows inevitably that the central bank cannot 
be accorded goal independence. The central nature and multiple influences on 
these variables necessitate that the central bank pursue its monetary policy 
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within a policy framework, and in pursuit of overall economic goals, as 
formulated by Government as a whole. At the same time, this does not prevent 
operational independence of the central bank, to engage in its specialised 
activities as efficiently as possible. Although some Post Keynesians have 
suggested a central banking arm within a government ministry, this is not a 
necessary component of a Post Keynesian view provided that the interrelated 
nature of monetary policy with broader economic policy is recognised and 
mechanisms to achieve policy co-ordination are effectively instituted and 
maintained. 
This reasoning, then, applied to South Africa implies continuation of the 
Reserve Bank in its present institutional form, which ensures its operational 
independence, but with recognition that the Reserve Bank is inevitably bound 
into broader economic policy issues which form part of an overall framework of 
economic policy set by government. It implies a return to the four broader 
overall goals as previously formulated, with the emphasis between them and the 
broad direction of monetary policy pursued being in accordance with the 
economic policy framework of government. It implies close and ongoing 
communication and co-ordination with central government, in particular the 
Department of Finance and its Treasury, but also other economic policy related 
departments such as that of Trade and Industry. 
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5.11 Concluding Remarks 
The Post Keynesian theory of money thus accords a far more wide-ranging 
contribution of monetary policy to real economic effects than does a monetarist 
or neoclassical approach. The theory of Monetary Analysis places monetary 
variables at the core of the nexus determining real economic 'outcomes in a 
modern entrepreneur economy, with interest rates being a crucial policy 
variable. It implies less emphasis by the Reserve Bank on monetary aggregates 
and on combating inflation, but at the same time implies the recognition that the 
Reserve Bank has a major impact on the real economy through its monetary 
policy actions. 
The monetary control system used by the Reserve Bank is found to be 
essentially Post Keynesian in nature, with the interest rate at the discount 
window serving as the main instrument of monetary control, supplemented by 
primarily interest :-ate effects across the spectrum of the money and capital 
markets through open market operations as well as through carrying out public 
debt management transactions on behalf of the Treasury. The exchange rate 
regime, on the other hand, is found to be more in line with monetarist thinking, 
though able to be changed fairly readily through stronger management of a 
floating exchange rate. The explicit statement, and pursuit, of target exchange 
rate levels in line with economic circumstances and interest rate policy could be 
introduced to move closer to a Post Keynesian approach. The emphasis on 
curbing inflation, and apparent tacit assumption that this is the primary goal of 
the Reserve Bank, follows from a monetarist orientation which has become 
prevalent over the last two decades in industrialised economies, though not 
usually taken to its logical conclusion in imposing money supply growth rules. 
Post Keynesian monetary theory finds this emphasis to be misplaced, with 
primary responsibility for combating inflation better placed elsewhere. Calls for 
central bank independence are found to stem in the main from monetarist 
presumptions. The Post Keynesian monetary view has no quarrel with 
operational independence of the Reserve Bank, or with its having a separate 
institutional structure from government, but regards its impact on real economic 
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magnitudes to be so significant, that co-ordination of its monetary policies with 
other government economic policy actions towards common overall goals 
becomes vital for maximal effectiveness of economic policy in South Africa. 
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5.12 Postscript: New Repo Rate Arrangement 
With effect from 9 March 1998, the Reserve Bank replaced the Bank Rate and 
second tier asset rate (1 % above Bank Rate) applicable to discount window 
borrowing, with a repurchase agreement rate (repo rat~) and marginal lending 
rate. The repo rate is determined by daily tenders for discount window funds 
submitted by banks. The rate (after being fixed for the first 7 days of operation) 
is therefore able to vary on a daily basis. The marginal lending rate is, however, 
set by the Reserve Bank. It was initially set at 16%, one percentage point 
above the initial repo rate. In introducing the new arrangement, the Reserve 
Bank has maintained that it would enable greater flexibility and more rapid 
response to money market conditions, and that the repo rate would be a 
reflection of market conditions. 
The question arises whether the new arrangement constitutes a fundamental 
departure from the old. It was argued in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 that the cash 
reserve system of the classical type adopted following the De Kock Commission 
report was based on an interest rate control mechanism in line with Post 
Keynesian thinking, rather than on a monetary aggregate control mechanism. 
Some of the language used in introducing the new arrangement may give the 
impression of quantitative controls. For instance, the Reserve Bank determines 
the quantity (volume) of reserves to be offered at the daily repo tender. The 
Reserve Bank emphasises that the repo rate is determined by the tender with 
market participants free to bid at the interest rate they consider appropriate. 
However, it is apparent that the Reserve Bank is able to manipulate the repo 
rate in accordance with its policy views by determining the quantity of reserves 
made available for tender. This strong influence has already been brought to 
bear when the Reserve Bank wished to prevent too raid a fall in the repo rate. 
In addition to this, the marginal lending rate, which is the rate at which the 
banking system is able to obtain borrowed reserves beyond those available 
through the repo tender system, \s set entirely and explicitly by the Reserve 
Bank. The combination, therefore, in the new arrangement does not constitute 
a fundamental departure from the previous Bank Rate system in that the 
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Reserve Bank is still able to determine the interest rates applicable to borrowing 
from the discount window. It still makes use of a money market shortage to 
ensure significant borrowing through the discount window, making the weighted 
average of repo rate and marginal lending rate effective as a marginal 
wholesale rate in the banking system. The repo rate may vary from day to day, 
and will serve as a means of providing immediate market signaJs between the 
Reserve Bank and the money market, but any significant move in the interest 
rate combination for borrowed reserves will still be determined by the Reserve 
Bank. The analyses and arguments of Chapter 5 therefore do not change in 
substance with the new arrangement introduced, even though the nomenclature 
of the interest rates, their flexibility and the specific operation of discount 
window borrowing differ from those of the previous arrangement. 
158 
CONCLUSION 
Post Keynesian monetary theory provides a view of money and its economic 
effects fundamentally different from that of monetarism and neoclassical 
economics. Whereas monetarists and neoclassicals view money as being 
neutral in its real effects in the long run, Post Keynesians regard money as 
inextricably linked to real economic variables in both the short and long run. 
Whereas monetarists regard the money supply as exogenous and best 
controlled by the monetary authorities under a growth rule, Post Keynesians 
regard it as being endogenous in the fundamental sense of being outside the 
control of the monetary authorities, even if they seek to control it. Whereas 
monetarists see interest rates as a price best left to market forces once 
monetary aggregates are set, Post Keynesians view interest rates as a crucial 
economic variable which can be, and ought to be, determined by the monetary 
authorities to the best advantage of the economy. Whereas monetarists regard 
the primary cause of inflation to be the excess level of growth of the money 
supply, Post Keynesians regard the causal mechanism as lying primarily in the 
wage negotiation process. Whereas monetarists favour fully flexible exchange 
rates on the grounds that balance of payments adjustments will occur readily as 
a result of the price effects of relative exchange rates, Post Keynesians favour 
strongly managed exchange rates on the grounds that exchange rates are 
inherently unstable and subject to large speculative shifts unrelated to 
underlying economic magnitudes. Whereas monetarists and neoclassicals 
regard full employment as the normal state of an economy, with deviations being 
short-lived and automatically corrected, Post Keynesians regard unemployment 
equilibrium as a sustained state in most economies, which can only be corrected 
over a period of time through appropriate economic policies on the part of 
government. 
Post Keynesian monetary theory is thus diametrically opposed to that of 
monetarism and neoclassical economics on virtually every major issue. 
Although not as dramatic, the differences in Post Keynesian monetary thinking 
from that of mainstream Keynesianism are also material. Post Keynesians 
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regard mainstream Keynesians as having misinterpreted some of the most 
important insights introduced by Keynes, and as having accommodated much of 
neoclassical thinking and its assumptions. Mainstream Keynesians typically 
regard fiscal policy as the primary avenue for economic management; Post 
Keynesians regard monetary policy to be of fundamental importance, although 
according fiscal policy a parallel role. Mainstream Key11esians regard 
stabilisation policies as addressing short-run deviations from full employment, 
as diminishing the recessionary phase of business cycles; for Post Keynesians, 
government policies in both the fiscal and monetary sphere are ongoing 
requirements to improve economic performance in the short and long run. 
Mainstream Keynesians base much of their macroeconomic analysis on the 
IS/LM framework which entails an exogenous money supply with interest rate 
determination through interaction of monetary and real sector schedules. Post 
Keynesians regard the interest rate (short-term) as being exogenously 
determined and the IS/LM framework as unable to portray correctly the 
operation of nv:metary variables in moving toward equilibrium. Post Keynesians 
view mainstream Keynesians as having an inadequate theory of inflation with 
the breakdown of Phillips curve-type relationships from the 1970s. The Post 
Keynesian view of adjustment processes in an open economy likewise differs 
significantly from that of the Keynesian mainstream. 
In addressing open economy issues, Post Keynesian analysis makes use of an 
extension of the liquidity preference or financial asset portfolio concept. 
Contrary to the monetary approach to the balance of payments, this leads to a 
view of international flows in which adjustments do not occur smoothly and 
rapidly under either flexible or fixed exchange rates. Instead, currency and 
financial asset holdings of residents and foreigners depend on expectations of 
returns arising both from exchange rate movements and from relative interest 
rates. Expectations are influenced by a variety of factors affecting the 
perceptions of economic actors, and are not necessarily stable. Price 
movements in the form of exchange rate changes are themselves a factor in 
determining expectations of further movements and may be self-propelling. The 
Post Keynesian analysis shows exchange rate flexibility according to market 
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perceptions to be a potential source of increased instability compared to 
strongly managed or quasi-fixed rates. Analysis of likely currency movements 
over the course of a business cycle indicates that international flows will tend to 
accentuate the cycle, with this effect being more pronounced in the case of 
flexible rates. The availability of foreign funds, to be converted into domestic 
currency or exchanged for domestic currency at the instance of economic 
agents, provides an additional source of monetary effects on the domestic 
economy which need to be addressed by domestic monetary policy. These 
influences apply even more strongly in the case of small open economies, which 
are price-takers in the international arena and for which imports (with a 
predominance of capital goods) are price inelastic. The level of monetary 
aggregates may be substantially influenced by foreign flows, and rendered even 
less subject to influence by the domestic monetary authorities. 
Monetary policy and its appropriate use are therefore crucial in a Post 
Keynesian monetary framework. Neither domestic nor international monetary 
variables are viewed as automatically adjusting to the maximum benefit of the 
economy, and both are potential sources of economic instability. This calls for 
careful measures both for maintaining stability of the domestic financial system 
and for moving towards economic growth and employment objectives. The 
focus of monetary policy thereby falls on interest rates, together with exchange 
rates. Monetary aggregates are not regarded as a significant policy variable in 
view of the money supply being mainly or entirely endogenously determined, 
and money supply guidelines or targets serve little more than an information role 
in conveying to the business sector the policy stance of the monetary 
authorities. 
The Post Keynesian view holds that the central bank exercises direct control 
over nominal short-term interest rates, and that long-term rates result fairly 
directly from these across the yield curve through expectations of the likely 
future path of short rates. It is long-term rates which influence investment 
J' 
activity through monetary equilibrium relating these to marginal efficiencies of 
new capital assets. This is the monetary mechanism which underlies the 
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principle of effective demand, through which the economy may remain 
substantially below full employment if the most beneficent interest.rate policy is 
not pursued. Short-term interest rate determination is thus crucial to the 
progress of the real economy, rather than being merely an instrument for 
ensuring efficiency and stability in money and financial asset markets. Any 
policy of allowing short-term interest rates to run freely according to market 
forces, especially when a restrictive policy is being pursued towards monetary 
aggregates, is likely to be economically damaging in the Post Keynesian view. 
Similarly, a policy of maintaining high real interest rates over a sustained period, 
perhaps with the argument that this is necessary to combat inflation, is 
unnecessarily damaging to economic activity and expansion in the Post 
Keynesian view. 
The issues of international flows and exchange rates of course add 
complications to the exercise of monetary policy through short-term interest 
rates. The monetary authorities cannot exercise interest rate policies without 
taking full cognisance of the effects of foreign funding flows. Interest rate 
differentials between the domestic economy and trading or investment partners 
are a factor influencing foreign flows. However, although relatively high short-
term rates generally attract foreign short-term funds into financial assets, it is 
lower relative long-term rates which render direct investment more attractive 
through their relationship to marginal efficiencies of capital. Maintaining 
relatively high interest rates for balance of payments and exchange rate 
purposes needs therefore to be seen as an immediate, limited duration measure 
rather than as a measure to be applied on a sustained basis. 
Since the Post Keynesian view favours managed exchange rates to reduce the 
instability arising from flexible rates, but recognises the effect of interest rates 
on foreign funding flows and exchange rates, monetary policy needs to be 
formulated and conducted jointly on the interrelated variables of interest rates 
and exchange rates. The preferre9 levels of the two may not both be attainable, 
especially when immediate economic problems occur. A lower interest rate may 
be desirable for domestic economic expansion, but foreign reserve levels may 
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be precarious and require a relatively high interest rate to attract foreign funding 
inflows to meet a current account deficit. The inflow may be necessary in order 
to maintain the exchange rate within a target range, without foreign reserves 
being rapidly depleted in the process. Monetary policy therefore needs to 
address a combination of interest rate and exchange rate levels which may well 
require a compromise between the two. The Post Keynesian analysis implies 
carefully formulated interest and exchange rate policies according to prevailing 
economic circumstances. There are no simple or universal rules. 
In the Post Keynesian framework, monetary policy cannot be divorced from the 
public debt management activities of executive government. The monetary 
effects of public debt management are material, and are influenced by executive 
government requirements, even if the central bank conducts certain public debt 
management functions as an agent to the Treasury. With Post Keynesians 
advocating (as suggested by Keynes) the active participation of government in 
stabilising and extending investment expenditure, issues surrounding public 
debt management are crucial. Post Keynesians do not regard public investment 
as simply crowding out private sector investment, and the nature as well as level 
of public investment have significant effects on the economy. In the sphere of 
inflation, the Post Keynesian causal mechanism places policy action primarily in 
the hands of executive government, with the central bank having a supporting 
role. In the Post Keynesian approach, therefore, there cannot be a complete 
separation of roles and responsibilities between executive government and the 
central bank for conducting monetary policy. 
The strident calls for central bank independence over the past decade appear to 
arise from a monetarist view of money and monetary policy. The purpose of the 
independence sought is generally to ensure that the central bank focuses its full 
attention on maintaining a stable currency (low inflation) through controlling 
monetary aggregates, even though this may cause economic hardship and be 
politically unpopular. The Post Keynesian view of money, although not opposed 
to operational independence of central banks, has the implication that central 
banks need to pursue national economic objectives established by, or in 
163 
conjunction with, executive government. This means that central banks cannot 
be goal independent, although they may be operationally independent, if 
monetary policy is to be conducted in a co-ordinated manner to the maximum 
benefit of the economy. The Post Keynesian view is a recognition of the 
breadth of monetary policy and the pervasiveness of its effects on the real 
economy. It holds that monetary policy cannot be confined to the relatively 
narrow tasks of maintaining a stable internal and external value of the currency 
without neglecting the wider aspects of monetary policy and their positive and 
negative consequences for the economy. 
An examination of the South African monetary system shows the monetary 
control mechanism to be in accordance with a Post Keynesian view in that 
commercial banks hold borrowed reserves through the discount window on an 
ongoing basis, with Bank Rate {plus a penalty in certain circumstances) serving 
as the dominant short-term rate in the financial system. On the other hand, the 
Reserve Bank's expressed preference for a flexible exchange rate, with its 
management serving only to dampen short-lived fluctuations, is more in line with 
monetarist and neoclassical thinking. The Reserve Bank still publishes 
monetary aggregate growth guidelines, and monitors actual growth against 
these, indicating some degree of commitment to monetary aggregates as a 
policy variable (though it is presently considering discontinuing this practice). 
The Reserve Bank has narrowed its overall goal over the past decade to focus 
on internal and external stability of the currency. It thus holds a mixture of 
monetarist and Post Keynesian elements in its instruments and approaches. It 
has clearly been strongly influenced by monetarist thinking over the past two 
decades, as has been the case with most central banks. 
The Post Keynesian view of money would imply re-adopting a broader set of 
overall goals, much as were in place prior to the monetarist influence of the 
1980s. It implies using the interest rate as a major policy variable, in seeking to 
attain economic growth and employment objectives as well as monetary stability. 
It implies adopting a stronger management approach to the exchange rate, 
probably with stated targets derived from purchasing power and interest 
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differential calculations in relation to trading partners. It implies recognition that 
anti-inflation measures need to be pursued outside the ambit of_ the Reserve 
Bank, with the Reserve Bank supporting these rather than being held 
responsible for the occurrence of inflation. It implies recognising the important 
role of public debt management in monetary policy, and closer co-operation 
between Reserve Bank and Treasury to ensure this occurs in accordance with 
monetary policy objectives. The discontinuation of monetary aggregate 
guidelines would be of little concern to a Post Keynesian view, which would 
favour the publication and monitoring of credit extension figures (for instance, 
Domestic Credit Extension) as more relevant information concerning credit 
creation than monetary aggregates. The Post Keynesian view places even 
greater emphasis than a monetarist or neoclassical perspective on the role of 
the Reserve Bank in maintaining stability of the financial system, since it 
regards economic variables as precarious, as not necessarily moving or 
-returning to stable equilibrium values. The Reserve Bank would need to avoid 
approac';es which are likely to generate erratic fluctuations in key monetary 
variables (especially interest rates and exchange rate). 
The Post Keynesian monetary theory is thus one in which monetary variables 
play a central and pervasive role in the economy, in the long as well as short 
run, influencing real as well as nominal magnitudes. Its lineage can be traced to 
the Banking School of the nineteenth century, to the monetary insights of 
Keynes and his disciples, and to the Monetary Analysis tradition which gradually 
coalesced thereafter. It is a theory which recognises the importance of 
uncertainty, time and expectations in economics, is at the forefront of theoretical 
debate, yet addresses real-world issues, including stylised facts, institutional 
effects and alternative policies. The implications of its theoretical models and 
structures can be unravelled through to the various facets of a monetary 
economy. It provides a framework against which comparisons of actual 
economic systems and policies can be drawn. This dissertation has made the 
journey from the theoretical origif,IS of the Post Keynesian view, through its 
models and analyses, to policy prescriptions and approaches, and has shown 
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the broad implications for monetary policy if the Post Keynesian monetary 
framework were adopted in the case of South Africa. 
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